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Abstract 
 
This thesis argues that Václav Havel presents a cohesive political philosophy which I 
term liberal agonism. In the thesis I explore the main influences on Havel‘s political 
philosophy. I describe what Havel means by his famous maxim ‗live in truth,‘ claiming 
that what Havel means is that to live in truth, one must continually engage in a process 
of self-agonism in order to be existentially honest with oneself. Further to this, I claim 
that in Havel‘s writings there is the idea that in order for self-agonism to be fully utilised, 
the state must take an active interest in encouraging self-agonism through a liberal 
philosophy. 
The thesis explores Havel‘s intellectual debt to Martin Heidegger and argues that 
Havel has a very different philosophy to Heidegger, particularly in respect to the purpose 
and value of art. Havel sees art as a means for political change and Heidegger sees art 
as a way to reveal Being. The main influence on Havel is Jan Patočka, and the thesis 
explores at length the intellectual debt that Havel owes Patočka. Where some scholars 
see Havel as a repeater of Patočka‘s ideas, a better view is that Havel has his own 
unique engagement with Patočka. From Patočka, Havel acquires an engagement with 
the Czech phenomenological tradition. His phenomenological outlook informs his political 
philosophy. Havel also employs the language of existentialism, and hence I compare 
Havel‘s views on authenticity with those of John Paul Sartre, claiming that living in truth 
is best understood as an existential concept.  
I am aware of the breadth of meanings to the term existential and am here using the 
word to describe a kind of thinking that begins with the human subject. Havel begins his 
analysis of the human with the existence of man as a given starting point. He is 
interested in the question ‗what does it mean to be?‘ Existentialists approach such a 
question by exploring the ways that being manifests in the world. That is by looking at the 
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modes of existence one can explore the meaning of that mode. Existentialism is not a 
philosophy that is looking for the thing in itself; rather, existentialists view the human 
subject as a being thrown into a practically meaningless universe and attempt to supply 
meaning to the subject through reading the actions of a subject as acting in freedom. 
That is the freedom of the subject to act, in a meaningless universe, gives the subject‘s 
actions meaning as they are chosen actions. A failure to account for one‘s actions to 
oneself is to act in an inauthentic way. 
Throughout his career Havel demonstrated a mistrust of the way that language can be 
ideologically manipulated to coerce behaviour. This thesis demonstrates the importance 
of this idea by exploring Havel‘s views about political discourse developed through his 
plays and selected writings on the issue. After scaffolding Havel‘s philosophy through the 
examination of his main concerns and major influences, this thesis spells out Havel‘s 
own unique political philosophy. I argue that a liberal agonism is a political philosophy in 
which the state allows, celebrates and encourages a process of self-interrogation through 
which existential identities are expressed and acted upon. 
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Introduction 
Václav Havel died on the eighteenth of December 2011. A matter of hours earlier the 
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il had also passed away. I was working on this thesis 
when I heard about the deaths, hence a comparison between the two men was 
inevitable; and it wasn‘t long before I saw news articles comparing both men‘s role in the 
twentieth and early twenty-first century.  
I had been re-reading Havel‘s essay Article 203 which explores a particular law in late 
socialist Czechoslovakia which prosecutes people who are regarded under the vague 
term ‗parasites.‘1 A parasite is someone who deviates from the socially accepted norm 
and the socially accepted is the state sponsored notion of the norm. A person who 
doesn‘t work at their assigned job is a parasite, a person who works illegally for some 
extra money is a parasite, and people who refuse to work in one industry because they 
have skills in another are also considered parasites. Havel argues that the reason this 
law exists is that the state saw the role of each person in the nation as a cog in a 
machine; producing, without freedom. I was reminded of the image of the machine from 
Yevgeny Zamyatin‘s dystopian novel ‗We‘ of the scary beauty of a well-functioning 
machine where there is no friction to be caused by the chaotic effects of freedom – 
everything moves in a well-choreographed dance, what the narrator D-503 describes as 
―nonfreedom‖.2 For Havel, such a law is evidence that the state views the individual as 
―mere cogs in the social machinery, cogs that have meaning only insofar as they blindly 
carry out the function assigned to them.‖3 For Havel when the state views the individual 
                                                 
1 Václav Havel Open Letters (New York: Vintage Books), 117.   
2 Yevgeny Zamyatin, We, trans Clarence Brown, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1993), 6. 
Upon witnesing the harmonious work being performed on the space ship INTEGRAL, and declaring the labour, 
which he calls a dance, to be beautiful,  the narrator, D-503 writes in his diary, “But why – my thoughts 
continued – why beautiful? Why is the dance beautiful? Answer: because it is nonfree movement, because all 
the fundamental significance of the dance lies precicely in its aesthetic subjection, its ideal nonfreedom.” (6). 
3 Havel Open Letters, 121. 
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as a performer of a role set by the state, this presupposes that ―the machine operator 
must be able to check on the cogs at all times‖.4 Havel defends the role of parasites 
arguing that their refusal to settle into the grey monstrosities of communist housing 
blocks tell a story whose colour stands out against the greyness of the age. This is the 
role of the dissident in Havel‘s writings, to be the stinging fly that awakens the polis to 
authentic action, to realise its freedom rather than to succumb to its state prescribed 
role. That is, the dissident is to be the example of transcendence to those stuck in 
immanence.  
Kim Jong Il on the other hand was one of the ―machine operators,‖ a maniacal dictator 
of whom the myth of his cruelty has reached a level of absurdity. Kim Jong Il manipulated 
the behaviour of his citizens to such a degree that North Korea is now one of the least 
free places on the planet. Dissidence is quickly and ruthlessly quashed with a state 
violence that is probably unequalled on the planet. He stands in some regards as the 
polar opposite of Havel; but I think these comparisons can be dangerous to the memory 
of Havel despite the intent to show what a moral dynamo Havel was by contrasting him 
with the towering figure of evil, Kim Jong Il. 
Perusing the various eulogies that came out after the deaths, I found that many 
journalists wanted to draw the sharp distinction between the two  figures. But there is 
something concerning in these comparisons. They obscure the real legacy of Havel by 
making him the polar opposite of Kim Jong Il‘s obvious totalitarian regime. Slavoj Žižek 
has constantly criticised Havel for being a naïve dissident and the eulogies which 
contrast Havel with Kim Jong Il, I think, open Havel up to such criticisms by making his 
moral message to politics so pure that it becomes an obscure call to end totalitarianism.5 
My point is that Havel has a relevance far wider than his specific role as dissident against 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Zizek‟s criticisms will be discussed in Chapter two. 
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the totalitarian element to late socialism, what Havel called post-totalitarianism.6 
Eulogies that praise Havel‘s role in transforming Czechoslovakia and then the Czech 
Republic into a liberal democracy are correct to point out Havel‘s achievements here; 
however I contend that there is a much richer intellectual legacy that many of the 
eulogies leave out.7 If Havel stands against the evils of Kim Jong Il. Then what can he say 
about smaller evils in the western world today? 
In putting Havel as the dialectical opposite to Kim Jong Il, the danger is that Havel is 
left with nothing to say about contemporary western society. Or to put it differently, if 
Havel is a voice against extreme state terror, then he is mute on problems closer to 
home. Making Havel the giant slayer blunts real contribution to an analysis of 
contemporary problems in western politics, which, although not nearly as extreme as the 
problems facing the North Korean citizen, are still alarming. The view that the state, 
under late socialism, saw citizens as performers of specific roles, I think is still highly 
relevant when considering the role of citizens in society in the conditions of late 
capitalism. We who live in the neo-liberal age are being coerced to ‗consume‘ lest our 
way of life lose its potency for freedom and security.8 One eulogy for Havel, by Aljazeera, 
                                                 
6 Post-totalitarianism is Havel‟s coinage to explain the shift in totalitarian power away from a dictator, to the 
ideology itself. In that sense the individual‟s running the nation are inconsequential as the power of the state 
machine‟s usurps those individuals.  
See Václav Havel‟s “The Power of the Powerless” in Open Letters, 131. 
7 Editorial “Kim Jong Il and Václav Havel: Two leaders a world apart” L.A. Times, December 20, 2011. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/20/opinion/la-ed-kim-20111220 
Joe Schlesinger, “Kim Jong-il and Václav Havel, the extremes of our age” CBC News, December 21, 2011. 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2011/12/21/f-vp-schlesinger.html 
Tereza Nemessanyi, “On Václav Havel, Kim Jong Il and Regular Russian Citizens” Huffington Post, December 
22, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tereza-nemessanyi/on-Václav-Havel-kim-jongi_b_1163871.html 
8 On October 11 2001, one month after the September 11 attacks on the World trade Centre buildings in New 
York, then President George W. Bush announced  “Now, the American people have got to go about their 
business.  We cannot let the terrorists achieve the objective of frightening our nation to the point where we don't 
-- where we don't conduct business, where people don't shop.  That's their intention.” The normal activity of a 
U.S. citizen is hence defined as consuming. The loss of economic growth that a lowering of consumption brings 
is considered fearful by the politicians of the war on terror. I consider viewing the roles of citizens as producers 
and consumers in late socialism to be analogous to the consideration of citizens as consumers in the neoliberal 
ideology. See White House Archive, “President Holds Prime Time News Conference” October 11, 2001, 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011011-7.html 
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hit the nail on the head with his real legacy, referring to the memory of Havel by his fellow 
Czech citizens.  
Czechs, given their growing dissatisfaction with the current political system‘s 
omnipresent corruption and other failings, have increasingly come to 
appreciate the importance of Havel's moral appeals. In fact, now, after his 
death, he is well on the way to being lionised as someone who foresaw many 
current problems, and not only at home: While still President, he repeatedly 
called attention to the self-destructive forces of industrial civilisation and 
global capitalism.9  
I don‘t want to take away from Havel‘s credentials as a world figure standing out against 
dictators; but I do think that Havel has quite a lot to offer the study of political philosophy 
in a more nuanced and complex way. The man who as a moral authority can say, perhaps 
naively, that China has a responsibility to assist protesting monks in Burma, is also the 
creator of, I contend, an interesting political philosophy that can help to explain how 
ideologies are able to coerce individuals to self-deceive in order to promote certain 
behaviours.10 His politics are quite simple, if individuals are existentially honest with 
themselves, then they are responsible for each other, and they hold institutions to 
account because they are honest about the activities of institutions in which they are 
involved.11    Throughout his career, I contend, Havel never deviated from the above 
sentiments. What I will do in this thesis, is show Havel‘s influences in arriving at this 
position, show what concerns Havel has that are necessitated by this position, and spell 
out just what kind of political philosophy underlies such a position. The conclusion that I 
                                                 
9 Jirí Pehe “Václav Havel's life in truth” Aljazeera. December 19, 2011. 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/20111219851022417.html (Accessed December 30, 2011). 
10 Václav Havel “Struggling Alone,” The Guardian, September 27, 2007. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/sep/27/strugglingalone (accessed September 28, 2007). 
11 See Martin Matuštík, Postnational Identity; critical theory and existential philosophy in Habermas, 
Kierkegaard, and Havel. New York: Guilford, 1993. 
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will make is that Havel offers a liberal political philosophy of which agonism is a strong 
feature; hence I will term Havel‘s political philosophy liberal agonism. 
Havel is a product of the culture of Czech dissidence.12 Living under the conditions of 
late-socialism, Havel became a dramatist, writing plays that were obviously critical of the 
role of ideology in people‘s behaviour. Havel infused the mis-en-scène of his dramas with 
absurdity to reflect just how far from authenticity ideological living was.  Philosophically, 
Havel is influenced by three major thinkers, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas and 
Jan Patočka, especially the latter. Havel makes explicit mention of reading Heidegger and 
Levinas in his prison letters sent to his wife, published as the volume, Letters to Olga, but 
it is hard to claim that Havel applies rigorous study to any philosopher and it is doubtful 
that Havel ever sat down to read the Heideggerian oeuvre in any depth.13 He claims to 
have read an essay by Levinas translated for him by his brother Ivan.14 Again this is no 
detailed study of Levinas‘ project; but, like Heidegger, Havel does borrow some 
philosophical ideas from Levinas.  
In the first chapter of this thesis I will explore the Heideggerian flavour of Havel‘s 
ideas. I have deliberately not included a chapter on Levinas because I believe that, while 
Levinas might seem to be the appropriate lens with which to analyse Havel, Patočka 
supplies a better entry. I am not denying that Havel is reading Levinas, and has Levinas 
on his mind, when he writes many of his most philosophically rich prison letters in Letters 
to Olga; however, I contend that Havel is using Levinas as a litmus test to explore his 
already formed ideas. In fact in Letters to Olga, Havel writes that while reading Levinas, 
                                                 
12 Edward Findlay “Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique: Political Philosophy in Václav Havel and Jan 
Patočka” The Review of Politics 61, no.3 (1999): 403. 
13 In a conversation I had with Ivan Chvatik, a student of Patočka‟s and the director of the Jan Patočka archive 
in Prague, Professor Chvatik made the point that the problem with studying philosophy for Havel was that he 
was always in jail. Havel‟s involvement in dissident movements, not just as an intellectual, but as an actor in 
them led him to have a very busy life that differs from the hermit-like existence of the intellectual with time to 
read volumous amounts of philosophy. My point is that what Havel read, he appropriated, and he read 
selectively. 
14 Václav Havel, Letters to Olga, trans. Paul Wilson (New York: Henry Holt and Co, 1989), 311. 
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he is furiously thinking through Levinas‘ ideas; but Havel adds that he has a feeling like 
he has read these ideas before.15 I argue he had at least encountered ideas similar to 
Levinas‘ in his encounter with Patočka. In addition, Havel, while writing about his reading 
of Levinas, leaves a promissory note that he desires a future time when he can really sit 
down with Levinas. This future encounter does not happen, although Havel does mention 
Levinas numerous more times in the collected letters. Havel even admits to not being 
able to understand the depth and breadth of Levinas‘ thought regarding responsibility, 
which could be another example of Havel‘s feigned ignorance in philosophical matters; 
however, I argue that there is something to this admission.16 Havel, in prison, does not 
engage systematically with Levinas‘ thought in the same way that he takes on 
Heidegger‘s critiqiue of technology and modernity. This will be even more clear if I take a 
moment to explore Levinas‘ responsibility in Havel‘s work.  
A major idea in Levinas‘ work is that ethics precedes ontology. Havel gives a lot of 
currency to this idea and in Letters to Olga he claims that he fully agrees with Levinas‘ 
assertion if Levinas means that responsibility is something primal and vital, and if 
responsibility is something we are thrown into and which precedes freedom.17 Havel then 
adds that he feels as if he‘s always believed this before he read Levinas.18 I think this is 
correct even if Havel doesn‘t spell out where he might have heard such ideas before. 
Similar ideas are in Patočka‘s philosophy as well. For Patočka, the individual finds itself 
(the I), in the search for itself, in its throwness and in recognition of the self‘s 
responsibility to the world and to others that share its situation and upon which it 
impacts. Hence although Levinas is a presence in Letters to Olga, I will focus in this 
                                                 
15 Ibid 314 
16 Ibid 322 
17 Ibid 322-323 
18 Ibid 323 
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thesis on the impact of Heidegger and Patočka‘s thought on Havel, because, as we shall 
see, these are more useful tools with which to explore Havel‘s thought. 
As mentioned, Patočka is a very strong influence on Havel‘s thinking as Patočka‘s 
philosophy left a mark on the culture of Czech dissidence as a whole, especially with his 
involvement as the spokesperson for the movement Charter 77.19 Havel attended 
seminars by Patočka, was involved with Charter 77 with him, and remained a strong 
supporter of Patočka‘s legacy after Patočka‘s premature death in the wake of an 
interrogated over his involvement with Charter 77. Edward Findlay claims that Havel‘s 
philosophical thought is just a rehashing of the themes of Patočka‘s work, and hence any 
reading of Havel is not complete without a reading of Patočka.20 I agree with Findlay to a 
point. While it is true that Havel must be read in the light of Patock‘a philosophy, it is 
unfair to claim that Havel‘s contribution to philosophy is not unique. For example, Findlay 
notes that in the article, ‗A Call for Sacrifice: The Co-responsibility of the West‘ published 
in the journal Foreign Affairs, Havel  mentions Patočka‘s contention ―a life not willing to 
sacrifice itself to what makes it meaningful is not living.‖21 Findlay goes on to write that 
Havel in neither essay philosophically develops the idea of sacrifice, deferring to Patočka. 
To an extent this is the correct reading; however Findlay is too quick to dismiss Havel. In 
this thesis I will argue that Havel has a different aim for his thought than Patočka. 
Patočka is a philosopher who wants to develop his ideas in a rigorous philosophical way. 
Havel on the other hand is a thinker who wants to apply his thinking to concrete political 
                                                 
19 See Findlay “Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique” 
See also Edward Findlay, Caring for the Soul in a Postmodern Age, (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2002). 
Avazier Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel, (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). 
20 See Findlay “Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique”. 
21 Findlay “Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique” 409 
Václav Havel, “A Call for Sacrifice: The Co-responsibility of the West” Foreign Affairs 73, no.2 (1994): 2-6 
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problems, with the aim of influencing the public sphere. Havel does borrow from Patočka, 
and at times he does defer to Patočka for philosophical justification, as Findlay claims; 
but it must be noted that their projects are different and that Havel uses Patočka to ends 
that Patočka did not anticipate.  
If we consider the Foreign Affairs article, this difference becomes clear. Havel is 
arguing that Western Europe needs to consider its responsibility to the post-socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the collapse of communism. Havel is 
arguing that the West needs to consider that it has possibly lost its possession of values 
worth sacrificing for, as the ideology of the free market has flourished, destroying the 
seedbed of those values that Havel looked to the west for before the collapse of 
socialism. Findlay is right; Havel does not give a detailed philosophical explanation of 
sacrifice, but that is because he sees his role as philosopher differently. 22 For Havel, his 
role is to point to the problems of the polis, or in other words to show the world as a 
problem. His article in Foreign Affairs does not give a rigorous account of sacrifice, as 
Patočka does in his Heretical Essays; however, conversely, Patočka does not apply his 
philosophy to contemporary Czech problems, stopping his philosophy of history at the 
Second World War in The Heretical Essays. I think that James Pontusso sums up the 
situation well in disregarding Findlay‘s dismissal of Havel, ―for those who have read the 
works of contemporary academic philosophers, Havel‘s ―search‖ for himself is not 
                                                 
22 In Letters to Olga Havel writes, “I have never created, or accepted, any comprehensive “worldview,” let 
alone any complete, unified, integrated and self-contained philosophical,  ideological or other system of belies 
which… I could identify with and which would provide answers to all of my questions.” (p. 190). Hence my 
positioning of Havel as a philosopher might seem a little strange. But I do not think that one needs to work out a 
complete philosophical system in order to be a philosopher.  Rather Havel does have coherent standpoints that I 
will spell out in the last chapter.  
James Sire and James Pontuso, in their book length studies of Havel‟s thought both have chosen to ignore 
Havel‟s insistence that he is not a philosopher as well. Sire points out that in the same book, Letters to Olga, 
where Havel denies having a worldview, he comes very close to offering one (Sire p. 54, Pontuso 16).  
See James Pontusso, Václav Havel; Civic Responsibility in a Postmodern Age (Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 2004). 
James Sire, Václav Havel; The Intellectual Conscience of International Politics (Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 
2001). 
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probably but surely more penetrating than any systematic philosophic text.‖23 That is the 
lack of conceptual rigour is not evidence of poor thinking; Havel‘s thought, whilst not 
contributing to the epistemology of phenomenology, does offer an interesting way for a 
political application of a phenomenologically grounded thinking. 
It is correct that Havel is a Patočkean thinker; however he is does not simply repeat 
Patočka‘s ideas; but instead applies those ideas to practical politics in a way that reveals 
an individual andcoherent position. My argument is that Havel offers a liberal political 
standpoint, one that I am terming in this thesis liberal agonism.  
According to Findlay, Havel claimed,  
[t]hat a politics of freedom and democracy will have its most universal appeal 
when it justifies its principles, not on foundations such as those implicit in the 
ideological positions of either liberalism or socialism, but on the basis of an 
ontological and phenomenological understanding of humanity that rejects 
abstraction and the pull of ideology.24 
I agree with this thought, but I want to add a twist. For Havel, such an ontological 
grounding of principles is only possible in a state which respects and encourages the 
individual‘s ability to authentically become aware of their responsibility and hence 
ground their individual actions in such an ontology of humanity. I contend that the state 
that best encourages such activity is a liberal state, and I will argue that Havel‘s political 
standpoint is characteristic of a liberal. Havel saw his role as dissident to defend and 
protect the individual‘s right to express their existential identities. The state, for Havel, 
should be a neutral entity whose aim should be to encourage citizens to engage in a kind 
of phenomenological self-examination to authentically realise their responsibility. This is 
a position informed by Patočka, but it is distinctly Havel‘s as well, as I shall demonstrate. 
                                                 
23 Pontusso  Václav Havel, 16 
24 Findlay Caring for the Soul 184 
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Ultimately this thesis is a reappraisal of the political philosophy of Havel. I think that 
now, especially in the year following his death, a re-reading of Havel‘s work is a useful 
task in establishing just what legacy Havel has left. Through exploring the influence of 
Heidegger and Patočka on Havel, I will elaborate Havel‘s continued concern with 
ideological manipulations of discourse in the public sphere and demonstrate how his 
idea of a life in truth is best understood in existential terms rather than religious terms. I 
will spell out the foundations of Havel‘s liberalism and explain just what a liberal agonism 
is. Liberalism is a difficult and loaded term. Perhaps it is best, as Alan Ryan does, to 
consider liberalism more as a set of liberalisms rather than one all-encompassing 
concept. 
25
   Liberals themselves disagree on what constitutes liberalism. Ryan suggests 
that the myriad forms of liberalism are better understood in terms of what they are 
against than attempting to define them as a single doctrine.  He argues that liberals are 
more or less united in their anti-absolutism, anti-theocracy, and anti-capitalism. Each of 
these antipathies, of course, comes with caveats. Ryan also points out that liberals share 
a focus on the individual and more importantly a focus on promoting the autonomy of the 
individual.  As this thesis   will point out, Vaclav Havel shares with liberals the opposition 
to absolutism, the promotion of toleration, a healthy fear of the market as a source of 
moral good, and most importantly the promotion of individual autonomy. Hence I argue 
that Havel is a liberal. 
I will conclude this introduction by making a comment on the style and method of this 
thesis. Havel is an interesting thinker for me in part because of his ambiguity. He denies 
being a philosopher, he denies having a position, and yet when I read him, I find him to 
both express philosophical arguments and to hold cohesive positions. But he can be 
vague. To overcome the ambiguity in Havel‘s writings, and lack of systematic thought, I 
                                                 
25Alan Ryan, “Liberalism” A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy,ed. Robert E. Goodin & Philip 
Pettit, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers; 1993), 291-293 
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will be comparing Havel‘s positions to those of his influences and other key thinkers who 
I think are pertinent to drawing out Havel‘s ideas. In this I will, in a sense, be explaining 
who Havel the political philosopher is, by explaining who Havel is not. By offering some 
systematic rigorous arguments by thinkers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Chantal Mouffe and 
John Stuart Mill to name a few, I set up arguments for Havel to either agree or disagree 
with. This is advantageous for two reasons. First it can fill in the gaps that Havel might 
have left in his thinking. Second, it situates Havel amongst some of the more established 
philosophical minds of recent times. Ultimately I believe that Havel‘s political philosophy 
is responsible, timely, pragmatic and philosophically rich.  
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Chapter 1: Is Havel a Heideggerian? 
Introduction  
In this chapter I explore Heideggerian themes in Havel‘s works. The philosophy of 
Martin Heidegger is a promising starting point for an analysis of Havel‘s political 
philosophy as Havel is explicit on numerous occasions that his reading of Heidegger is 
important for him. The ethical treatment of Being that marks Havel‘s thought might make 
a comparison of Emmanuel Levinas and Havel seem like a more useful choice, but 
Havel‘s encounter with Levinas is limited. He read a translation of Levinas, made by his 
brother, whilst in prison.26  
Havel‘s encounter with Levinas in Letters to Olga is interesting, but ultimately, I 
contend, not that useful in spelling out Havel‘s position. That is because Havel seems to 
have already worked his ideas out by the time he reads Levinas in prison. Levinas is 
employed by Havel as a sounding board for him to test his idea of responsibility. He 
admits that he has probably failed to fully digest all of the ideas in the work, but does 
note that on the priority of responsibility over identity Havel finds that Levinas helps him 
reformulate his ideas.27 But I do not think that this reformulation represents a significant 
change. Havel had believed that our authentic identity is based on our responsibility 
before he first read Levinas. This understanding of responsibility and identity appears to 
be an obvious insight of Patočka‘s, passed on to Havel. Not a result of Havel‘s having 
read Levinas. Havel names Levinas an inspiration, whereas Heidegger and Patočka are 
more fruitful sources of ideas. Aviezier Tucker, in his article ―Vaclav Havel‘s 
                                                 
26 Martin Matuštík explores Havel as a thinker influenced by Levinas. Matuštík makes his analysis however 
based only on those prison letters written by Havel as he was reading the translation of Levinas made for him by 
his brother Ivan. Matuštík Postnational Identity, 190-192. 
27 Havel Letters to Olga 312. 
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Heideggerianism‖ claims that Heidegger and Patočka are the two strongest influences on 
Havel.28 
By comparison, in Letters to Olga, Havel makes numerous mentions of engagement 
with Heidegger‘s thought.29 Also, much of the secondary literature treats Heidegger as 
the major influence on Havel30 (apart from the obvious influence of Jan Patočka whose 
thought and its relation to Havel will be elaborated in chapters three and four). Havel‘s 
mentor, Jan Patočka, produced a phenomenology that is critical of many of Heidegger‘s 
pronouncements, and much of that critique of Heidegger is present in Havel‘s writings. 
Hence a central aim of this chapter is to tease out exactly how Heideggerian Havel‘s 
political philosophy is. 
Due to the strong commitment to politics and the political that is present in Havel‘s 
work, Heidegger is something of a red-herring in Havel scholarship. More than that, 
Havel‘s philosophy represents a meaningful move past Heidegger‘s in that the call for 
meaningful political action in Havel‘s work is a practical answer to the crisis of modernity 
that both Havel and Heidegger articulate. Both Havel and Heidegger share a conception 
of a crisis in modernity due to the increase in ‗technological thinking‘ – that is that 
technology in ever increasing ways, is defining our thoughts and taking us further away 
from the question of Being. The result of this technologism, is nihilism. Havel and 
Heidegger differ, however, in their approach to solving the crisis. Where I read Heidegger 
(especially the later Heidegger) as failing to provide an adequate response to the crisis of 
nihilism in modernity, Havel offers a practical political philosophy which is able to 
address the crisis in a meaningful way. This chapter will explain how Havel‘s political 
                                                 
28 Aviezer Tucker “Václav Havel‟s Heideggerianism,” Telos 21, (1990): 64. 
29 This is noted by translator Paul Wilson in his introduction to Letters to Olga p.17.  
30 Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence, 143. 
Sire, Václav Havel, 55. 
Pontusso, Václav Havel, 20. 
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philosophy is essentially a practical philosophy that operates from a Heideggerian 
perspective, past the inaction of Heidegger. 
 
A Shared Nomenclature; but Differing Goals 
This section will explore Havel‘s use of two Heideggerian terms, Being and throwness. 
A latent concept in Havel‘s thought, as noted by Tucker, is the Heideggerian concept of 
everydayness, this concept will be explored in Havel‘s work as well. 
For Heidegger, Dasein is in a condition of ‗throwness,‘ that is, the human being finds 
themselves thrust into the world, in a situation which is not of their choosing and which is 
out of their control. The world is full of others and in encountering the other, Dasein 
identifies as a ‗they,‘ which for Heidegger, means that as Dasein has everydayness thrust 
upon it, it subjects itself to the they and loses its sense of its Being and its autonomy.31 
Havel, as Tucker writes, shares, to an extent, Heidegger‘s analysis of throwness.32 
However I want to point out a key subtle difference which Tucker seems to miss. For 
Havel the state of throwness is the creation of the space for transcendence. Heidegger 
laments the loss of autonomy in idenfiying with the ‗they‘ and for Havel, this autonomy 
can be regained through a life in truth. One can live authentically amongst the they. 
Havel, throughout his writing makes reference to Being. An interesting question to ask 
is to what extent is Havel‘s Being the same as Heidegger‘s understanding of Being?  In 
letter 140 of Letters to Olga, Havel writes,  
 
But what is it, this rather cryptic ―Being‖? I‗ve been using the term for too long 
now not to feel that the time has come to throw a little light on it. I‘m not 
                                                 
31 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper Row, 
2008) 163-168. 
32 Tucker, “Havel‟s Heideggerianism,” 67-70. 
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entirely happy doing so: its blurred, ―soft‖ and unclear character suits me, for 
it corresponds precisely to the mysterious haziness of what I‘m indicating by 
the term; I like the fact that in every context or sentence it has a slightly 
different semantic colouring, and I know that any attempt to define it will, at 
the same time, impoverish, flatten and weaken  its uncertain semantic 
radiations… 
…My only true certain and indisputable experience is the experience of Being 
in the simplest sense of the word, that is, the experience that something is.33 
 
It is significant that Havel deliberately leaves the term vague and actually seems to 
celebrate the enigmatic nature of Being. The description of Being as an essence of 
existence might be read in a Heideggerian way, but there are other possible 
interpretations and I think that moving away from Heidegger is more in the spirit of 
Havel‘s texts. If you were to ask Havel if he is a Heideggerian, I am sure the answer 
would be no. For Heidegger Being is something that modernity has completely lost 
orientation towards, and for Havel, Being is a part of ordinary experience, as this chapter 
will demonstrate. Havel has actually shifted away from Heidegger, if indeed he is even 
responding to Heidegger,34 in that for Havel, Being is moral and Being is our best 
experience of essential humanity expressed as an appreciation of responsibility. 
Uncovering Being for Havel is political; because humanity is necessarily pluralistic and so 
the Being of man involves humans living together. For these reasons Havel‘s Being is 
best understood as dissimilar to Heidegger‘s Being. Such a strong move away from 
                                                 
33 Havel, Letters to Olga 358. 
34 See chapters three and four for an explication of the influence of Jan Patočka on Havel, which is far stronger 
and has far more evidence to support the link, then does the link to Heidegger‟s philosophy. 
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Heidegger is missing from most scholarship on Havel that treats Heidegger as an 
influence. 
Relying too much on Heidegger‘s philosophy to fill in gaps in Havel‘s philosophical 
writing is dangerous because both thinkers have fundamentally different conceptions of 
what constitutes Being. I make this point because James Sire, Aviezer Tucker, and James 
Pontusso, in their studies of Havel‘s philosophy, are adamant that Heidegger‘s thought 
can explain Havel‘s. I agree that Heidegger is an influence on Havel, but one of the main 
aims of this chapter is to tease out some key differences in their thought. Pontusso 
writes that Havel‘s thought is best regarded as a fundamental agreement with 
Heidegger‘s critique of the contemporary world, and a profound disagreement with 
Heidegger‘s exploration of the nature and character of Being.35 This is a view in support 
of my own, but Pontusso seems to take it for granted that Heidegger and Havel mean the 
same thing when they write of Being, and the difference is found in the particulars. This 
is incorrect. Fundamentally Havel and Heidegger are opposed on the nature of Being, 
and are even talking about different things. 
What Havel means by Being is very vague. This is not necessarily a negative in Havel‘s 
writings, as his focus is, when he is at his best, on the political. Being, for Havel, is a 
presupposition, and he is concerned about acting with this knowledge in a political way. 
Heidegger‘s project was to try and use human thinking to uncover or reveal Being. This is 
not Havel‘s project. For Havel, Being is true and stable, and a part of the ordinary 
experience of human life, albeit a more primordial experience than any ontic category of 
existence - for if being is a no-thing, then, for Havel, it would be impossible to ground a 
morality on it. For Havel the ground of reality is the primordial experience of a Being 
which is a thing. A thing which surrounds and encompasses his being and grounds his 
                                                 
35 Pontusso, Václav Havel, 26. 
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experience of an I in a moral world. This is an existential theme, however this is an 
existentialism unlike the existentialism of Sartre, where the no-thing-ness of Being gives 
rise to the ought to be, in the sense that the ought to be is the result of the self deciding 
to act in freedom. For Havel, we are fee to act to realise Being. However, to claim that 
Havel‘s exploration of the character of Being in any way describes Being is to miss the 
intentional ambiguity in his description of Being. Pontusso gets it right when he claims 
that Havel is more interested in the phenomenological reality of the spiritual dimension 
of the political.36 However, I contend that it is a focus on the concrete phenomenological 
reality that is the hallmark of Havel‘s critique of modernity, and that needs to be the 
prime focus in appraising Havel‘s thought. The existential themes of Havel‘s philosophy 
will be further elaborated in Chapter Five. The point was made early in Havel scholarship 
by Stanislaw Baranczak, who argued that in Havel‘s plays the focus is always on a 
concrete reality.37  Baranczak‘s point is that in order to explain ‗man‘ Havel always 
situates man in his thrown state, in the concrete world of lived experience. He cites the 
character of Mephistopheles from Havel‘s Temptation, who is afflicted with smelly feet, 
as an example of Havel‘s grounding of his characters. In this chapter I will give outline to 
the concrete political philosophy inherent in Havel‘s thought that distances him from 
Heidegger. 
The political focus in Havel‘s writings is clear; hence the lack of clarity on what exactly 
constitutes Being is not as problematic as it might first appear. When considering the 
concept of Being in both Heidegger‘s and Havel‘s works, it becomes clear that their 
thought is at loggerheads. Heidegger is interested in describing the essence of Being 
itself, while Havel is more interested in describing the relationship between Being and 
                                                 
36 Ibid 35. 
37 Stanislaw Baranczak “All the President‟s Plays” in Critical Essays on Václav Havel, ed. Marketa Goetz- 
Stankiewicz & Phyllis Carey, (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1999)  53-54. 
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beings.  This is clearest in Havel‘s long essay, The Power of the Powerless. The focus of 
this essay is not about uncovering the ground of Being, but analysing the mechanics of 
power within an ideology. Havel in this work describes political ideology as a socially and 
historically manufactured construct. Its power is illusory and is only made legitimate 
when citizens actively acknowledge the ideology as real. Havel claims that if one is 
responsible to Being and not to an ideology, then one is living in the truth. A socially 
created political system such as the post-totalitarian system creates and invades life with 
a variety of ideological machinations that manufacture fear and consent from the 
citizens.38  When the ideological component of the political system is adhered to by 
beings, responsibility towards Being is replaced with responsibility  towards an ideology.  
The aim of The Power of the Powerless is to explicate the utility of this relationship 
between Being and beings in a political way. This theme is carried on occasionally and 
somewhat more cryptically in Letters to Olga and in Havel‘s open letters, speeches and 
as far back as his plays; however, it must be noted that not all of Havel‘s writings offer a 
coherent and consistent philosophy. When Havel offers an analysis of the relationship of 
beings to Being his philosophy is pragmatic and morally rich. When he diverges from this 
Havel has a tendency to obfuscate. By way of an explanation of this confusion I point to 
Havel‘s descriptions of Being. In describing Being Havel uses many religious phrases. 
Chapter 2 deals specifically with religion in Havel‘s work, but here I point to the mystical 
description of Being. This character is perfectly portrayed in the passage from letter 140 
of Letters to Olga quoted above. I think writing that Being is ―soft‖ and ―blurred‖ and 
coloured differently in each semantic depiction reveals an inherent disregard for the 
                                                 
38 This is Havel‟s own term to describe the socialist system in control of Czechoslovakia while he composed 
the essay. He uses the term post-totalitarian because he finds many fundamental differences between smaller 
totalitarian regimes and the much more complex system that was then in effect. Havel uses the term post-
totalitarian to describe the condition of late socialism. He describes, in The Power of the Powerless, a difference 
between the traditional notion of totalitarianism and the incorporeal entity that exerts power under late 
socialism. For Havel, Stalin embodied a totalitarian leader, however under late socialism, the socialist ideology, 
was propounded by a series of social checks and balances which did not rely on the organisation of society by a 
figure head. That is that a post-totalitarian system‟s power structure is created by the entire society. See note #5. 
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beeline that Heidegger made for an uncovered Being. Havel is happy to leave Being 
concealed, and let it be revealed through responsible political action. 
 It is my contention that Havel is not specifically a religious thinker; however, due to 
deliberate ambiguities in Havel‘s writings I cannot make such a pronouncement with any 
real certainty, nor can those writers who claim that Havel‘s thought is best understood as 
Christian thought advance their interpretation with any real certainty. This is the theme of 
the following chapter; but I draw attention here to a quote from Edward Ericson Jr‘s 
article ‗Solzhenstein, Havel, and the Twenty-First Century‘; ―If [Havel] doesn‘t say 
everything a Christian might, he doesn‘t necessarily say anything at odds with a Christian 
critique.‖39 In these kinds of passages Havel has a tendency to be vague. He is much 
less so when writing about politics. This is important because Havel‘s philosophy rests on 
the significance of Being as a fundamental ontological given, and despite his inability to 
clearly describe Being, he still offers a meaningful and clear political philosophy. Havel‘s 
philosophy needs to be considered against that of his mentor Jan Patočka, who attempts 
to philosophise after Heidegger and after  the ‗death of metaphysics.‘ I agree with Peter 
Vardy, who in What is Truth? argues that Havel‘s position is that truth is best revealed by 
the falsity of ideological positions, in other words the deliberate exclusions of parts of life 
that are against an ideology reveal that there is an outside of power relations, that truth 
is not relative.40  The concern for Havel then is how to achieve this outsider perspective 
so that moral considerations of acting within an ideology are more easily discerned. This 
is not a Heideggerian philosophy because the basic concern expressed here is for the 
relationships between beings, not an attempt to reveal Being as such.41  
                                                 
39 Edward Ericson Jr, “Solzhenstein, Havel and the Twenty-First Century” Modern Age 99, Iss 1 (1999): 4.  
40 Peter Vardy What is Truth? (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999), 157. 
41 The position I am advocating is similar to that found in John Glasser‟s short summary of Havel‟s philosophy 
in his book length study of the rise of civil society in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, Living Within the 
Truth. Glasser focuses purely on the political dissent in Havel‟s writings.  
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  Heidegger,  Havel and Technology 
It is, however, undeniable that Heidegger‘s critique of modernity is prominent in 
Havel‘s perspective. Both Havel and Heidegger share a common concern about modern 
technology and its alienating effect in contemporary society.42 Heidegger‘s dislike of 
modern technological living is most clearly summed up in the famous Der Spiegel 
Interview.43 
 
Heidegger: … I say we have no path that corresponds to the essence of 
technology as of yet. 
Spiegel: One could naively object: What do we have to come to terms with 
here? Everything functions. More and more electric power plants are being 
built. Production is flourishing. People in highly technological parts of the 
earth are well provided for. We live in prosperity. What is really missing here? 
Heidegger: Everything Functions. That is exactly what is uncanny. Everything 
functions and the functioning drives us further and further to more 
functioning, and technology tears people away and uproots them from the 
earth more and more. I don‘t know if you are scared; I was certainly scared 
when I recently saw the photographs of the earth taken from the moon. We 
don‘t need an atom bomb at all; the uprooting of human beings is already 
                                                                                                                                                        
See John Glasser, Living Within Truth (United States: Xlibris Corporation, 2005). 
Another important advocating a purely political interpretation is Richard Rorty‟s essay „The End of Leninism, 
Havel and Social Hope.‟ This essay will be discussed in more detail  in the next chapter. 
See Richard Rorty, “The End of Leninism, Havel and Social Hope” in Truth and Progress; Philosophical 
Papers, Volume 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
42 Tucker, “Havel‟s Heideggerianism,” 70. 
43 Martin Heidegger, Interview by Der Spiegel, Der Spiegel, September 23, 1966. Trans by Maria Alter & John 
Caputo http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~other1/Heidegger%20Der%20Spiegel.pdf (accessed on May 27, 2007) 
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taking place. We only have purely technological conditions left. It is no longer 
an earth on which human beings live today.44 
 
Heidegger believes that there is something authentically human in the experience of 
tradition and history that is not found in the experience of technological living. By 
technological living I am referring to an ideology of sorts which is how Heidegger, and 
Havel, sees the condition of modernity. It is ideological in the sense that technology does 
not give a total perspective to life; it is a particular view, not the only view, yet advances 
itself as a total view. Heidegger expresses a fear that technology might uproot man from 
the world through space exploration.45 Space exploration is only an example of the 
alienating effect of technology, however. For Heidegger, technology uproots us from our 
past and traditions. This uprooting has the effect of turning man into  a technological 
being, a functional artefact. The example of space exploration is apt because Heidegger 
is able to conjure an image of man leaving the world, which is exactly what is 
conceptually problematic about technology for him. In the same interview Heidegger 
claims that everything essential and great has occurred as a result of humans being 
rooted in a particular place and engaging with particular traditions.46 For Heidegger, 
technology and technological living rapidly increase the pace at which life is running away 
from the rooted and traditional modes of living. The instigation of a space program 
leaves Heidegger to muse on humanity‘s eventual abandonment of planet earth. The 
analogical significance of human beings dwelling on another planet is clearly not lost on 
Heidegger. That technology will possibly eventually undo the physical and not merely 
                                                 
44 Ibid 10. 
45 Hannah Arendt, in the prologue to her work The Human Condition, gives a nuanced response to the space 
shuttle‟s orbit. She is wary of the sense of relief of man escaping from our imprisonment on the earth for the 
first time. 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 1. 
46 Ibid. 
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existential relationship between a human being and the earth reveals the destructive 
nature of technology.  
After postulating the dire consequences that await humanity  upon adopting a 
technological life that is different from the essence of humanity (a life rooted in tradition 
and history); Heidegger is then asked by the interviewer about a possible role for 
philosophy in attempting to change the bearing of humanity from the destructive road 
that Heidegger has described to a more positive life. Heidegger‘s answer is not at all 
comforting. In fact when asked directly, what role philosophy, or the philosopher has in 
improving the situation of humanity, Heidegger responds with the statement that 
philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present state of the 
world leading to a famous pronouncement, ―only a god can still save us.‖ Heidegger 
contends and then clarifies that preparations for a change in thought, through thinking 
and poetry, are all that can be done in the face of a rapidly instrumentalising 
technological world.  Heidegger sees his philosophy as thinking about the history of 
western philosophy to find the origin of technological thinking, to attempt to find its 
counter, thinking as poesis. One of the interviewers quizzed Heidegger for clarification, 
asking: 
 
Because we do not live three hundred years from now, but here and now, we 
are denied silence. We politicians, semi politicians, citizens, journalists, et 
cetra, we constantly have to make some sort of decision or other. We must 
adapt ourselves to the system under which we live, must try to change it, 
must watch for the narrow door to reform and for the narrower door to 
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revolution. We expect help from the philosopher, even if, of course, only 
indirect help, help in roundabout ways. And now we hear: I cannot help you.47  
 
Heidegger responds, ―I cannot.‖ Heidegger, in claiming that ―only a god can still save us,‖ 
is not advocating to a return to a particular world religion. He claims in the same 
interview that the answer to the world‘s technological problem does not lie in replacing or 
substituting technological life for Zen Buddhism or something like that. Instead any 
change must come from the source of the technological world - the place of its origin. 
The interviewer asks if western theologians are perhaps thinkers who possess the 
answer to Heidegger‘s technological crisis, to which Heidegger responds that they are 
different kinds of thinkers than philosophers. Western philosophy, or more specifically 
western metaphysics, ends for Heidegger with Nietzsche. For the theologian, utilising 
western metaphysics occludes the possibility of experiencing fundamental 
characteristics of the technological age. For Heidegger, the thinking of theology is unable 
to understanding the technological world. Scientific thinking has completely replaced 
metaphysical thinking. Hence Heidegger sees his philosophy as an attempt to think back, 
through the history of philosophy, to find the origins of technological thinking.  
Heidegger‘s deep dissatisfaction with scientific thinking in an increasingly 
technological society led him to speculate in his essay The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking that: 
 
The sciences are now taking over as their own task what philosophy in the 
course of its history tried to present in certain places, and even there only 
                                                 
47 Ibid 
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inadequately, that is, the ontologies of the various regions of beings (nature, 
history, law, art).48  
 
That a ‗scientific‘ philosophy would attempt to provide answers to the question of Being, 
in Heidegger‘s eyes, points to a rapid acceptance of nihilism. Heidegger asserts that 
―Being is no thing‖ hence any attempt to describe Being in ‗scientific‘ terms as some sort 
of substance is nihilistic. In his essay What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger explains the 
nihilistic ground of the sciences: 
 
The special relation science sustains to the world and the attitude of man that 
guides it can of course be fully grasped only when we see and comprehend 
what happens in the relation to the world so attained. Man – one being 
among others – ―pursues science.‖ In this ―pursuit‖ nothing less transpires 
than the irruption by one being called ―man‖ into the whole of beings, indeed 
in such a way that in and through this interruption beings break open and 
show what they are and how they are. The interruption that breaks open, in its 
way, helps beings above all to themselves.49  
 
Heidegger is claiming that sciences only reveal the contents and nature of being and 
things. When man pursues science, man is thinking about the nature of beings. The 
question of Being is not able to be addressed by the sciences as Being is fundamentally 
a no-thing. That is it is not ontic in nature. By directing thought towards things, science 
has directed thought away from Being. Heidegger claims that the question of Being has 
                                                 
48 Martin Heidegger “End of Philosophy” in Basic Writings, trans David Krell, (New York: Harper Collins, 
1993), 435.  
49 Martin Heidegger “What is Metaphysics?” in Basic Writings, trans David Krell, (New York: Harper Collins, 
1993), 95. 
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been forgotten. There is thinking occurring in science; however according to Heidegger 
when science announces the scope of its inquiry, beings are to be examined and nothing 
else.50 Heidegger continues to assert that this ―nothing else‖ that science mentions is 
important, for, when you assert that beings and nothing else shall be examined you are 
conceding the existence of nothing. For Heidegger, science asserts that this nothing is 
―an outrage or a phantasm‖ and subsequently the question of nothing is left un-
investigated by science. 51  ―Science wants to know nothing of the nothing.‖52 This is 
problematic for Heidegger because when science delineates the scope of its inquiry it 
necessarily calls the nothing into focus in order to do so.53 Heidegger writes that science 
―has recourse to what it rejects.‖54 Havel would argue (and this can be read as being in 
agreement with Heidegger) that science, or to be more accurate scientism, is ideological. 
It is pulling all aspects of life into itself and imposing a particular view of how things are 
in all discourse.  
With our contemporary existence being determined by science, for Heidegger, 
contemporary existence is not investigating one of the most important questions that 
perpetually confront us. This nothing that allows beings to be considered as things, is 
Being. Being for Heidegger is a nothing. It is the nothing that surrounds all other 
investigations. Modern science, for Heidegger, directs thinking towards beings. It takes 
                                                 
50 Ibid 95. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid 96. 
53 It should be noted that recent developments in science are not as open to Heidegger‟s criticism as the more 
positivistic strand that Heidegger was criticising. The further science explores the composition of the universe 
and the atom, the more and more startling is the discovery that the universe is comprised of quite a lot of 
nothingness. Jim Holt, author of Why Does the World Exist makes a coherent argument for rejecting the 
premise that the world is comprised of things. For Holt, the better idea is that the world is, in essence, the flux of 
pure information, and is therefore substanceless. For Holt, the question „why is there something rather than 
nothing?‟ is the wrong question. Branches of contemporary science are quite comfortable with the idea of 
nothingness. 
See Jim Holt, Why Does the World Exist, (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012). 
54 Heidegger, „What is Metaphysics‟, 96 
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the Cartesian cogito as the source of existence and moves from this to an investigation 
of the world of things. Against this view, Heidegger sees thinking as the pathway to Being. 
Being is very different from the overly humanistic Cartesian cogito. In The Letter on 
Humanism, Heidegger writes ―[t]hinking accomplishes the relation of Being to the 
essence of man.‖55 Thinking accomplishes the revealing of Being when it escapes from 
the technical connotations that Plato and Aristotle gave it and that have been carried 
down through the history of western philosophy. Heidegger writes that if we want to 
experience the more poetic and true essence of thinking then a technical interpretation 
of the world must be abandoned. 
In Letter on Humanism, Heidegger writes,  
 
The rigor of thinking in contrast to that of the sciences, does not consist 
merely in an artificial, that is, technical-theoretical exactness of concepts. It 
lies in the fact that speaking remains purely in the element of Being and lets 
the simplicity of its manifold dimensions rule.56  
 
Describing Being in technical (scientific) terms is impossible. Being is rather intuited 
through thinking. Speaking, in its simplest form is giving oral expression to thought.  
Language then for Heidegger is the vehicle through which Being is revealed.  Earlier in 
the letter he writes that ―language is the house of Being.‖ Giving a scientific dimension to 
language, for Heidegger, reduces language to a practically orientated tool that expresses 
subjectivity‘s relationship to beings rather than realising its full potential and 
accomplishing a revelation of our relationship to Being. On this point Havel and 
                                                 
55 Martin Heidegger “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, trans David Krell, (New York: Harper Collins, 
1993), 217. 
56 Ibid 219. 
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Heidegger are in agreement. A large part of the ambiguity and inexactness of Havel‘s 
description of Being lies in the fact that to talk of Being is to allude to the sheer fact of 
existence, something of which there can be no description. One cannot describe with 
accurate detail the fact that there is something. 
A useful term to introduce here is nihilism. Thinking as techne is nihilistic and a 
society that is based on a technological identification presents signs of nihilism. 
Heidegger borrows the term from Nietzsche who used it to describe the decadent path 
that thought had taken after Plato‘s influence  had shaped Christian morality, and with 
that the whole future direction of western history.  Heidegger similarly sees the turn in 
philosophy after Plato as a nihilistic turn. Heidegger, unlike Nietzsche, is not interested in 
morality and its corrupt and dishonest origin. Instead Heidegger sees reframing of 
thinking as a technical tool as nihilistic. It is symptomatic of what he terms the end of 
thinking.57  
 
When thinking comes to an end by slipping out of its element it replaces this 
loss by procuring a validity for itself as a techne, as an instrument of 
education and therefore as a classroom matter and later a cultural concern. 
By and by philosophy becomes a technique for explaining from highest 
causes. One no longer thinks; one occupies oneself with ―philosophy.‖58 
 
Heidegger is being critical of philosophy. Philosophy, in an attempt to justify its existence, 
has presented itself as a science which for Heidegger means that thought has ended. 
There is no true thinking when thought concerns beings. Thinking in its purest form is 
thinking of Being. On this point it is possible to differentiate Havel and Heidegger. For 
                                                 
57 Heidegger, “End of Thinking” 220. 
58 Ibid 221. 
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Heidegger thinking as poesis is the most important idea in his later writing. Thinking as 
poesis, for Heidegger, is thinking in a way that brings forth truth. Thinking is not technical 
thinking but rather a ―letting happen‖ of truth.59 In other words, poetry, or the poesis of 
the poem, lets an unconcealing of a being happen, revealing the Being of the being. 
He displays a strong affiliation with romanticism and the attempt to escape from 
society towards pure existence. The romantic in Heidegger sees thinking as a task to 
take us away from the world of things towards Being itself. He is perhaps advocating a 
turning away from a world of events and decisions to employ poetry as an access to 
Being. This is quite a romantic position. Poetic language, for Heidegger, reveals the artist 
through the art, and thereby transcends both in that revealing. Heidegger reminds me 
here of Keats, in ‗Ode to a Nightingale,‘ longing for a draft of nature‘s wine which will 
fuse his soul with the forests, and in doing so escape the dull world of men.60 As Walter 
Kaufmann suggests, for Heidegger, due to the essential alienation of common sense 
from the source of our being, we must rely on poetic creations like those of Hölderlin to 
supply us with a thinking that recalls Being rather than represents it.61 It is far beyond 
                                                 
59 Martin Heidegger “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Basic Writings, trans David Krell, (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1993), 197. 
60 John Keats Ode to a Nightingale. The exact lines are from the second stanza and are as follows, 
 
O for a draught of vintage! that hath been 
 Cool'd a long age in the deep-delvèd earth, 
Tasting of Flora and the country-green, 
 Dance, and Provençal song, and sunburnt mirth! 
O for a beaker full of the warm South! 
 Full of the true, the blushful Hippocrene, 
With beaded bubbles winking at the brim, 
And purple-stainèd mouth; 
That I might drink, and leave the world unseen, 
 And with thee fade away into the forest dim: 
 
61 Walter Kaufmann Existentialism, From Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York: New American Library, 1975), 39. 
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the scope of this thesis to explain the Romantic elements of Heidegger‘s thought; 
however the point needs to be made that perhaps Heidegger‘s lack of enthusiasm for 
confronting the urgent practical tasks of human society is explainable by his affiliation 
with romantic thinkers. This is significant because Havel is not an avid reader of the 
romantics. Havel‘s literary taste runs more to modern writers such as Kafka. There might 
be a point to be made about the difference in focus between the two thinkers and their 
literary interests. The modernist‘s direction towards the demands of society is strong in 
Havel and the romantic direction towards nature is strong in Heidegger. 
Thinking for Heidegger, in its purest form, thinks Being, and is the way to engender a 
change in the nihilistic path of humanity. In the interview that Heidegger gives to Der 
Spiegel, Heidegger is continually pressed for an opinion about whether or not he believes 
in a political system that can enhance good political life. Heidegger continually maintains 
that he does not believe in any currently existing political system.62 It is probable that 
Heidegger is trying to remove the associations in his past with the national socialist 
movement that had haunted his later career. Yet there is also something deeper in 
Heidegger‘s denial of utility in political systems. The fact is that Heidegger‘s philosophy is 
not a political philosophy. Pure thinking and politics, for Heidegger, are completely 
separated. Politics, for Heidegger, is a part of what he calls the ―fallenness into beings‖ 
and thinking of Being is an emancipation from this fallenness. In the Der Spiegel 
interview, when asked about which political system is most appropriate for our times, 
Heidegger responds, 
 
That I don‘t see. But I do see a decisive question here. First we would have to 
clarify what you mean by ―appropriate to our time,‖ what time means here. It 
                                                 
62 Heidegger “Der Speigel” 10. 
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is even more important to ask whether appropriateness to our time is the 
measure for the ―inner truth‖ of human actions, or whether ―thinking and 
writing poetry‖ [Denken und Dichten], despite all censure of this phrase, are 
not the actions that most provide us with a measure.63 
 
I think the above passage highlights the fact that Heidegger is not a political thinker. Yet 
the fact remains that Heidegger was an active member of the Nazi party. This political 
involvement might hint at a correlation between Heidegger‘s philosophy and his political 
perspectives. Did he believe that his philosophy, acted out politically, could be an escape 
from a technological disintegration of humanity? It is not the intention of this thesis to 
offer a definitive reading of Heidegger‘s philosophy and politics. There have been 
numerous accounts of his Nazism and its relation to his philosophy. I argue that his 
involvement in National Socialism, shows Heidegger to be politically naive. It is a fair 
suggestion that after the end of World War Two Heidegger became politically disengaged. 
During the war, Heidegger was delivering lectures on romantic poetry, and, by his own 
admission, he was not favoured by the party during the war years.64 Clearly the greater 
part of Heidegger‘s career as a philosopher is disengaged with fundamental questions of 
politics.  
Leslie Paul Thiele asserts that despite Heidegger‘s personal distance from politics, his 
philosophy, and its concern for freedom, represent a contribution to political thought. 
 
During  his  politically  active  career  as  rector  of Freiburg  University  under  
the  Nazi  regime, Heidegger  adopted  a  positive  concept  of  liberty.  In line  
with  Nazi  ideology,  which  he  fervently  propagated  during  his  brief  
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tenure,  Heidegger  situates  the self within  a  Volk that  circumscribes  and  
defines  its identity.65  
 
Thiele notes that this belief in positive liberty, and a correlated enthusiasm for the strict 
laws of National Socialism, is not followed up by Heidegger after resigning his rectorship 
in 1934. This turn away from positive liberty, Thiele asserts is replaced by a new 
conception of freedom in Heidegger‘s thought. Freedom, for Heidegger, is freedom to 
participate in the revealing of the what-is-as-such.66 As a practical political philosophy, 
this conception of freedom is lacking substance and plausibility. I also think it is a 
mistake to conflate enthusiasm for a particular political ideology in a particular place and 
time with a strong interest in political philosophy. By Heidegger‘s own admission, in 
National Socialism, the same tendency of technology to promote nihilism is found.67 In 
one of the few instances where Heidegger discussed the War, Heidegger compares the 
death camps to instrumentalising reason. This is pointed out by George Pattison who 
presents some justification for the view that Heidegger‘s membership of the party did not 
extend to support for the ‗Final Solution‘. Pattison refers to Heidegger‘s lecture ‗The 
Enframing‘ where Heidegger mentions death camps in an analogy with industrial 
production. Heidegger writes, ―Agriculture is now a motorised food-industry – in essence 
the same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, 
the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs‖68 For Pattison, and I agree with him, 
this is evidence that Heidegger equates the holocaust to his distrust of technological life. 
                                                 
65 Leslie Thiele “Heidegger on Freedom” The American Political Science Review, 88, No 2, (1994): 281. 
66 Ibid 282. 
67 Thomas Iain writing on Heidegger‟s aesthetics in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy finds in 
Heidegger‟s „The Age of the World Picture‟ a subtle critique of the National Socialist worldview. 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy “Heidegger‟s Aesthetics” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger-
aesthetics/ (accessed 26 May 2008). 
68 George Pattison, The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to the Later Heidegger (Kentucky: Routledge, 2000), 
28 
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The holocaust had industrialised death. For Heidegger, in Being and Time, death is an 
experience peculiar to Dasien. An individual is able to accept their death. The 
technological interpretation of death that is realised by the holocaust is censured by 
Heidegger.  
I do not deny that other thinkers have gleaned a political angle out of a Heideggerian 
perspective – I simply assert that Heideggerian concern for the technological 
impoverishment of the contemporary lifeworld is not yet a political philosophy: it fails to 
deal with the fundamental problems of social and political living. When his historical 
situation was in most need of political debate, Heidegger spoke about poetry. Havel‘s 
political philosophy is much richer in a political sense because of its concern for 
practicality. This richness, I will argue in chapters seven and eight, is a result of the 
liberal standpoint of Havel. 
For Havel, the political realm is the realm from which change happens. The problems 
of the technological world are addressed and a reprieve is offered to humanity via the 
political philosophy propounded in his work. There are clear differences between Havel‘s 
and Heidegger‘s political projects that are much greater than the shared nomenclature 
might suggest. Whereas Heidegger prefers a kind of meditative philosophy that can think 
Being without the taint of western metaphysics or science, Havel believes that real action 
motivated by a concern for Being can bring about a political change that can overcome 
the problems that humanity faces currently.    
Heidegger and Havel have a similar, though not equal, attitude to technology. Havel 
does not specify, as Heidegger does, that there is an essence of technology that runs 
divergent to the essence of Being. However Havel, like Heidegger, is worried about an 
increasingly technological world and its effect on one‘s relationship to Being. In Letter 
118 in Letters to Olga Havel writes, 
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Not long ago, while watching a report on cows on the television news, I 
realised that the cow is no longer an animal: it is a machine that has an 
―input‖ (grain feeds) and an ―output‖ (milk). It has its own production plans 
and its own operator whose job is the same as the job of the entire economy 
today: to increase output while decreasing input. The cow serves us quite 
efficiently, really, but at the cost of no longer being a cow, in the same way 
that northern Bohemia is an important source of fuel (that is, if an admixture 
of brown coal and clay can be called fuel) at the cost of ceasing to be our 
homeland and becoming something between the surface of the moon and our 
homeland.69  
 
The modern world is detrimentally technological and economical in Havel‘s eyes. Organic 
matter is viewed as an economic resource which technology exploits. Havel thinks that 
pride and historical identity have become  commodities. Heidegger‘s framing of the 
problem in terms of  the essence of technology is not present in the above example. In 
analysing the source of this shift in the identity of nature (of beings), Havel claims the 
dire situation of the world today is the result of a crisis in the experience of our absolute 
horizon.70  
The notion of horizons is borrowed from Patočka and will be further elaborated on in 
chapters three and four. For Havel, experience can be divided into horizons of 
experience. There is the concrete horizon, which is the totality of physical experience, 
and then there are conceptual horizons in which one exists as well. For example, I might 
not be in Syria at this present moment, but I can learn about a struggle for democratic 
reform and feel some sympathy for that struggle. In this instance I am living in the 
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70 Ibid  
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horizon of Syrian politics, or as Havel would say, the horizon of the world, rather than my 
immediate space. Havel, whilst in prison, compares horizons to walls. The concrete 
horizon‘s walls conceal the higher horizon of Being, the authentic, unrepresented 
horizon.71 ―Something higher than my family, my country, my company, my success.‖72 
The world that gives the family, the country, its history and customs, the success and 
failures is a world that is experienced in a host of ways by different humans. The shared 
experience of the world creates the need for responsibility. As there will be other humans 
in the future, it is my responsibility to leave a decent world for them to live in; as there 
are humans in Myanmar living under extreme oppression, it is my responsibility to push 
the ruling regime for change if I can.  
For Havel, being rooted in the intellectual and spiritual structures that define twentieth 
century living, is a disability when it comes to understanding or considering what Havel 
calls the horizon of Being. That is modern life fails to refer to, or recognise Being. Clearly 
there is a parallel that can be drawn to Heidegger‘s philosophy. Heidegger‘s explanation 
of the essence of technology, and its essential difference to the essence of Being is, 
however, missing form Havel‘s explanation. In Havel there is a greater focus on the 
concrete experience of everydayness. This is not disadvantageous. In fact there is great 
utility in Havel‘s story about watching the cows on television. He recognises a problem 
with modern living and offers an explanation for it. Modern life is not up to the task of 
‗living in truth‘ because regrettably it has lost the horizon of Being. However rather than 
dwelling on the taxonomy of that loss, as Heidegger does, Havel wants to make a 
difference. Heidegger‘s sense of a loss of hope for salvation is not found in the account 
of Havel. Havel wants to rescue humanity and conceives of this as a practical task.  
                                                 
71 Ibid, 122. 
72 Václav Havel quoted by Lewis Lapham in Goetz-Stankiewicz & Carey (ed), Critical Essays on Václav Havel 
94. 
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At the end of letter 118 Havel writes, 
 
If I consider the problem as that which the world is turning me into – that is, 
as a tiny screw in a giant machine, deprived of human identity – then there is 
really nothing I can do. Obviously I cannot put a stop to the destruction of the 
globe, the growing stupidity of nations and the production of new 
thermonuclear bombs. If, however, I consider it as that which each of us 
originally is, or rather what each of us – irrespective of the state of the world – 
has the basic potential to become, which is to say an, autonomous human 
being, capable of acting responsibly to and for the world, then of course there 
is a great deal I can do. 
For example I can try to behave in a way I think is proper, a way I am 
convinced everyone should behave – that is responsibly.73 
 
It seems as though Havel is speaking directly to Heidegger. A major point of difference 
between the two thinkers has emerged in this passage through the practical orientation 
of Havel‘s thought. If Havel is responsible for himself, for recovering his sense of Being, 
by living in truth, then Havel has made progress. If others do the same then there will be 
an existential revolution of sorts. Here the problems announced in the story of the cows 
are overcome through individuals being responsible to and for their Being. Rather than 
claiming that the problem humanity faces is too large and too entrenched in history to be 
solved, Havel reduces the problem to the individual as a representative of humanity, that 
is, to a person not constituting the whole of humanity, and consequently the problem 
becomes much smaller and manageable. 
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Havel takes from Heidegger the idea that there is a tendency for the self to lose itself 
through interaction with the Other, as Dasein identifies with the ‗They‘. There is an 
illustrative example of Havel‘s concern for the loss of the self in his play ‗The Garden 
Party,‘74 which centres on the adventures of young Hugo Pludek as he ventures out into 
the world of work. His parents, who have already worked, are identity-less, consumed by 
a jumble of clichés which are their only expression. In the opening scene the family of the 
protagonist are anxiously awaiting a very important visitor who will guide their son in his 
future. Despite the eagerness of their vigil, when the mother asks ―what if he doesn‘t 
come‖ the father responds ―if he doesn‘t come then somebody else will.‖ For Havel, this 
is a moral problem, because, as the ‗I‘ is subsumed in the ‗they‘, the very idea of 
personal responsibility is lost – one person is as good as another. This is a loss of the 
moral dimension of society. There is, in ‗The Garden Party,‘ a somewhat Heideggerian 
critique of the alienating effect of technology. However the concern for the loss of the 
moral is equally important if one is to understand Havel‘s position, this is something that 
has been largely overlooked scholarship on Havel. 
The Heideggerian analysis of alienation in modernity is, for Aviezier Tucker, the 
fundamental core of Havel‘s thought.75 This is not suficent for a complete analysis of 
Havel‘s position. Tucker is critical that it seems that in Havel‘s analysis, life outside of 
post-totalitarian conditions is as alienating as life under post-totalitarian conditions. 
Tucker argues that Havel‘s concern for politics both within and outside post-totalitarian 
life is lacking.76 This is a flawed position on Tucker‘s part. The central aim of this thesis is 
to explain Havel‘s philosophy as having a twenty-first century relevance. Tucker‘s claim 
                                                 
74 This is the most popular of Havel‟s plays and as Pontusso explains, deals with the workings of bureaucracy. 
The central point to keep in mind about this play is that the language of the characters on stage is vague and 
general. That is, they do not address any specific reality, but instead speak in general clichés. For a full review 
of the play‟s content, see Pontusso Václav Havel, 92-94.  
75 Tucker The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence, 140-142. 
76 Ibid 142. 
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that Havel‘s philosophy is a naive adoption of Heidegger‘s without critical analysis 
requires  careful response. In later chapters I will be employing Havel‘s philosophy to 
political problems addressed by other contemporary political thinkers like Jurgen 
Habermas, Chantal Mouffe, and John Rawls amongst others, and in each analysis I aim 
to present Havel‘s work as having relevance outside of the conditions of late socialism in 
which most of his writing was composed. In Chapter 7 I make it explicit that as soon as 
the velvet revolution had overthrown the communist regime, Havel is straight away 
concerned with increasing the horizon of political involvement in Czechoslovakia by 
applying for NATO membership and lobbing the U.N. for greater involvement in world 
affairs. This concern comes from recognition on Havel‘s part of a problem of modernity 
that is not at all specific to socialism. There is some enduring truth to Havel‘s insistence 
that life, in what he readily calls the post-modern world, is alienating.  
The loss of morality that comes with the alienating effects of modernity is a far 
stronger part of Havel‘s analysis than the Heideggerian core that Tucker critiques. The 
emphasis on responsibility in a political sphere is of paramount importance to Havel‘s 
thought. Pontusso is more correct to focus on Havel‘s understanding of a meaning in life 
rooted in the everyday.77 For Havel, Pontusso writes78, since the world contains structure 
and order, from culture, history, customs etc, there is nothing wrong with feeling 
authentic when engaging in everyday practices. I would go one step further and say that 
for Havel, life is meaningful when one lives in this concrete world of experience in a 
responsible way; that is, in a way which promotes individual self-fulfilment through a 
liberal understanding of the self. Havel‘s liberalism is the focus of a following chapter, 
but I want to suggest here that for Havel, the individual is charged with pursuing their 
                                                 
77 Pontusso, Václav Havel, 35. 
78 Ponstusso is analysing „Letter 76‟ from Letters to Olga, where Havel writes about the “order of Being” 
which is the meaningful world of customs, culture, aesthetics in which human beings are „thrown.‟ 173. 
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own unique understanding of happiness that is worked out in an existing political 
structure. This is best set out through an example. 
Havel, in his essay The Power of the Powerless, tells the famous story about the 
greengrocer placing a sign in his window proclaiming ‗Workers of the World unite!‘79 
Havel questions the greengrocer‘s motives in placing the sign in his window: 
 
I think it can safely be assumed that the overwhelming majority of 
shopkeepers never think about the slogans they put in their windows, nor do 
they use them to express their real opinions. That poster was delivered to our 
greengrocer from the enterprise headquarters along with the onions and the 
carrots. He put them all into the window simply because it had been done that 
way for years, because everyone does it, and because it is the way it has to 
be. If he were to refuse, there could be trouble .80 
 
The world that the greengrocer engages in, that is actually lives in, involves a set of 
ritualistic practices that maintain his existence in the social world. Havel intended this 
story to be a critique of socialist governance; however the moral reaches much further 
than this. The actions of the greengrocer, whether they are the performance of his job 
(placing of carrots and onions), or performing  his  social duty (placing the placard), for 
Havel represent those of a person in a thrown state of Being. It is the job and the social 
structure in which he live, which determine or coerce action from the greengrocer, and, 
also, in a sense determine his identity in the world. As a greengrocer it is natural to place 
onions and the carrots in a window, however, as a greengrocer there is something a little 
bit odd about placing a socialist slogan. 
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What is it that compels the greengrocer to place the slogan in his window? Havel 
writes that it is fear. Havel writes that the placing of the slogan is ―one of the thousands 
of details that guarantee him a relatively tranquil life ‗in harmony with society‘, as they 
say.‖81 The combined placing of slogans by all citizens affirms an ideology. What Havel 
calls ―the aims of life‖ are put aside in order to live in harmony with ideology. Life within 
the system, for Havel, is life within a lie, as one‘s actions are being determined by one‘s 
desire to not upset a system rather than being determined by a desire to live an 
authentic life. The totalitarian system is created and affirmed through the greengrocer‘s 
actions. He shares the guilt, along with all of the other participating citizens, in making 
normal the practice of affirming the totalitarian system. The identity of the greengrocer is 
tied in with his participation in the ideology‘s rituals and practices. Havel believes in an 
authentic existence which is outside and apart from ideology. Without having to have 
recourse to a metaphysical principle, Havel can assert that through a critical examination 
of one‘s actions and a refusal to act to the dictates of the ideology, one can be authentic 
to oneself. That behaviour must change to suit and propound an ideology, for Havel 
evidences the authenticity of life outside of the ideology. It is not enough to put up the 
sign and then complain to one‘s friends about a corrupt system; this behaviour still 
asserts the dominance of the ideology. Despite the criticism, the system still is being 
affirmed and recognised. When all one does is complain about how bad their life is, or 
how oppressed they are, the system that one complains about remains, still dictating 
behaviour and controlling life. For Havel the dissident denies the authority of the ideology 
by refusing to behave as the system dictates. and in effect dissident denies the ideology. 
By choosing to not place the sign, the greengrocer begins to ‗live in the truth‘.  
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‗Living in truth‘ is the key maxim of Havel‘s writings. It is the impetus behind his plays, 
it is the concern of his dissent, and it is foremost in his concerns as President. Living in 
truth is living outside of the coercions of ideology; that is being open to all possible 
appearances rather than focusing on a single mode of appearance. Being open to life‘s 
plurality is living in truth. In later chapters I will explain living in truth as a kind of Socratic 
inquiry , an inquiring into the nature of things to reveal their mendacity rather than living 
in a set or prescribed way.  Living in truth is living responsibly towards Being. James Sire 
describes living in truth as listening to the call of conscience, as the call to Being.82 This 
is only half right. Sire intends to show Havel to be a Christian thinker and so it is natural 
for him to limit living in truth to a Christian conscience. Living in truth is better conceived 
of as a critical activity and framing this activity as listening to the call of conscience tends 
to obscure this. By living in truth, through rational inquiry, a false ritual that one 
participates in can be revealed as false, endowing one with the responsibility to not 
comply with that ritual. This is a more complex conception of conscience than Sire 
admits.  
It is clear that living in truth is a moral philosophy that deals with practical political 
actions, consequently the similarity of Havel‘s analysis of modernity with Heidegger‘s 
does not suffice to understand Havel‘s philosophy. Heidegger by his own admission, is 
not concerned with prescribing a political philosophy for acting to counter the nihilism 
inherent in modernity, instead his focus is on thinking the nothing that modernity 
excludes in its acceptance as scientific instrumentality as the only mode of thinking. 
Havel on the other hand does see the same alienating effects of modernity; however he 
sees his task as generating a practical solution to halting the spread of nihilism. This 
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separation will be better worked out through a more specific discussion of Havel‘s and 
Heidegger‘s conception of the political significance of art. 
 
The Political Significance of Art 
 
In this section I discuss the political significance of art in the philosophy of Heidegger 
and Havel. More specifically I will argue that art, for Heidegger is not politically 
significant, whereas for Havel art can contain a political significance which encourages or 
affects a life in truth. Timothy Garton Ash, in an article in the New York Review quotes 
Havel from a conference of writers involved with PEN an organisation which supports 
writers who are persecuted for political reasons. Havel, speaking to the collection of 
writers suggests that they, 
 
..gradually begin to create something like a worldwide lobby, a special 
brotherhood or, if I may use the word, a somewhat conspirational mafia, 
whose aim is not just to write marvellous books or occasional manifestoes but 
to have an impact on politics and its human perceptions in a spirit of 
solidarity, and in a coordinated, deliberate way...83 
 
Havel is not offering a normative theory of art here; instead he is highlighting the effect 
that art can have on politics. For Havel, art is a means of living in truth, as through art 
one justifies one‘s position and one can bring the given into question. Josef Chytry in his 
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work Unis Vers Cythère claims that Havel, in his work in the theatre had hoped to exploit 
the art of the theatre for political change.84 
Chytry‘s explanation of Havel‘s position contrasts with Heidegger‘s attitude to art.  For 
Heidegger, art does reveal truth. For Havel, art is best when it is political. This is because 
for Havel, art can inspire political action in an individual. As Paul Wilson, Havel‘s friend, 
translator, and former member of the band Plastic People of the Universe, notes ―Havel‘s 
[priority in his writings] was to [inspire] action – not organised mass action, but to a revolt 
of individuals, a revolt of conscience.‖85 Art, for Havel, can have a primary role in 
instigating this individual action. By exploring Heidegger‘s attitude to art we will see key 
differences between the two thinkers that will again reinforce the political focus of 
Havel‘s efforts in all forms of his writing. 
In The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking Heidegger explains the completion 
of metaphysical thinking that is affected by the separation of the sciences from 
philosophy. Thinking, in so far as thinking brings Being into a clearing – in other words 
reveals Being – must be from a source that is neither metaphysical nor scientific. For 
Heidegger, politics speaks in the language of positivism, (by positivism Heidegger means 
a kind of scientism - that is a philosophy of beings only) and is therefore not the kind of 
preparatory thinking that he sees as necessary to escape humanity‘s current 
predicament. Science, as has already been discussed, is incapable of bringing Being into 
the clearing and for Heidegger, even philosophy is incapable of this task. The entirety of 
western metaphysics, for Heidegger (and Patočka after him), is written in Platonic 
language. Even when we consider then work of Nietzsche, who vehemently opposed 
Platonic metaphysics, we find that Nietzsche presented himself as an antithesis of Plato. 
In other words Nietzsche engaged in dialogue with Platonic philosophy; hence even 
                                                 
84 Josef Chytry, Unis Vers Cythère, (New York: Peter Lang, 2009), 120. 
85 Paul Wilson “Václav Havel in Word and Deed” in Stankiewicz-Goetz & Carey, Critical Essays on Václav 
Havel, 24. 
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Plato‘s opposite is still in essence a Platonic philosopher. Since Nietzsche represents the 
end of philosophy in Heidegger‘s mind, even the end of philosophy is intrinsically 
Platonic. 
Philosophy has missed something vital. It has failed to be the revealer of Being, which 
for Heidegger is the proper task of philosophy. Heidegger writes, ―Still, the clearing as 
such as it prevails through Being, through presence, remains un-thought in philosophy, 
although it is spoken about in philosophy‘s beginning.‖86 Heidegger is referring to the 
concept of alethia - a Greek concept which means a bringing into a clearing ,or a 
revealing. It is Parmenides who Heidegger quotes as the originator of this idea. It is vital 
to note that Heidegger is referring to a poem composed by Parmenides. The End of 
Philosophy and the Task of Thinking is a relatively late article written by Heidegger but it 
is not a new idea of his that the kind of thinking involved in poetry and meditation on 
poetry is the thinking that involves bringing Being into the clearing of unconcealment. 
Concerning alethia, or revealing, Heidegger writes that ―[t]he meditative man is to 
experience the untrembling heart of unconcealment.‖87 The idea of an untrembling heart 
of unconcealment is very confusing. Heidegger means that the meditative man has 
access to the experience Being - of the ―the possible presencing of presence itself.‖88 
Poetry brings things into the clearing in which Being is discerned most easily and with the 
greatest level of achievement. Poetry and not political action bring Being into the light of 
the clearing. 
In an earlier essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger explains the importance of 
artistic thinking for revealing Being.  
 
                                                 
86 Martin Heidegger “The End of Philosophy” in Basic Writings, trans David Krell, (New York: Harper Collins, 
1993), 444. 
87 Ibid 444. 
88 Ibid 445 
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Thus in the work it is truth, not merely something true, that is at work. The 
picture that shows peasant shoes, the poem that says the Roman fountain, 
do not simply make manifest what these isolated beings as such are – if 
indeed the manifest anything at all; rather, they make unconcealment as such 
happen in regard to beings as a whole.89  
 
What is missing from western philosophy is explicitly present in the functioning of art. It is 
in the making a work of art, and the consequent work of art that contains the notion of 
alethia – the clearing - that is so vital to Heidegger. Heidegger discusses Mayer‘s poem 
about a Roman fountain.90 The poem says the roman fountain, it brings the fountain into 
thought. The poem discloses the being of the fountain in its Being. In the same way, the 
peasant shoes in Van Gough‘s painting reveal not only various facts about the shoes, 
that they are leather, and to be worn on the feet. Instead, as Hans Jaeger makes clear, 
―Van Gough‘s painting has revealed to us what the peasant shoes really and truly are.‖91 
The shoes really and truly are a part of the peasant, of her rootedness to the world – they 
reveal truth as the world of the peasant. For Heidegger, this unconcealing is the role of 
art. Jaeger makes the point that for Heidegger ―A work of art establishes truth by means 
of erecting a world.‖ This point must be conditioned with the knowledge that art, in 
erecting a world, is still in the world. Truth for Heidegger is about a strife between what is 
revealed and what is concealed. Engaging with a work of art then is engaging this strife. 
Art then can be considered as a beginning of strife, because art brings the world into 
question. Heidegger writes, ―[w]henever art happens... only then history begins or begins 
                                                 
89 Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” 164 
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91 Hans Jaeger “Heidegger and the Work of Art,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 17, no 1 (1958),  
61. 
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anew.‖92 This is a very different conception of art than that of art as a representation of 
reality.  
Another point of concern is that for Heidegger, any kind of aesthetics are nihilistic. 
Aesthetics is symptomatic of subjectivism. This is because aesthetics represents a 
human attempt to master our nature rather than let it happen. Aesthetics fundamentally 
presents the world as a subject - object dichotomy, as the subject applies the aesthetic 
to the art object and interprets it. This is a kind of technical thinking and is therefore 
erroneous for uncovering truth in art.  
Havel seems to agree that art is about unconcealing.93 However rather than escaping 
from the world to Being, Havel sees art as a way to reveal the mendacious and reversible 
trend of thought as techne. The concern of Havel‘s plays is for drawing the audience 
attention to the absurdity of life under ideological conditions. This same concern is 
throughout his writings, but here I want to focus on his thoughts regarding art and art‘s 
ability to reveal false political structures. Havel does not provide a clear discussion of 
aesthetics; however he does, on numerous occasions, write regarding the role of art in 
enriching civil society. In his speech ‗On Evasive Thinking‘ Havel claims that a state that 
promotes pluralistic modes and genres of art is better because the totality of art is able 
to reflect the pluralistic condition of humanity? 94 This speech was made in opposition to 
state pressure to restrict the kind of literature being published. Similar themes are found 
in ‗Dear Dr Husak,‘ an open letter published in 1975 to Gustav Husak who was then the 
General Secretary of the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia.95 Writing about the 
censorship of art and the promotion of a single art that promotes the values of the ruling 
ideology, Havel lambasts the party for restricting art in the public sphere. Havel is not 
                                                 
92 Ibid 71. 
93 I write, “seems to agree...” because Havel does not offer a clear or explicit aesthetic.  
94 Havel Open Letters 10-24. 
95 Ibid 50-83. 
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concerned about a restriction on the ability to reveal Being. Instead art for Havel, is a 
means through which a society, or a collection of people in a political space, become 
aware of themselves. Heidegger agrees with this role of art, but critiques the very idea of 
aesthetics as a symptom of subjectivism. Havel on the other hand wants to promote a 
range of competing aesthetics, to enlighten the concrete world of experience. Using art to 
reveal the truth of Being is not Havel‘s concern; his concern is for using art to instigate 
political action which will be responsible to Being.  
Havel calls art an ―organ through which a society becomes aware of itself.‖96 With this 
in mind I wish to return to the above discussion of the political focus of Havel‘s work. I 
made the claim, which was an extension of Pontusso‘s analysis of Havel‘s thought, that 
Havel‘s philosophy is not concerned with the revelation of Being. Rather Being is taken 
for granted and Havel is concerned with the concrete phenomenological reality. Nothing 
makes this distinction between Heidegger‘s and Havel‘s thought clearer than Havel‘s 
claims about the role of art. Havel sees art as a means to explore the order of Being, the 
manifold ways in which individuals find meaning in their life, and the manifold ways in 
which a person can be responsible; he does not see art as a light to illuminate Being.  
Other comments by Havel regarding art take this point further. In Letters to Olga, 
Havel writes about the use of symbols in art, that they should be pluralistic and have no 
fixed meaning.97  This is because Havel sees art as something to reveal the pluralistic 
mesh of intertwined customs, beliefs, histories etc, which comprise a political reality. 
Art‘s meaning, for Havel, should compete in the political sphere in the same way that 
ideas should. Art then reflects the incomprehensible nature of Being. Havel, it appears to 
me, with his thoughts on art, is celebrating the ambiguity of Being. On the one hand 
Being is real and fundamental, and it orders the concrete world of experience. On the 
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97 Havel Letters to Olga 170. 
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other hand, that ordering is so pluralistic in nature as to make living responsibly in that 
order a constant Socratic task of uncovering misinterpretations of the order of Being. 
Where the meaning of art is subject to competition in a political sphere, it is intuitively 
obvious, for Havel, that a more responsible understanding of the order of Being is 
attainable, as intrinsically bad ideas are revealed as such through a coming to 
awareness that is embodied in the contemplation of art. This interpretation is in line with 
that of Jean Bethke Elshtain. Elshtain argues that for Havel, we can never be certain that 
our choices are in accord with authentic principle; hence we must perpetually open 
ourselves up for critique. 98 
Allowing art to reflect society allows a contest of principles or a beginning  of  creative 
strife which aims at a getting closer to the order of Being through successive 
transformations of the existing concrete political order. This is the most important aspect 
of Havel‘s political philosophy in my view and Elshtain agrees. In her essay, ‗A Man for 
This Season: Václav Havel on freedom and Responsibility‘99 Elshtain argues that Havel‘s 
important idea is a continuous ―permanent agon‖ between tradition and transformation. 
This ―agon‖ requires, I will argue later, a liberal political situation. However it is obvious 
that Havel‘s political philosophy is rooted in directing the concrete world of experience 
towards a responsible society, not directing concrete experience to a transcendent 
experience of Being. 
Rooted in the intellectual and spiritual structures that define contemporary living is a 
disability when it comes to understanding or even aiming or looking at what Havel calls 
the horizon of Being. That is, modern life fails to refer or recognise Being. There is a great 
utility in Havel‘s story about watching the cows on television which was described above. 
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Havel recognises a problem with modern living and offers an explanation for it. Modern 
life is not up to the task of living in truth because regrettably it has lost the horizon of 
Being. Technology has taken away the impetus to belong to a specific order of being, and 
consequently the traditions which Elshtain says should be in contest with transformation, 
are not understood. However rather than dwelling on the taxonomy of that loss, as 
Heidegger does, Havel wants to make a difference. Heidegger‘s sense of a loss of hope 
for salvation is not found Havel. Havel wants to rescue humanity. Bringing Being into a 
clearing is not his task, rather he is interested in the uncovering responsibility to Being; in 
other words Havel asks what actions lead us to live in truth? At the end of letter 118 of 
Letters to Olga, which is quoted earlier in this chapter, Havel could be taken as speaking 
directly to Heidegger, or at last to someone who finds nihilism inevitable. A major 
difference between the two thinkers has emerged in this passage through the simplicity 
of Havel‘s thought. If Havel makes himself responsible for himself, for recovering his 
sense of Being, living in truth, then Havel has made progress. If others do the same then 
an existential revolution of sorts is realised where the problems of a technological society 
are overcome through individuals being responsible to their Being. Rather than claiming 
that the problem humanity faces is too large and too entrenched in history to be solved, 
Havel reduces the problem to the individual as a representative of humanity, not 
constituting the whole of humanity, and consequently the problem become much more 
manageable. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on a discussion of the differences between Havel and 
Heidegger‘s thought. Sire, Tucker and Pontusso are partially correct to cite the heavy 
influence of Heidegger on Havel; however Pontusso is more correct to locate the 
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divergence between the two regarding  the nature of Being. Heidegger‘s Being as a no-
thing is not conducive to Havel‘s understanding of the moral dimension of Being. That is, 
Havel cannot conceive of Being as lacking a foundation because that would mean that 
there would be no foundation for moral responsible action. Instead, from its foundation, 
Being orders concrete experience in a fine mesh of pluralistic possibilities which all have 
roots in the moral foundation of Being. Living in truth is Havel‘s method of tracing the 
string back to its moral foundation, not to reveal Being, but instead to be living 
authentically. This is a point that Pontusso makes; however it needs to be spelt out more 
clearly. This chapter made the point that Havel is fundamentally a political thinker, he is 
primarily concerned with how we should act in a political way. His use of Heidegger‘s 
critique of modernity is only meaningful when coupled with his attempt to transform the 
political sphere. Havel does not share Heidegger‘s pessimism about the possibility of a 
politics genuinely open to question of Being, but he transforms the task of being open to 
that question: it becomes in his hands a matter living in the truth, not of revealing the no-
thing of Being. Havel sees political action as a means of recovering a meaningful political 
space where individuals can be authentic. 
In order to demonstrate that the difference between Havel and Heidegger is Havel‘s 
political focus, this chapter explored the utility of art in both thinkers. For Heidegger, his 
thoughts on Mayer‘s poem, or on Van Gogh‘s painting of the peasant‘s shoes, suggest 
that art is a means of transcending the ordinary everyday world of experience. For Havel, 
art is a means of infusing meaning in the political sphere, and testing meaning in the 
political sphere. 
The next chapter will further elaborate on Havel‘s idea of living in truth by exploring 
and ultimately rejecting the religious interpretation of Havel‘s thought. 
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Chapter  2: Exploration of a Religious Element in Havel‘s Political 
Philosophy 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore Havel‘s notion of Being and ask whether or not Havel‘s 
thought can be labelled religious or not. I can only give a tentative answer to this 
question because Havel does use a lot of Christian terminology in his writings, and yet is 
also explicit in his rejection of theism throughout his writing. However the question, 
whether completely answerable or not, is still important because it allows for a further 
examination of Havel‘s political philosophy. Not only that, Havel‘s possible religiosity has 
framed many analyses of his thought, and these will be explored in this chapter. 
Ultimately the argument of this chapter is that Havel‘s mentioning of religious symbols is 
best understood as coming from a lack of resources in his thinking to explain the idea of 
transcendence that is a hallmark of his work. Havel uses religious ideas in much the 
same way that he speaks of music and in much the same way as he uses the absurd in 
his plays: as a carrier of thinking that calls the present political moment into question. 
Havel is on a constant search for symbols to call the given world into question, and that 
some of these symbols are Christian is not a sign of Christian belief, but instead a use of 
symbols available to him that help express his thought. For example, if we explore the 
presence of hope in Havel‘s use of the absurd in his plays and in his writing on his plays, 
we find that hope, for Havel, is not necessarily a concept that requires a spiritually 
transcendent anchor.  
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In Letters to Olga, Havel writes that the theatre allows him to ―grasp the world‖ in 
three meaningful ways.100  The first is as a bridge to ―interexistentiality;‖ as the theatre 
creates a community of others whose common participation brings the community 
together as a morally responsible and authentic presence. Secondly the theatre has the 
immediate power of demystifying the world of appearances. That is through the depiction 
of a reality on stage, and through the reflection, by the audience, on their own lives‘ 
relationship to the reality of the stage‘s life, a mirror is held up to the mendacious 
elements of the audience‘s life. Ideological, and therefore inauthentic, behaviours 
coerced by ideology are revealed through the theatre and the impetus is then to be 
authentic with the knowledge that one has not been authentic. The third way that the 
theatre allows Havel to grasp the world is through the theatre‘s power to represent the 
importance of structure and order in that it is structure and order which organises the 
performance. I take this to mean that Havel understands that dissent or living in truth is 
not a form of anarchism. That the structures of everyday life are to be explored and 
examined, but not necessarily completely abandoned. In other words, the theatre shows 
that the world of politics is a man-made construction, and that the construction itself is 
very important; but within that structure there needs to be a constant re-examining of the 
authenticity of behaviour. Havel‘s dissident activities are not a promotion of a return to 
some state of nature, as chapters 7 and 8 will elaborate in greater detail, Havel‘s 
thought is best understood as a liberal political philosophy. Drawing on the discussion of 
art in the previous chapter, there is, in the theatre‘s depiction of an unreal world, a power 
to present, or open up a space for, the idea of political change.  
In revealing the world of appearances, in that the theatre itself is a world of 
appearance, there is hope that the audience can recognise the elements of the unreal 
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play which are a real part of their lives. The theatre then is a catalyst for hope, without 
needing a guiding metaphysical principle to elicit progress. The theatre has the power of 
transforming agents to be able to see through ideology and then responsibly oppose it. In 
the Letters to Olga, Havel recorded his thoughts on absurdist theatre‘s relationship to 
faith and hope.101 For Havel, the absurd in theatre is a cry against meaninglessness. The 
presence of the absurd, in his plays, is the presence in faith; faith that the absurd in the 
world outside of the theatre can be overcome and that meaning can be restored to 
life.102 What is meaningful for Havel is left, as it usually is, unexplained. Havel 
ambiguously says that absurdist art is an attempt to orientate man towards the higher 
horizon of Being. This is not necessarily a theological horizon; it can be understood as a 
conceptual understanding of the world‘s historical traditions which have given rise to the 
current world situation. Some commentators give Christian readings of Havel on faith 
and hope.  Patrick Deneen, for example, uses Christian philosophers to describe Havel‘s 
attitude to faith. It is my intention in this chapter to draw attention to a non-Christian 
interpretation of Havel‘s philosophy which I believe is better able to be sustained. It will 
be argued that Havel uses quasi-religious language in a symbolic or metaphorical way. 
 
Some Problems with Being as God 
The question of Havel‘s religious conviction has been raised in many scholarly articles 
on Havel. This section will critically examine the arguments advanced in this literature 
and offer an alternative interpretation of Havel‘s apparent religiosity.  
                                                 
101 Ibid 151-152. 
102 See also J.P Stern “Havel‟s Castle” in Critical Essays on Václav Havel, edited by  Marketa Goetz- 
Stankiewicz & Phyllis Carey. (New York: G.K. Hall & Co., 1999), 31-44. 
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Stephen Schiff‘s article from Vanity Fair, reprinted in a collection of critical essays on 
Havel is a useful starting point for exploring religious themes in Havel.103 Schiff 
interviewed Havel for the article in 1991 and asked Havel why he was so willing to risk 
harm to himself on so many occasions throughout his life. His response was ―It‘s fear of 
my conscience, or God, if you want.‖104 Havel refers to a fear of God, but hedges. He is 
aware that people interpret his ideas in a religious framework and is not backing away 
from interpretations like this, but the important point is that he is not verfiying them 
either. The telling word in that reply is ―you.‖ This suggests that Havel is happy for 
religious people, embarking on their own struggle for a life in truth, to use their faith in 
God to assist in the struggle against ideology. For Havel, to assert God as the source of 
conscience would put him on a path to supporting a dogma; which, as this chapter will 
explain, is in contradiction with a life in truth.  
James Sire writes that Havel‘s considerations of morality are ―close, if not identical, to 
a fully theistic conception of God.‖105 He claims that a hallmark of Havel‘s work is a 
combination of Christian theism and Heideggerian metaphysics.106 This is an odd claim 
for Sire to make, because, later in the book, he agrees with Roger Scruton‘s assertion 
that Heidegger ―may be unintelligible.‖107 As unintelligible as Heidegger is for Sire, Sire 
still claims that it is through a Christian and Heideggerian lens that Havel‘s work is best 
understood. However, I believe that Sire is overstating the case. Sire writes that Havel 
uses the term ―Being‖ like a Christian uses ―God.‖  However this contradicts the 
elaborate rejection of Christian theism that Havel puts forward. In Disturbing the Peace 
Havel writes, 
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104 Ibid 86 
105 James Sire Václav Havel, 59. 
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There are some things that I have felt since childhood: that there is a great 
mystery above me which is the focus of all meaning, and therefore is more 
than just a cluster of improbable accidents; that in my own life I am reaching 
for something that goes far beyond me and the horizon of the world that I 
know; that in everything I do I touch eternity in a strange way…genuine 
conversion as I understand it, would mean replacing an uncertain 
―something‖ with a completely unambiguous personal God, and fully, 
inwardly, to accept Christ as the Son of God, along with everything that that 
entails, including the liturgy. And I have not taken that step.108 
 
I am not able to fully reject the possibility of Havel‘s theism; however I do reject the 
Christian interpretation of Havel. Havel is not offering a way to understand a deity; nor is 
he is offering a Christian understanding of the universe as love or some other distinctly 
Christian position. He is solely concerned, as will be spelled out throughout the thesis, 
with responsible action in a political situation, any political situation. A life in truth does 
not require a Christian perspective. Demonstrating how one can reveal ideological 
apparatus at play in everyday life is not the task of the Christian. The Christian position, 
with its rituals, in the above passage seems like another ideological position - something 
perhaps to be overcome through a life in truth. Havel can be a moral absolutist and not 
be a Christian. Such a view is the best reading of Havel. 
Hannah Arendt in her essay ‗What is Existential Philosophy?‘ argues that what is 
characteristic about modern philosophy is the realization that the What will never be able 
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to understand the That.109 Arendt refers to Schelling‘s later philosophy which takes 
existence as its starting point. Schelling was aware that reason could not understand 
Being,110 and so rational consciousness is left with the paradoxical fact that it is and yet 
how it is and why it is are not answerable questions. Arendt traces this line of thinking 
through Kierkegaard, who interpreted Socrates‘ willingness to die on the gamble that 
there might be an afterlife as demonstrating Socrates acceptance of the contingent and 
paradoxical state of Being.  
 
Socrates exemplifies the existing philosopher with his ―if there is an 
immortality.‖ ―Was he therefore a doubter?‖ Kierkegaard continues... ―By no 
means. On this ‗if‘ he risks his entire life, he has the courage to meet death... 
The Socratic ignorance... was thus an expression for the principle that the 
eternal truth is related to an existing individual, and that this truth must 
therefore be a paradox for him as long as he exists.‖111 
 
My intention in introducing Arendt‘s explanation for the groundlessness of being, or the 
inability to find a ground, is to draw a parallel to Havel‘s attitude to Being. Arendt 
describes a tradition of doing philosophy from existence rather than to existence. 
Traditional theism works to existence. Existential phenomenology, the tradition to which 
Heidegger and Havel belong, is philosophy done from existence. It seems, then, that a 
theistic understanding of Havel‘s concept of Being misplaces his philosophy. The 
question is whether a close reading of Havel and Heidegger, and the relation between 
them bears this out. Since the previous chapter explored Heideggerian interpretations of 
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Havel it would be illustrative to tease out this idea further by exploring Heidegger‘s Being 
and asking if it is, in some sense, God. 
I want to explore more fully the term Being and a possible theistic interpretation of it 
by examining John Macquarie‘s investigation of Heidegger‘s Christianity. As I argued in 
chapter one, I do believe that Havel is not as much of a Heideggerian as commentators 
such as Sire take him to be.112 Heideggerian interpretations of Havel‘s work overstate 
the case. Simply because Havel capitalises the ―B‖ in Being, and uses terms like 
‗throwness‘ and ‗existence-in-the-world‘, does not mean that we should read Havel as a 
Heideggerian. On the other hand, it doesn‘t follow that we should overlook all points of 
connection between Havel and Heidegger. Instead one should be wary. Havel makes use 
of Hedeggerian terminology, and in so doing locates himself in the tradition of existential 
phenomenology. The question is can Sire‘s claim that Havel‘s Being is a reference to 
Christianity‘s God can be supported by any link between Havel and Heidegger? I will 
argue that it does not because Heidegger‘s concept of Being is not fundamentally 
theistic. 
Macquarie, in his book Heidegger and Christianity discusses the problems with trying 
to find a neat concept of God in Heidegger.113 While not finding a philosophy that is 
consistent with a theistic perspective, Macquarie still pushes the idea that Heidegger is a 
religious thinker. He finds that in Heidegger‘s Letter on Humanism, the impossibility of 
the saying ‗Being is‘ highlights the converse usefulness of the phrase ‗there is Being‘. 
‗There is Being‘ implies a giving of Being. In order to explain this Macquarie quotes 
Heidegger. 
 
                                                 
112 See Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
113 John Macquarie, Heidegger and Christianity, (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 
1999).  
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We try to bring the It and it‘s giving into view, and capitalize the ―It‖. We are 
then to fix our attention on the ‗It gives‘, which seems to be the source of 
Being and time. ‗It gives Being‘ means that there is presence, that there is 
unconcealment, that Dasein is brought into the clearing.114 
 
Macquarie then explains this somewhat confusing passage of Heidegger‘s in theological 
language: 
 
‗To think explicitly of God, you must think of him in abstraction from all 
created things,‘ or, to put it in another way, try to think of an act of pure 
creating , apart from any creature that is created. This would be to think of the 
ontological difference between Being and being, or theologically expressed, 
the difference between God and the ens creatum.115 
 
Macquarie is almost equating Heidegger‘s concept of Being with a concept of God 
despite, as Macquarie points out, Heidegger‘s insistence that Being is not God. It seems 
as though Macquarie is tempting the reader to make the conclusion that Heidegger is a 
theist. Macquarie never explicitly writes that Being is God;  but the strength with which 
Macquarie explains the idea of Being as the ‗It gives‘ tempts the reader to equate Being 
with the ultimate image of the giver: God. For Macquarie, the ‗It gives‘ is an act of 
creation; Being therefore is a creationary act. The obvious religious connotations of such 
a definition of Being are not lost on Macquarie. Macquarie writes that one might argue 
that ―Being has taken the place of God‖. 
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Heidegger himself claims that violence is permissible in hermeneutics, he 
could hardly object if some of his readers claimed to find meanings which he 
did not wish them to find. But it is the ‗It gives‘ that is more ultimate even 
than Being and seems to come close to what has ordinarily been understood 
as God. In Christian theology, God is love. In Heidegger, ‗It gives‘ is an act of 
giving or donation, and since he has told us that the ‗It‘ which gives Being is 
Being itself, then the act of giving is also an act of self giving, and so not 
different in any major respect from love.116 
 
Macquarie gives good grounds for asserting that ‗It gives‘ is God-like in a number of 
absolutely central respects. However, Macquarie is unwilling to call this a Christian God. 
Instead he avers to Heidegger‘s reading of the history of western philosophy where the ‗It 
gives‘ is forgotten ―in favour of the gift which It gives‘. Heidegger‘s notion of the forgetting 
of Being is explained by this preference and consequently the metaphysical urge in man 
is explained by Heidegger as an historical insecurity on the part of Dasien. The ‗It gives‘ is 
an event, a manifestation of Being and time. The western tradition has objectified the gift 
which the ‗It gives‘ gives and so metaphysics has been directed towards the substance of 
beings rather than viewing Being as an event of giving. Thus Heidegger‘s thought in one 
sense lambasts the Christian tradition for objectifying Being and in that act forgetting 
Being. However Macquarie is searching in Heidegger‘s thought for a ―holy reality‖ – that 
is a transcendent force which is the heart of all Being. It is a bold move to call the 
transcendent in Heidegger‘s philosophy a ―holy reality‖ and Macquarie does not make 
this move -  as much as he would perhaps like to. 
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The idea of nothingness in Heidegger‘s writings appears as the foundation of Being. In 
his famous essay What is Metaphysics?, Heidegger writes that ―Da Sein means: being 
held out into the nothing.‖117 This expresses an anti-foundationalist perspective. I agree 
with Macquarie that there is a sense of giving in the notion of Being, as Being gives a 
thingness to nothing. However Macquarie does not make the final leap in logic to call 
Heidegger‘s ‗It gives‘ a god. Macquarie is wise in this decision. The matter of Heidegger‘s 
religiosity remains unclear and this lack of clarity is even more evident in Havel. 
Macquarie‘s ultimate conclusion is that if one looks for a personal God in Heidegger, it is 
not there; however, if one looks for an impersonal and non-essential God, who is more 
like an event than any kind of existing substance, who is ―suprapersonal,‖ then one could 
suggest that Heidegger is a theist.  This is not entirely satisfying. Claiming a theistic 
principle sans personal god in Heidegger‘s thought seems strained. In the same way, the 
idea of a personal God, I contend, is not an aspect of Havel‘s thought, even though I 
cannot reject the possibility of a much broader theistic principle. 
Havel’s Being 
Havel does not explicate a detailed philosophy of Being. Instead Being is inherent in 
his thought, it does not need to be found or explained. Instead, what is important for 
Havel is beings‘ relationship to Being. Havel‘s idea of ‗living in the truth‘ presupposes a 
notion of Being. That is, a life in truth is a life lived in authentic relationship to Being. Or 
to use Havel‘s terms, a life lived in accordance with the order of Being. Sire writes on 
‗living in the truth‘: 
 
First, there is a truth to live in. In Havel‘s work that truth is the presence of 
Being itself – that which makes everything to be. In practice it means that 
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when one is doing what one ought to do, one is expressing the character of 
being in the actions of its ―thrown,‖ derivative other – that is, in human being. 
Being so understood, is a given, a fundamental, a presupposition. 118 
 
In light of this, it might be possible to draw a similarity between Heidegger‘s ‗It gives‘ and 
Havel‘s Being. Sire calls Being ―that which makes everything to be‖.119 This sounds like 
an act of creation. But it would be detrimental to read too much into Sire‘s explication of 
Havel. The giving nature of Being is only referred to minimally, as ―that which makes 
everything to be. This is a misreading of Havel. Being is not a creationary force, it is the 
normative source of reality but not explained as the force of creation. Comparing this 
concept of Being to Heidgegger‘s concept of the ‗It gives‘ is to make an interpretative 
leap that is unjustified. Also, the statement, ―there is a truth to live in‖ is not how Havel 
would phrase it at all. Havel‘s truth is a negative truth, that is, rather than thinking of 
truth as a concrete realizable condition at which we aim, Havel argues that a life in truth 
is a life that is constantly justifying oneself through self-scrutiny. Hence Havel does not 
argue that there is a truth to live in, contra Sire‘s interpretation. For Havel, the valuable 
life strives to live truthfully; it does not aim at some pre-given truth. In fact, Macquarie‘s 
analysis of Heidegger, which is useful for considering Sire‘s analysis of Havel, is actually 
not applicable to Havel. Havel is doing something different in his analysis of how to 
behave to Being, not to discover Being, but to make a better political situation in which to 
live. 
Havel‘s sense of Being, in my opinion, is not a force that gives existence, it is the force 
of existence. It is that which exists. Havel describes Being as the sensation that 
something is. For Havel being is the normative source of reality; as mentioned in the 
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previous chapter, Being is the fundamental experience that something is. This is not a 
cryptic ‗It gives‘ or some other creationary force.  Havel‘s attitude to Being is thus: 
humans frame the world with normative demands on them and it is just better to 
understand the world in this response dependent way. I can‘t say that there is a 
metaphysical deity who calls us to responsibility; instead I argue that it is better to 
consider Havel as advising that it is fitting and satisfactory to frame the world in this way. 
I claim that Havel‘s Being is not even similar to Heidegger‘s Being. Havel is doing 
something completely different to Heidegger. Havel is concerned with how an individual 
frames their identity in the world and is warning of the danger of using ideology to frame 
one‘s decisions. Being is the world unmolested by ideology, hence it is the point at which 
to aim to escape ideological living. 
Havel, when he does ambiguously explain Being, sees Being as capable of being 
divided, for the purposes of explanation, into two layers.120 The first is the thrown world 
that a person finds themselves situated in – the immediate world of experience. The 
second, is the world of pure Being - the world outside of relative experience. It is from this 
world that Havel‘s ‗higher‘ concepts like responsibility and life in truth arise from. This is 
because the second world incorporates all experiences. The best way to explain Havel‘s 
Being is through another writer who espouses a very similar view to that of Havel, David 
Foster Wallace. The essay ‗Plain Old Untrendy Troubles and Emotions‘ puts forward a 
world view that helps explain Havel‘s two levels of Being.  
Wallace describes two fish swimming who encounter a third fish who asks how the 
water is. The fish, confused, respond by asking each other water is. They are so caught 
up in swimming that they are unaware that they are even in water.121 Wallace unpacks 
                                                 
120 Havel Letters to Olga, 358. 
121 David Foster Wallace, “Plain Old Untrendy Troubles and Emotions” The Guardian, September 20, 2008. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2008/sep/20/fiction (accessed September 21, 2008). 
70 | P a g e  
 
this joke to explain how so many people are caught up in feeling themselves to be the 
centre of their own private universes, that they forget they are in a larger universe. 
Describing a trip to the super-market after a busy and frustrating day at work where 
everyone is tired and rude, Wallace suggests a new perspective. Rather than seeing the 
rudeness of the clerk as a direct attack on you, think instead that perhaps she has some 
personal tragedy which is taking up her mind, or something else, which removes you 
from being the cause of all reactions in the universe. In other words, remind yourself that 
you are swimming in metaphorical water, rather than take the world as it is given to your 
perception with you at the centre of your private insular universe. Such thinking that goes 
away from the self, is, for Wallace, sacred. For Havel, this is being responsible to the 
second layer of Being. In the next two chapters I will explore the relationship of Havel‘s 
thoughts on Being as sum of all experiences, and its relationship to Jan Patočka‘s idea of 
negative Platonism. Here though I want to draw attention to the Socratic leanings of the 
notion that Being is the negation of the singular experience of the self, and the move 
towards an understanding of a greater shared experience. 
An illustration from one of Havel‘s plays, The Increased Difficulty of Concentration, is 
an appropriate example Havel‘s position.122 The play was first produced in 1969 and 
received an Obie award in the 1969-1970 awards. The Increased Difficulty of 
Concentration is, as Sire notes, a play with many stories existing simultaneously.123 The 
story to focus on here is that of Huml. Huml is a social scientist who is dictating an essay 
on happiness to his secretary, attempting to have many extra marital affairs. 
When Huml is dictating a manuscript on human happiness to his secretary the 
dictation he is giving sounds very much like Havel‘s own position. Huml speaks of layers 
of human interaction, historical values, the importance of justice, the detriment of 
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scheming and alienation; yet despite the surface level importance of the dictation, it is 
empty, without life, and is hence somewhat meaningless – just a dictation of empty 
words. Chapter 4 will more fully explore the critique of discourse in this play, but here the 
point should be made that when the meaning of life is recorded down, it becomes 
dogmatic, like a dictation to a secretary. It is a speech about life made without life and 
hence becomes another aspect of the absurd in the play.  
A number of other Havel commentators muse on the possibility of a personal God in 
Havel‘s work. An early scholarly article exploring the possibility of a religious element to 
Havel‘s thought is Havel on Political Responsibility by Peter Lawler.124 Lawler is equivocal 
regarding the presence of a theistic principle in Havel‘s writings. The purpose of his 
article is to introduce the thought of Havel to America by comparing similarities in Havel‘s 
thought and the work of Russian dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn is 
unambiguously a Christian. Lawler writes that one of Solzhenitsyn‘s criticisms of the west 
is that western societies have ―deprived themselves of the gifts of nature and God – 
courage and spiritual life – that are the precondition for what happiness is possible for 
human beings.‖125 Setting up a discussion of Havel‘s address to Congress, Lawler 
describes Solzhenitsyn‘s term ‗humanistic autonomy‘ as the idea that man is ―free from 
any force above him.‖126 The suggestion is that a moral life requires a Christian theology; 
the result of freedom from Christianity is enslavement to the ordinary and every day and 
a loss of a moral society. I do not agree with the implicit argument in Lawler‘s article that 
the secularisation of society is responsible for the loss of a moral and meaningful 
political sphere. I think that it is possible to read the critique of modernity in Havel, and in 
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Heidegger, as not only a move away from Christian metaphysics, but away from 
metaphysics in general. Later in the thesis I will use Havel‘s political philosophy to 
combat the alienated and de-politicised space of neo-liberalism, which has the hallmarks 
of the insular society Lawler describes as being a result of a move away from Christianity 
in the west. However I do not see the rise of neo-liberal thought as a result of a loss of 
Christian theological explanations of man. Later in the article Lawler confusingly asserts 
that Havel is not a Christian and that he has no faith in a Christian God.127 Lawler 
confesses difficulties in understanding Havel without using the idea of a personal God. 
This is because Lawler can‘t seem to conceive of a higher horizon that doesn‘t take the 
form of a personal God.128  
Lawler in a later article changes his position somewhat after reading later speeches 
and letters by Havel that seem to him to promote a vague and confused spirituality.129 
This is not the most perceptive article on Havel; however it is directly concerned with the 
presence of religion in Havel‘s thought. The weakness in the article lies in Lawler‘s use of 
a later speech by Havel as a catalyst for revising an understanding of Havel‘s entire 
philosophy. This is a mistake because looking at the body of works by Havel the later 
speeches are far less important than the more thorough works of his dissident years. 
Nevertheless, Lawler‘s argument needs to be examined here. 
The later speeches of Havel are evidence for Lawler that Havel is not a Christian.130  
Instead Havel engages in what Lawler terms ―post modern science.‖ This is basically an 
attempt to anchor moral principles, previously based on a transcendent authority like a 
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Christian God, to a different, more currently acceptable authority. The first principle that 
Lawler describes is called the anthropic cosmological principle which is roughly explained 
as the idea that the universe emerged in the only possible way for life, and by that Havel 
means human life, to emerge. Hence the universe meant to be seen through our eyes 
because it has evolved to be seen in that way.131 The second is the Gaia hypothesis, 
which is the idea that the world is one big, connected, and living, system of which 
humanity is a part. In this way the ‗world‘ becomes the universal principle which 
originates all possibilities and to which we are ultimately responsible. Havel does 
advocate both views in the speech ‗The Need for Transcendence in the Postmodern 
World‘; however this speech does not reflect the overall body of Havel‘s thought, nor 
does it represent revisions on Havel‘s part. They stand as an attempt to explain the 
complex term ‗the memory of Being‘ but are not very persuasive.  
What I find interesting in Havel‘s different attempts to explain Being in these 
confusing, ambiguous, and disappointing ways is that it appears as though Havel lacks a 
clear means of explaining his position. It is as if he is grasping for a symbol that will 
convey his idea of being responsible to a higher authority that is not theistic and that 
does not demand a set kind of behaviour. However, because the use of Christian 
symbolism in some of Havel‘s earlier writing is made with the same intention as these 
later speeches, the content of this speech shouldn‘t be rejected. The quasi-religious 
language is employed to explain something which Havel lacks the language to explain. In 
his earlier essay Lawler correctly claims that Havel‘s aim is to reveal the singular vision of 
ideology as mendacious compared to the true and pluralistic nature of humanity. Being 
responsible to a non-specific authority which reflects the pluralistic nature of the human 
condition is an ambiguous idea at best. Pontusso correctly critiques Lawler‘s argument 
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claiming that Havel is not proposing a Gaia principle as the ground of Being, but is 
instead attempting to rationalise the Gaia myth in order to rationalize existence.132 
Havel‘s writings refer to as many sources as possible to symbolically convey whatever 
meaning he is trying to attempt. Pontusso writes that ―Havel claims that there are no 
simple answers to the mysteries of existence – not even in religious texts.‖133 Hence 
Havel resorts to myths to furnish his depiction of the ground of Being, which is the 
normative authority from which human action is understood. It is unfortunate, however, 
that the use of religious symbols further cloud the matter further than enlightening 
Havel‘s fundamental stance towards the order of Being. I point to Havel‘s career as a 
playwright and suggest that Havel is perhaps at times too much of a dramatist, searching 
for stories, myths and archetypes to explain his thoughts rather than clear and directed 
prose.  
It is noteworthy that Lawler is not the only critic to contrast Havel‘s political thought to 
Solzhenitsyn.  In a paper titled ‗Solzhenitsyn, Havel and the Twentieth-First Century,‘ 
Edward Ericson Jr compares and contrasts the works of both thinkers. Ericson also notes 
that the problems that Havel expresses about using the word ‗God‘. He also notes the 
clumsiness with which Havel employs concepts like the ‗memory of Being‘ and a ‗horizon 
of Being‘. According to Ericson, who agrees with Sire, Havel, despite the weakness of his 
religious affirmations must for ease of analysis, be considered as a Christian thinker. He 
writes, ―If he doesn‘t say everything a Christian might, he doesn‘t say anything at odds 
with a Christian critique.‖134 However, in the same paper, Ericson, in critiquing Havel‘s 
later (post 1989) world view, notes that a solution that Havel offered to the problems of 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century are to be found in ancient (that is pre-
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Christian) religions. What Lawler saw as a sign of paganism is credited by Havel as a 
bridge between the emerging problem of maintaining a peaceful co-existence ―between 
different cultures within a single civilization.‖135 Appealing to pre-Christian mythologies 
and perceptions is in no way congruent with a Christian world view. Nor is the Gaia 
principle a Christian principle. Ericson is right to point out that Havel‘s employment of 
manifold references to spiritual sources is better conceived as a way for his philosophy to 
be applicable to a global society. The description of Havel‘s political philosophy as an 
attempt to say something meaningful for a global society is also in alignment with Havel‘s 
aims. However Ericson‘s view that Havel promotes a personal God is not correct. 
Sire‘s, Ericson‘s and Lawler‘s claim of a personal Christian God in Havel‘s writings 
does not hold up to scrutiny. Nor does the idea of any single personal god appear 
concrete in Havel‘s thought in any consistent way. There are occasions when one might 
draw the conclusion that there is mention of a singular personal god, however, closer 
inspection reveals Havel to be using a god as a symbol rather than as an object. In 
Letters to Olga, Letter 41 has mention of an idea which might be construed as a 
personal God. 
 
And something else that is typical of my god: he is a master of waiting, and in 
doing so he frequently unnerves me. It is as though he sets up various 
possibilities around me and then waited silently to see what I would do. If I 
fail, he punishes me, and of course he uses me as the agent of that 
punishment (pangs of conscience, for example); if I don‘t fail, he rewards me 
(through my own relief and joy) - and frequently he leaves me in uncertainty. 
(By the way, when my conscience bothers me, why does it bother me? And 
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when I rejoice, why do I rejoice? Is it not again because of him?) His Last 
Judgement is taking place now, continuously, always – and yet it is always the 
last: nothing that has happened can ever un-happen, everything remains in 
the ―memory of Being‖ – and I too remain there – condemned to be with 
myself until the end of time – just as I am and just as I make myself.136 
 
It is true that that this deity of Havel‘s is personalised and masculine in presence; 
however it is natural to read this as poetic imagery. At other times, as mentioned, Havel 
does refer to Gaia, a distinctly feminine spiritual force.  It is not possible that the god 
mentioned above, along with the Christian references contained in the passage, can be 
asserted literally concurrently with what Lawler calls the pagan elements of Havel‘s 
thought. It is a mistake to take a single passage of Havel‘s writings that evoke an obvious 
symbol and pin it on him as evidence of a specific religiosity, due to the intentional 
ambiguities in describing the second layer of Being. Later in Letters to Olga, Havel 
describes the above mentioned dual layered theory of Being, which seems to be 
incompatible with the God mentioned in the section just quoted.  
He begins the passage by describing a god who judges; but when the judgement 
comes in the second half of the fragment, the god seems to disappear from the analysis. 
It is Havel doing the judging – Havel who is responsible for his own past. There is no 
theistic principle required for this analysis. The memory of Being is not god, it is simply 
the past, the sum total of all experiences. Havel believes that the past is real and 
important, and that the past does not forget one‘s actions, hence it is imperative to judge 
one‘s own actions and be responsible for them. 
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Again, to me, this is evidence that Havel is continually grasping for a means of 
instigating thought and action about responsibility, he uses different descriptions for 
achieving that. Havel‘s way is a process of allusion and misdirection: using various 
techniques to show the second layer of Being rather than set out an ontological 
characterisation of it. The best interpretation of the above section is that Havel is arguing 
that a life in truth is a continuous judgement of oneself, a Socratic life that perpetually 
investigates the foundations of one‘s actions.  
The presence of a somewhat mystical and judging conscience, I read as symbolic. This 
is supported in Václav Bělohradský‘s short paper on living in truth, ‗The Jubilee.‘ 
Bělohradský is an eminent Czech philosopher. He writes, 
 
When does a person live in truth in Havel‘s sense of the word? Not when he 
respects some dogma; he lives in truth only when he crosses the boundaries 
of his own version of the world, finds himself on an alternative map of reality, 
and is constantly forced to justify his own positions.137  
 
An overarching, or even guiding metaphysical principle is not suggested by Bělohradský 
as being a necessary condition of a life in truth. Instead a life in truth is simply a 
continual search for authenticity through self-justification. Consequently there is no 
specific truth to live in; or in other words, there is no specific guide or plan or method to 
living in truth. This lack of specificity has caused problems for Havel the politician, as 
noted by Paul Wilson.138 When President Havel did not vigorously hunt for communist 
sympathisers or informers, he was lambasted by the public. Wilson quotes Havel‘s 
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attitude to Czechoslovakia‘s past, from Havel‘s New Years Address as President: ―We 
cannot blame the previous rulers for everything, not only because it would be untrue, but 
because it could blunt the duty each of us faces... to act independently, freely and 
reasonably, and quickly.‖139 Havel‘s advice is sound, but the lack of bloodletting and 
public spectacle that is inherent in Havel‘s attitude of individual responsibility for the 
horrors of totalitarianism left the public unhappy. Hence the support for people like 
Václav Klaus, Havel‘s successor as President, grew. But I want to suggest that there is 
real value in Havel‘s position. This value is expressed wonderfully by Lewis Lapham, who 
while meditating on Havel‘s writings at a ceremony honouring Havel said the following: 
―...if all of us were at fault for the shambles of American enterprise, then I had as much 
of an obligation as everybody else to find the words, or the rush of words, that could be 
bound to the task of telling a believable story.‖140 To paraphrase the sentiment, Havel‘s 
position charges each individual to find the way of dealing with the current situation 
rather than a public bloodletting which does nothing to solve the problem. His lack of 
specific direction is a major part of living in truth due to the request for individuals to 
scrutinize their own behaviour to see their own complicity. With this model, the problems 
of totalitarianism are things that can be completely overcome. With the public 
scapegoating of prominent party sympathisers, the problems remain. 
Doing politics Without Metaphysical Certainty 
It would be worthwhile to briefly consider Peter Lom‘s paper comparing Jan Patočka 
and Richard Rorty. For Lom, what is important in Patočka‘s philosophy is the importance 
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of metaphysics, without needing to hold or promote any metaphysical certainty.141 I will 
further analyse Lom‘s argument in the next chapter, but it should be noted that the same 
analysis is equally applied to Havel. Havel is clearest when he is not promoting any one 
metaphysical certainty, and is instead advocating using metaphysical questioning to 
reveal the mendacious foundation of any ideological position. This point is supported by 
Caroline Bayard142 who sees in Havel‘s plays, a similarity with the politically directed 
writing of Jean Francois Lyotard. Bayard praises Havel‘s plays which suggest that in 
politics no discourse can have primacy over another. She notes that Havel‘s dissidents in 
his plays are far less eloquent than are the ideologues, who promote the dominant 
ideology. Consequently Havel‘s dissidents promote an anti-ideology rather than promote 
a different ideology. Bayard‘s point is that it is far better to oppose ideology in all its 
forms than to search for the ideology to replace the current one. Richard Rorty also 
writes about the utility of Havel‘s philosophy as a philosophy of dissent rather than a 
philosophy based a normative metaphysics. In fact Rorty focuses on Havel‘s dissent 
against ideology in his paper, ‗The End of Leninism, Havel and Social Hope.‘143  
Havel‘s philosophy is pragmatically useful for Rorty as Havel, in Rorty‘s analysis, is an 
advocate of social hope rather than hope requiring a metaphysical underpinning such as 
faith or history; in other words it is a groundless hope.144 Rorty has been taken to 
account for apparently misreading, or cherry picking, comments from Havel that 
advocate his view and ignoring ones which go against his pragmatic philosophy.145 
Patrick Deneen writes that Rorty ignores the clear and blatant use of metaphysics to 
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underscore any moral position in Havel. While it is true that Havel is no pragmatist, and 
that he does use, on occasion, metaphysical language, Havel, as Deneen concedes, does 
not explain his transcendent - it remains unsaid.146 Deneen claims that Rorty shares with 
John Dewey a sense of faith in the ability of man to transform society through his actions 
alone. He writes that our willingness to believe in the narratives which modern societies 
weave lends modern societies hope for improvement. In this light Havel‘s invocation of 
transcendence is best read as a part of the narrative to promote societal improvement, 
rather than as faith in a metaphysical certainty. Havel should be read not as a religious 
thinker, or as a thinker promoting a religious certainty. Instead he should be read as a 
promoter of inquiry into mendacious social practices so that the can be improved 
incrementally. In the following chapters I will utilise the writing of Hannah Arendt and her 
idea of politics as ―birthing‖ new human possibilities to further elaborate on the politics 
of Havel that I am defending here. 
The view of a life in truth being more about inquiring rather than discovering truth is 
clearer when it is understood that there isn‘t a factual specific truth or precise normative 
framework that Havel has in mind in his philosophy. The idea of living in truth does not 
require one to live in a specific and ordered way,147 for example a Christian life, instead it 
is about recognising how one‘s actions contribute to what in phenomenology is called the 
life-world. Perhaps some thinkers would argue that Havel is motivated to act by Christian 
beliefs whether he explicitly mentions them or not. I argue instead that Havel‘s notion of 
‗truth‘ that fills his idea of ‗living in truth‘ is not a normative fact corresponding to any 
particular or specific state of existence. Instead, through scrutiny of one‘s actions, one 
can determine to what extent one‘s actions create and affirm one‘s situation. This is 
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more like a revealing of how one lives rather than advice on what particular actions one 
should take. Therefore a Muslim in Saudi Arabia, or, a Voodoo practitioner from Haiti, are 
both able to apply Havel‘s call for a close scrutiny of their actions. Without adopting 
Christian ideas, these citizens of vastly different cultural communities can see how their 
actions determine their political situation and can adjust their actions according to their 
sense of a better purpose for their civilization. 
Tucker, in his book, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to 
Havel, writes that Havel‘s separation from Heidegger can be found in the fact that Havel 
does not, as Heidegger did, reject the Judeo-Christian moral tradition. Instead Tucker 
writes that ―Havel often refers to his ―responsibility toward Being‖ as what used to be 
called ―responsibility to God.‖148  Tucker continues: ―Havel‘s moral principles are 
transcendental because truth and authenticity must originate beyond the human ―I‖; they 
must come from Being.‖149 Tucker does not mean to imply Kantian transcendentalism, 
rather a more broad use to the word is Tucker‘s motive. For Tucker Havel‘s 
transcendental is that which appeals and relates to the world of Being. It is easy to see 
how with such an analysis it might be possible to assert that Havel‘s transcendental has 
a theistic nature. However, for Havel, even amoral principles have a transcendental 
origin. That is to say that for Havel, all action, whether good or bad by nature, originates 
outside of the human ―I‖, not only good action. A supremely good force which lends itself 
to a theistic interpretation is missing. The higher horizon is not God but a higher horizon 
of Being. By a higher horizon of Being, Havel is referring to a horizon of experience that is 
greater than an individual‘s experience. It is the fabric of shared human experience in 
the world. As it is a shared experience, between times, countries, cultures etc., it is a 
                                                 
148 Tucker Czech Dissidence 156-157. 
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source of responsibility. The higher horizon is what ties, as Lewis Lapham150 describes, 
―the past to the present, the dead to the living, the citizen to the state, the now to the 
then.‖151 The higher horizon is hence still a horizon of human experience. Paul Wilson 
quotes Havel describing the inter-relatedness of human experience. 
 
The identity of each of us is composed of several layers. We are members of 
our family, or our profession, of our community, of our nation, of our state as 
a whole, of Europe. And if a citizen of California feels like a Californian, it 
doesn‘t mean that he can‘t, at the same time, feel like an American. When a 
lesser entity delegates certain functions to a higher entity, this does not mean 
that something is cut away from the lesser entity, that is, it is not something 
negative; it also means positive participation in the higher entity.152 
 
In the above quote Havel is arguing about Slovak involvement in the Czechoslovak state 
before the separation of the two nations. However I read in the argument a good 
description of what Havel‘s higher horizon might mean – a shared and layered world of 
different experiences. 
The nature of the higher horizon and its impact on an individual‘s experience is 
exemplified in Havel‘s famous story of the greengrocer, described in Chapter 1. The point 
to take from that discussion is the absence of any metaphysical certainty or theistic 
principle. Despite Being remaining undescribed, Havel could still infuse the story with a 
sense of morality and authenticity. Havel argues that it is better for the greengrocer to 
                                                 
150 I should note that Lapham is quoting Havel to describe the source of responsibility. He does not use the 
phrase “higher horizon”. However Havel claims that responsibility derives from the higher horizon and so I 
believe Lapham‟s quote is suitable for this description. 
151 Lewis Lapham in Goetz-Stankiewicz & Carey (ed), Critical Essays on Václav Havel, 96. 
152 Havel in Wilson in Goetz-Stankiewicz & Carey (ed), Critical Essays on Václav Havel, 27. 
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frame the world with a normative sense of responsibility – in other words for Havel, the 
world is better when the greengrocer behaves authentically.   
Žižek in the London Review of Books writes 
 
Havel‘s concept of living in truth involved no metaphysics: it simply 
designated the act of suspending one‘s participation, of breaking out of the 
viscous cycle of objective guilt. He blocked off all the false escape-routes, 
including seeking refuge in the small pleasures of everyday life. Such acts of 
indifference, making fun in private of official rituals, for instance were, he 
said, the very means by which the official ideology was reproduced.153 
 
I agree with Žižek on this point, that at no point is recourse to a metaphysical principle 
required to defeat the totalitarian regime through the non-political politics of a life in 
truth.154 Havel is stressing the paramount importance of personal responsibility. The 
conditions in which one lives are a direct result of the way in which one lives. Seeking for 
escape from an oppressive regime through poetry, or private whispering, only asserts the 
authority of the regime that one needs to escapes from. Being responsible for how one 
lives makes one responsible for the ideology that lays out the political climate of one‘s 
life. Actively denying the system makes the ideology obsolete. The transcendent force in 
Havel‘s story is life itself, a pre-political sense of oneself. This is what Rorty found so 
attractive in Havel‘s philosophy. It is pragmatically useful, without needing to explicate a 
metaphysics.   
                                                 
153 Slavoj Žižek “Attempts to Escape the Logic of Capitalism”  London Review of Books, October 28, 1999. 
154 It should be noted that Žižek is highly critical of Havel in this essay, however I do find some of the analysis 
useful.  
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Havel is interested in the pre-political components of political action.155 Political 
action, for Havel, is an individual action. Individuals comprise the system and so any 
change within a system is to come through individuals. The idea of an individual being 
responsible for their own conditions is not new; however Havel is using the idea as the 
foundation for a political philosophy that aims to encompass a global community. Havel‘s 
global relevance is mentioned in Žižek‘s article, ‗Attempts to Escape the Logic of 
Capitalism.‘ Žižek points out that Havel agrees with Heidegger in calling communism an 
―inflated caricature of modern life, with many tendencies shared by western society.‖156 
Žižek writes that Havel posits instrumental reason not in actual and factual capitalist 
social relations, but instead as the ―quasi-transcendental foundation.‖157 Žižek writes, 
 
The moment that Havel endorsed Heidegger‘s recourse to quasi-
anthropological or philosophical principle, Stalinism lost its specificity, its 
specific political dynamic, and turned into just another example of this 
principle (as exemplified by Heidegger‘s remark, in his, Introduction to 
Metaphysics, that in the long run, Russian Communism and Americanism 
were metaphysically one and the same).158 
 
Havel is not only a critic of the totalitarian socialist government, Havel is also aware that 
western liberal democracies do not offer the kind of authentic life that Havel is searching 
for. For Žižek, Havel is naïve. The logic of the post-totalitarian societies is akin to the logic 
of capitalism. For Žižek, Havel is distinctly unable to describe an effective society 
                                                 
155 Jean Bethke Elshtain, “Václav Havel on Freedom and Responsibility” in Theory and Practice, ed Ian 
Shapiro and Judith Wagner DeCew (New York: New York University Press, 1995): 464-482. 
156 Slavoj Žižek “Attempts to Escape the Logic of Capitalism”  London Review of Books, October 28, 1999. 
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because the alternative society that Havel looks to as a moral example (the west), has a 
foundation that is the same as the socialist foundation.159 Žižek‘s argument, which he 
repeats numerous times in many places, is that communism opened a space for utopian 
thinking; hence Havel, arguing for a life in truth, is doing so in a space opened up by 
communism in the first place.160 This is absurd. Havel clearly, throughout his career does 
not simply argue for a replacing of socialist values with western ones. He is constantly 
critical of the west‘s abandonment of ideas worth sacrificing for. Hence the space for a 
life in truth as dissent is just as open in western capitalism as it is in socialism.  
In fact, in tracing Havel‘s thoughts back through Patočka over the next two chapters, 
Havel‘s thought will be revealed to be far less naïve that Žižek continuously claims. Aprad 
Szakolczai traces the political problems of Eastern Europe to the history of ideas in 
Europe.161 He argues that the role of Patočka as a public intellectual is deeply informed 
by an engagement with Nietzsche. I argue that it is in the space of Patočka‘s 
engagement with the history of ideas that Havel develops his thought, not in the space 
created by the oppression of socialism as Žižek claims. In other words, Nietzsche‘s, (and 
following Niezsche‘s, Heidegger‘s) critique of modernity in the language of a critique of 
the history of ideas grounds Havel‘s thought and not some utopian moralising which is 
only a reaction to the violence perpetrated by the socialist state as Žižek paints it. 
Žižek‘s claim that Havel totally agrees with Heidegger‘s conflation of the underlying 
metaphysics of the socialist and capitalist societies is contested by Lawler in his article 
―Havel on Political Responsibility.‖ Lawler contends that Havel clearly explains a 
                                                 
159 Ibid. 
160 See Ibid. 
Slavoj Žižek, The Universal Exception, (London: Continuum, 2007), 46. 
See also Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism, (New York: Verso, 2002), 89-92. 
 
161 Aprad Szakolczai “Moving Beyond the Sophists; Intellectuals in East Central Europe and the Return of 
Transcendence,” European Journal of Social Theory 8, iss 4 (2005), 417-433. 
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difference between on the one hand societies whose political life has been reduced to a 
mere ritual of participation in ideology, and, on the other hand, societies who exhibit 
some tendencies to adopt an ideological life.162 Havel is acutely aware of the 
shortcomings of western liberal democracy. Scientism permeates the capitalist 
perspective as much as the socialist; however for Havel, a life in truth is much easier to 
achieve in a democratic state than it is in a post-totalitarian society. It would be better 
than to say that for Havel, both capitalist and socialist societies exhibit symptoms of the 
crisis of modernity explained in chapter one; however in liberal societies, a life in truth is 
easier to achieve due to the civic freedoms in possession of each citizen. The liberal 
aspect of Havel‘s thought will be explored in Chapter 7. 
Bělohradský writes that the most attractive aspect of Havel‘s ‗The Power of the 
Powerless‘ an essay from which he and his friends in Italy took many quotes to adorn 
their walls163 was this idea that ―totalitarianism is nothing but an image of the West in a 
convex mirror.‖164 Hence in chapters 7 and 8 I will utilise the political philosophy of 
Havel, elaborated in these early chapters, to think through and contest aspects of 
contemporary western politics to show the utility of Havel‘s thought outside of his specific 
historical situation. 
An Encounter with Post-secularism 
The argument against Havel's religious leanings has been driven by the metaphysical 
language employed by critics of Havel. I have shown how such attempts to describe 
Havel as a doctrinal Christian fail. However, in recent years, what is known as the post-
secular turn in philosophy proclaims a different understanding of religion, one which 
                                                 
162 Peter Lawler “Havel on Political Responsibility,” Political Science Reviewer 22 (1993): 42. 
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Havel might fit into. Post-secularism is a broad field of scholarship incorporating thinkers 
from many religions and even atheism.  
In 2003, Phillip Blond edited the volume Post-secular Philosophy.165 This anthology 
represents a major work of post-secular thinking. The essays in this volume aim to 
demonstrate the timeliness of a return to theology in modernity. The common theme 
amongst post-secular thinkers is that modernity faces a form of nihilism that a new 
understanding of theology offers a pathway out of. This new pathway is a recovery of 
metaphysical thinking. This is not a return to metaphysics, but a return to thinking 
metaphysically. The collected essays in Blond‘s volume address this theme through a 
reexamination of European philosophy that demonstrates how a reconfiguration of a 
theistic God is possible. Two examples from this anthology will suffice as example of the 
arguments contained therein. John Peacocke reconfigures Heidegger‘s concept of 
Thinking to demonstrate that the concept can be construed as thinking for the existence 
of God.166 Also, the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams reads in Hegel the 
idea that the modern state needs to lose its being-in-itself in order to find meaning from 
an outside source. This move between the transcendent outside and the in-itself inside 
of the state is the role of theology for Williams. 
The secularist Simon During wrote in 2005 that secularism is ill-prepared to deal 
with a post-secular turn as the methods of secularism, built up in the enlightenment 
focus on rationality, are poorly suited to think through religion today.167 He argues for a 
return to Leo Strauss who was ―nostalgic for a collective existence ordered by revealed 
laws, at once worlded and cosmological, which might underpin the virtuous search for 
perfection.‖168  During argues that in taking such nostalgia seriously, but also 
                                                 
165 Phillip Blond (ed) Post-Secular Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 1998) 57. 
166 John Peacocke “Heidegger and the problem of onto-theology” in Phillip Blond (ed) Post-Secular 
Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 1998) 193 
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simultaneously avoiding a dismissal of modernity, a possibility for a meaningful 
encounter with religion that is politically beneficial is possible.169 Post-secularism is also 
well captured in the published 2009 debate between Slavoj Zizek and John Millbank, The 
Monstrosity of Christ. In this debate regarding the nature of Christ in a post-secular 
world, they manage to explore the relationship between faith and reason, ultimately 
showing that distinctions between them are not so black and white. The debate 
highlights the claim that in the closed system of capitalist ideology, theology offers a new 
portal for transcendence.170  
Post-secularists argue that the secularism of the last few hundred years has run its 
course and religion has not disappeared. Instead, religion is to be found in experiences 
of transcendence other than traditional religious forms. One such change is that religion, 
in a secular age, is relegated to the private realm. The state might be secular; however, 
citizens believe a variety of religious creeds simultaneously in the same political space. 
Jurgen Habermas, in his paper ―Notes on a Post-Secular Society‖ argues that: ―Today, 
public consciousness in Europe can be described in terms of a ―post-secular society‖ to 
the extent that at present it still has to ―adjust itself to the continued existence of 
religious communities in an increasingly secularised environment.‖171 For Habermas, 
post-secularism is important for its attempt to have many faiths living together not only 
peacefully but in a manner which encourages flourishing in the one space.172 In a time 
when the state is increasingly secular while the experience of religion - whether it is 
expressed in the form of fundamentalist acts or some other manner – is politically 
inflammatory, Habermas argues that a post-secularism focusing on the mutual 
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recognition of all religions in the state is important.173 For Habermas, the ideal society is 
one in which all citizens recognise each other as equal citizens with equal rights.174 That 
recognition is not to take the form of a respect for alien practices such as one might pick 
up while travelling and seeing another culture. Instead, for Habermas, this recognition is 
to take the form of a real tolerance: a tolerance where each citizen recognises in each 
other citizen a mutual responsibility for political contributions and is equally accountable 
for those contributions.175 Hence, rather than a secularist adopting a hardline stance 
about the invalidity of religious claims, Habermas argues that we should be considering a 
stance which allows an understanding of shared citizenship.176 The great benefit of 
secularism is that it refuses to drop equality from its understanding of society.177 Hence 
we encounter a fine balancing act between the progress of reason and the demands of a 
shared multicultural society. 
Havel's pluralism, with its focus on the plurality of the experience of Being could 
contribute a lot to Habermas' project. For Havel, all religious creeds are to be respected. 
Havel's faith in globalisation as a force for creating discourse between cultures in a way 
which celebrates their difference and shows their universally shared values is consonant 
with Habermas' project of doing politics in a post-secular age. However, this still doesn't 
get to a post-secular argument for religion that could encompass Havel's position.  
Charles Taylor argues that in the current age, the arguments against faith and god 
made by the new atheists, such as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher 
Hitchens, shed no meaningful light on the still existing phenomenon of belief.178 The new 
atheists are a collective who share the view that any belief in a transcendent deity is 
irrational and dangerous for the world politically. For Taylor, a much more interesting 
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discussion unfolds when one considers the conditions of belief rather than the structure 
of belief.179 For Taylor, one common experience today that leads one to the view that we 
are in a post-secular age is that despite the rapid development of secularism since the 
enlightenment, there is still an experience of a transcendent whole that is available to all 
people.180 This transcendent whole is the experience ―which unsettles and breaks 
through our ordinary sense of being in the world, with its familiar objects, activities and 
points of reference.‖181 Such an experience could take the form of a contemplation of a 
sunrise, a moment of insight, or a burst of energy. Taylor writes that these moments 
afford us some cosmic insight into our own lives where it appears as though things have 
lined up. Taylor does not make a simple move to say that this transcendent whole which 
breaks through the ordinary is God. However, he does suggest that experiences like 
these provide the condition for belief. Taylor is especially interested in such experiences 
which allow us to live better in the world. That is when the transcendent and the 
mundane combine rather than negate each other.182  
A similar view of transcendence today is described by Phillip Blond. He argues that 
theology today needs to be practiced at the level of perception.183 For Blond, locating 
God in traditional metaphysics is not in line with the experience of transcendence in the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For Blond, (referencing Maurice Merleau-Ponty,) 
immanence and transcendence are both available to perception.184 Blond argues that 
when we open our eyes and see the transcendent immanent in our experience of the 
world we see that Christianity is a real alternative to discourses of modernity which 
promote nihilism.185  
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Taylor notes his own problems with the word ‗transcendence.‘186 A focus on 
transcendence might lead to a rejection of the present in favour of a higher reality – the 
afterlife. Instead Taylor argues for an oscillation between transcendence and flourishing 
in the earthly realm. For Taylor it is important to fuse God into our lives. That is to 
manifest and incarnational mode of life.187 Such a life lives in both secular time – the 
time of the present only - and eternal time.188 Incorporating the higher time of eternal 
time into the experience of the mundane, for Taylor, allows a greater experience of the 
present.189 This incorporation gets at what Taylor means in prescribing the oscillation 
mentioned above. For Taylor, incorporating God into our lives allows the human to see 
itself as something that goes beyond itself.190 This is for Taylor the vital move in 
challenging the problematic nature of modernity which has lost its sense of 
transcendence.  
In his description of being's relationship to Being, Havel does seem to supply an 
experience of a transcendent whole which throws light upon his mundane existence. In 
this sense Havel could, perhaps, be labeled as possessing a post-secular understanding 
of religion. However, this experience is more along the lines of Taylor's post-secularism 
than it is Blond's. Blond is looking for a theology in a way that Havel, as I have described 
his position above, could not accept. Blond says that God is phenomenal. Havel says that 
Being is phenomenal. It would be too big a move to say that Havel's Being is Blond's God. 
However, in a stance that fits with Taylor's position, Havel is searching for an experience 
of transcendence in the mundane world. However, it is inescapable that Taylor is arguing 
for the Catholic Church as the model for human flourishing. On this point Havel and 
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Taylor can be said to come apart from each other. Havel, as already claimed, has no 
interest in restoring power to an ideological institution such as the church.  
Havel‘s essay, ‗The need for transcendence in a postmodern world‘ argues for the 
kind of transcendence Taylor desires.191 However, in Havel‘s hands, it is a more 
Habermasian respect for rights and freedom that is the point of transcendence, than it is 
Taylor‘s religious transcendence. For Havel, the possibility for transcendence arises in 
modernity from an acceptance of globalistation. The mixing of cultures that is effected by 
globalization allows one to step outside of one‘s specific place and culture and identify 
with more universal goals – such as rights and freedom.192  For Havel, in modernity, 
these higher values have been forgotten. He writes that ―[t]his forgotten awareness is 
encoded in all religions.‖193 What is encoded is not faith in a deity, but the possibility of 
self-transcendence. That is the knowledge that humans can overcome themselves. Havel 
writes that transcendence is ―a hand reached out to those close to us, to foreigners, to 
the human community, to all living creatures, to nature, to the universe.‖194 Such a 
conception of transcendence involves fighting against the tendency in modernism to view 
the self as an insular, disconnected being. Taylor would agree with such a view of the 
need for transcendence. Hence I cannot ignore the possibility of a greater discourse 
between Havel and post-secularity. 
In this chapter I have been making claims about Havel expressly in terms of 
conventional theological metaphysics. Havel's own insistence that he takes part in no 
ideological religious practices allowed me to demonstrate that Havel is offering no 
metaphysical position which could be attached to Christianity. However, I must leave 
open the question of the extent of Havel's connection with post-secular thinking as for 
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Havel the kind of thinking that religion allows, engages with the higher values that Havel 
sees as having universal significance. Havel‘s possible contribution to post-secular 
thinking is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is dedicated to Havel‘s political 
philosophy, however I have demonstrated a possible starting point for considering such 
an engagement. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In exploring a possible religious element to Havel‘s political philosophy this chapter 
argued that Havel‘s position is best understood as non-religious. This conclusion was 
reached by exploring the claims for a religious element made in the scholarship treating 
Havel‘s philosophy. Arguments for Havel‘s Christianity fail to demonstrate an actual link 
to Christianity and not just a similarity. In continuing the theme from Chapter 1, this 
chapter explored Heidegger‘s concept of Being to see if it could be called Christian, or 
even theistic, and, in agreement with Macquarie, it was claimed that Heidegger‘s Being is 
not explicitly God and further to that that Havel‘s Being is not the same as Heidegger‘s 
Being. The presence of a theistic principle could not be wholly or definitively denied, but 
neither could it be affirmed. This analysis was applied to Havel‘s political philosophy and 
the same conclusion was reached. Havel‘s attitude to being, and the memory of Being is 
better understood, not as a theistic philosophy, but as a way of framing the world which 
puts claims of responsibility on us. That is, it is better for humans to be responsible for 
their past actions and their involvement in the world‘s bigger picture. 
When you explore Havel‘s Being, the best conclusion to draw is that Being remains 
unexplained. His attempt to define Being in Letters to Olga are unsatisfying for the 
ambiguities they bring up. It is more helpful when Havel leaves Being as a presupposition 
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and concentrates on politics. The dictation by Huml to his secretary on the art of 
happiness, in the play The Increased Difficulty of Concentration, is a good example of 
this. Huml‘s dictation, because it is dictation, loses the meaning of the exposition 
because recording it takes it out of the human sphere. When Havel is giving prescriptive 
advice regarding Being he can be ambiguous and create more problems than he solves. 
When Havel addresses political issues, he is in far safer territory. Hence living in truth is 
best understood as a negative concept where the individual is forced, through self-
scrutiny, to justify any position that they take. I agree with Bělohradský that Havel‘s living 
in truth is about revealing the mendacious structures of ideology in society and not living 
by their coercions. Finally, in this chapter I built on the allegory of the greengrocer to 
explore the analysis and criticism of Havel‘s thought made by Slavoj Žižek. Žižek‘s article 
on Havel highlighted key aspects of Havel‘s political philosophy and through a countering 
of Žižek‘s criticisms of Havel I leave open the possibility of finding in Havel a political 
philosophy useful for addressing issues in contemporary western politics.  
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Chapter 3: The Influence of Jan Patočka 
Introduction 
Before embarking on a study of Patočka‘s works and their impact on Havel it is 
important to note that a complete edition of Patočka‘s works in English is unavailable 
and that the Jan Patočka archive is in the process of publishing his works in French, 
German and Czech, the languages Patočka wrote philosophy in. I will not undertake a 
study of his untranslated work. It is not the aim of this chapter to give a full account of 
the corpus of Patočka‘s philosophy. Instead, the central aim is to highlight some of the 
major themes that permeate Patočka‘s work and find root in Havel‘s thought. There are 
enough works available in English translation to make this a possibility. There is also a 
significant, and growing, body of scholarship in English on Patočka‘s work, which has 
been utilised here. 
A point regarding Havel‘s debt to Patočka which is generally missed in scholarship on 
Havel is that at no point in his philosophical writings does Havel actually engage with any 
particular text of Patočka‘s. This is symptomatic of Havel‘s general lack of engagement 
with the canon of Czech phenomenology and with any canon of philosophy in general. 
That is not to say that Havel does not contribute to the canon. Havel‘s contribution lies in 
his living of the philosophy espoused by Czech phenomenology and his writing from 
general themes of Czech phenomenology. Havel‘s philosophical writings are more like a 
guide to the practice of phenomenology than an engagement with the theoretical 
particulars of the canon. With this in mind the question could be posed, what point is 
there in even analysing the influence of Patočka if Havel doesn‘t engage with Patočka‘s 
texts? The answer is, in part, that Havel is influenced by Patočka the person more than 
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by particular texts of Patočka‘s.195 That is, Patočka, like Socrates, was able to embody a 
philosophy that could be emulated in praxis, even in the symbolic character of his death. 
In analysing the Socratic death of Patočka it is easy to find a link between his activities 
leading to his death and the theoretical phenomenology contained in his writings. Erazim 
Kohák writes that for Patočka, ―if the entire ideal order of being human—the true, the 
good, the beautiful, and the just—is to have any meaning, it must be appropriated in the 
act of the philosopher who stands up to bear it witness.‖196 I take this to be related to the 
philosopher‘s return to the cave in Plato‘s cave allegory. In other words, the philosopher 
is not philosophizing by merely engaging with abstract concepts. To give theory meaning, 
it must be lived and lived for others. Therefore it is necessary to examine the practical 
example of his life (and death) as well as the theoretical aspects of Patočka‘s 
phenomenology as far as they inform action. It is the combination of these which 
influence Havel, not a specific text or argument. 
For Patočka, the most important task of philosophy is calling the given into question. 
What is given is, for Patočka, the amalgam of the subjective experience of a thing and its 
manifestation as an objective thing. The given presents itself to consciousness and so is 
known as a phenomenon and not as either an objective ‗reality‘ or a product of 
subjective idealism. This view of Patočka‘s is not unique. The intentional nature of 
consciousness is a major tenant of phenomenology. Essential to the presenting of a thing 
to consciousness, or as Patočka terms it, its unconcealing, is the concealment which 
penetrates the phenomenon, as a phenomenon can only present through the structure 
of its presenting. For example, one‘s consciousness, almost ineluctably, illuminates the 
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given through structures of a specific time and place, through its historicity. Being 
conceals itself in this historicity and it is the task of philosophy—that is, phenomenology—
to unconceal Being.   Hence Patočka‘s philosophy reads as a constant questioning rather 
than the espousal of a position. This is explicit in an essay by Patočka, ‗Platonism and 
Politics‘. Writing about the importance of concepts like the Platonic ideas, Patočka 
writes, ―For the real philosopher, i.e., who methodically and thematically awakens within 
himself the hidden meaning of humanity, there is no other possible path.‖197 Later in the 
same essay Patočka writes, ―It can be difficult to live in philosophy because philosophy is 
the unceasing struggle against the natural direction of life‖.198 From this it is again easy 
to draw a comparison to Socrates. 
The philosophy of Jan Patočka and the philosophy of Václav Havel owe a great debt to 
the earlier philosophy of the towering figure of Czech history, Tomáš Masaryk. Any 
explication of the influence of Patočka on Havel first requires an exploration of the 
humanist philosophy of Masaryk. The exploration would be of extra benefit to this thesis 
as Havel‘s philosophical position, and his actions as President, have been compared by 
H. Gordon Skilling to Masaryk‘s.199 Erazim Kohák, in his illuminating work, Jan Patočka; A 
Philosophical Biography, has already provided a thorough account of Patočka‘s 
interaction with Masaryk and so it is not necessary for this thesis to provide that. A brief 
summary of this interaction will nonetheless serve to highlight the main point of 
convergence between Masaryk‘s thought and that of Patočka. As Kohák notes, the 
philosophy that unites Patočka with Masaryk is that of Edmund Husserl, especially the 
later work of Husserl centred around The Crisis of the European Sciences. After working 
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in his retirement with Patočka, Husserl gave Patočka a desktop lectern which had been 
given to him previously by Masaryk. Kohák writes that Patočka made mention of his 
inheriting a tradition.200 
In his first philosophical work, Suicide as a Mass Phenomenon of Modern Civilization, 
Masaryk writes of a loss a pre-reflective religious perception of the world. As Kohák 
writes: 
 
Modern man, as Masaryk sees him, perceiving the world through the eyes of 
materialistic, mechanistic science, no longer sees around him a meaningfully 
ordered cosmos in which good and evil, right and wrong, are as much 
primordial data as weights and measures.201 
 
This concern with thinking as techne, which is also prominent in the philosophy of 
Heidegger, and discussed in the previous chapter, is prominent in the thought of Patočka 
and Havel as well. If we can make a tradition of phenomenology in Czechoslovakia out of 
Masaryk, Patočka and Havel, the canon is centred around this loss of the question of 
being, or what Patočka terms the higher horizon of Being.202 As Kohák notes, Masaryk 
turned to an objective sense of truth in order to infuse meaning and order into the 
cosmos whereas Husserl, exploring the manner in which objectivity is only meaningful in 
subjective experience, finds a phenomenological analysis of subjective experience to be 
the key to recovering from the pitfalls of scientism.203 Patočka conversely, engages with 
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both philosophical solutions and Kohák claims that his later philosophy represents a 
synthesis of Masaryk‘s objectivism and Husserl‘s analysis of subjectivity.204  
As inheritor of a tradition stemming from Husserl and Masaryk, Patočka is obviously 
interested in phenomenology. For Patočka, phenomenology is the most useful 
philosophical method for contemporary times because even in an age where 
metaphysics and grand narratives have died, phenomenology allows an examination of 
how a thing is presented to consciousness. That is, phenomenology allows a 
philosophically reliable view of any particular situation and the elements of contingency 
that comprise phenomena. Patočka, interestingly, seems to accept that contingency 
plays a very important and shaping role in determining the structures of everyday life and 
the life-world, yet he also sees philosophy as having a great importance in shaping the 
world in the best possible way. Petr Lom, the translator of Plato and Europe, writes, 
 
But how then is one to live according to truth, to care for the soul if one 
admits the basic historicity of man and the relativity of his orientation in the 
world? And why should this not lead either to despair or the abandonment of 
philosophy if one acknowledges that two thousand years of philosophy have 
not yielded incontrovertible certainties? Patočka‘s answer is that contingency 
still does not foreclose the possibility of philosophy. For philosophy is 
rendered possible precisely by the phenomenological fact that we are able to 
distance ourselves from all that is given despite our contingency, a distancing 
that is always possible because we never experience the world in an 
incontrovertible, unequivocal manner.205 
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Patočka‘s work is an always dense exemplification of the phenomenological method. His 
major and last work, Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History, aims to explain the 
European situation by peeling back the contingent layers of contemporary life.  
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History brings up notable influences on Havel‘s 
thought that are useful to keep in mind when exploring his writings. The specific 
phenomenological work of the text itself, I contend, is not a useful entry into Havel‘s 
thought as Havel makes no mention of it at all in his writings and speeches. There are 
certain Patočkean themes which are present in Havel, but it is more accurate to contend 
that these themes were presented to him through means other than engagement with 
the phenomenology of specific Patočkean works. I take Plato and Europe to be the most 
influential of Patočka‘s works on Havel.  Plato and Europe is composed from unofficial 
lectures Patočka delivered to friends, in secret, in lounge rooms or other venues. Havel 
certainly attended these lectures and mentions them in his eulogy for Patočka. The 
theme of the lectures is fitting for conceptualizing Havel‘s works. Yet that is not to say the 
rest of Patcoka‘s corpus of works is irrelevant to Havel‘s thought, as this chapter and the 
next will demonstrate. An examination of the theme of the Heretical Essays and other 
works can shed light on Patočka‘s concerns which might be considered to have 
transferred to Havel. The main theme of Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History 
involves questioning the meaning of history, in particular, European history. This is not a 
Havelian theme, but Patočka‘s conclusions, I argue, are a major influence on Havel. 
Patočka, Havel and Arendt 
The Heretical Essays begins with an analysis of pre-history that explicitly builds on 
Hannah Arendt‘s The Human Condition, where Arendt describes human history as 
beginning with the human undertaking of ‗work.‘206 Work, for Arendt, is acting to create 
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something beyond the self, and Patočka too describes work as the beginning of history 
and the recognition of the burden of being a finite being.207 As work reaches beyond the 
self, to preserve life and create life, the political sphere has its origins in work – work 
makes the world where people relate politically. Throughout the Heretical Essays Patočka 
mentions his debt to the groundwork offered by Arendt in The Human Condition. This is 
interesting because Havel is a thinker whose work also bears close comparison to that of 
Arendt in some regards which this thesis will spell out. Both hold that a conflict of ideas 
in the political sphere is a healthy and authentic means of self-expression. Havel, 
however, does not mention ever reading Arendt. Jean Bethke Elshtain notes that Havel 
and Arendt escape the pragmatism of Rorty and others, in that both use political analysis 
to analyse the concrete rather than the abstract.208 In an explication of Havel‘s in-
between stance on political matters, that is neither left nor right, Elshtain responds to the 
criticism of Patočka and Havel made by Richard Rorty that neither thinker requires the 
concept of the higher horizon which frames their philosophy. For Elshtain, Rorty and 
thinkers like him miss the fact that their own philosophy, despite proclaiming the 
universality of contingency, is still linked to the idea of progress. Arendt calls concepts 
like this, ―banisters‖, and Elshtain notes that Havel, like Arendt, is explicit about their 
reliance on them, rather than Rorty who is deliberate in hiding his reliance on them.209 
 
With Arendt, Havel is utterly resistant to the alchemy of ―the dialectic‖ that 
transforms concrete evils into abstract goods. There is a beyond, and that is 
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why the here and now, this moment as a concrete slice of all moments, takes 
on such shimmering vitality and importance.210  
 
This is important because one of the hallmarks of both Patočka‘s and Havel‘s philosophy 
is the insistence that there is a ‗higher horizon‘ of Being which frames our experience of 
the world - something beyond any subjectivist or relativist account of the world. In 
‗Platonism and Politics‘, Patočka writes that the role of philosophy is to not engage in the 
―daily praxis, which is always based on sophistry and mysticism,‖211 but is instead to 
base activity around a political idea in the platonic sense of idea. On the one hand, the 
philosopher recognises that the ideas are practically not useful, but on the other hand, 
the philosopher recognises the mythic nature of all political systems; the ideas become a 
means of holding the myths to account. Philosophy is described by Patočka here as 
being a purification as the philosopher reaches into their inner selves, in a search for 
inner truthfulness, and from this basis alone is philosophy given the right to ―establish 
norms for life.‖212 In other words, the philosopher, in considering the higher horizon of 
Being, is in the unique position to consider the horizon which frames the myths which 
sustain political systems. 
Rorty criticizes Patočka for accepting the role of contingency in life whilst still holding 
to an idea of an ideal form. In a similar vein, Rorty argues that Havel‘s best contribution 
to philosophy lies in the example of charter 77.  ―Charter 77 supplied us with a new 
example of social poetry, of the poetry of social hope. That example makes clear that 
such hope can exist, and can sometimes even be fulfilled, without backup from a 
philosophy of history and without being placed in the context of an epic or tragedy whose 
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hero is humanity.‖213 I think that Rorty is deliberately reading Havel selectively to suit his 
purposes.214 Charter 77 is perhaps an example of ‗social poetry‘, whatever that means, 
but it is also the core idea in Havel‘s political philosophy. In his writings not tied to the 
charter 77 movement, Havel argues incessantly that the task of life is to be open to 
Being; life is the tragedy of which humanity is the hero. Tragedy is a concept that is 
intrinsic to Havel‘s philosophy. In his ‗New Year‘s Address to the Nation,‘ his first as 
President, Havel describes the previous ideology‘s failures as the Czechoslovakian 
people‘s failures. The speech is designed to depict a tragic scene, and the task of the 
present and future is to embrace that tragedy and thereby overcome it. He writes, ―we 
must accept this legacy as a sin we committed against ourselves. If we accept it as such, 
we will understand that it is up to us alone, to do something about it.‖215 The acceptance 
of responsibility for the tragedy of socialism entails framing a possibility of a better world, 
against a higher, moral horizon of Being. Havel can say that a liberal democracy is a 
better form of Government than socialism because for Havel, that form of Government is 
better able to produce a more authentic relationship with Being. It is unwise to do as 
Rorty does and remove the element of transcendence from Havel‘s philosophy. The idea 
of transcendence is also intrinsically linked to Patočka‘s philosophy and the idea of 
tragedy. 
Robert Pirro compares Havel‘s tragic vision of Czechoslovakia to Hannah Arendt‘s 
tendency to conceptualise historical events as tragedies.216 This is an important point 
which needs further elaboration. Pirro is right to suggest that Havel‘s framing of the 
Prague Spring of 1968 as a tragedy is similar to Arendt‘s framing of the 1956 Hungarian 
revolution as a tragedy.  Both write that the event has significance far beyond the actions 
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of the event. For Kant, the enlightened aspect of the French revolution was found in the 
attitudes of the onlookers as they felt sympathy for the aims of the revolutionaries.217 In 
the same way, the Prague Spring and Hungarian Revolution are events which maintain 
their spirit of attempting to create freedom despite the failure of the events to realise 
their intended aims. Havel does not take his cue from Arendt however; it comes through 
Patočka, who saw history as a mode of being in truth.218 Patočka, reading Arendt‘s The 
Human Condition, sees strife between free individuals in a political sphere as the barrier 
to the detrimental effects of passive consensus. Philosophy, for Patočka, problematizes 
life and creates the impetus for conflict. Hence events like the Hungarian revolution are 
as significant for Patočka as they are for Arendt. The significance of these actions lies in 
the attempt to make society a better place, not through the crafting of more legislation 
but instead through genuine action. 
Here it seems necessary to explain a fundamental differentiation of three kinds of 
human action in Arendt‘s philosophy. The three categories of human activity are: labour, 
work and action. For Arendt, through the activity of labour, the human condition is that of 
animal laborans, concerned solely with self survival. The animal laborans is totally 
subject to necessity – to nature – and hence is unfree, requiring continuous toil to 
remain alive.219 Arendt notes that the distinction between labour and work is clear in the 
connotation with work of an attachment to a finished product, whereas labour denotes 
the constant toil in production. To distinguish between labour and work Arendt points out 
John Locke‘s distinction between work of the body and work of the hands. The latter has 
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an element of artifice whereas the former is characterised as toil.220 Work, as described 
above, is a different kind of action because it fashions something out of the world. That 
is, work transcends the basic biological needs of life. Work is the human condition as 
homer faber – the man who ―works upon‖.221 Work creates an objective world against 
human subjectivity.222 In other words, it makes the worldliness of the human condition – 
or work fabricates the world in which humans form communities. Like labour, work is not 
an activity for Arendt that is free. That is there are necessary conditions on work. 
Freedom, for Arendt, is political - freedom is found in the pluralistic conception of 
humanity. Work is not political, as even though it creates the world in which political 
action occurs, work remains an act of the individual.  Arendt classifies action as the 
activity of humanity whose basic character is freedom. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl writes 
regarding action in Arendt: 
 
No two human beings are alike, so people must relate to one another, must 
come together, find ways to live together, negotiate their differences, 
exchange opinions, found relational political institutions in the world they 
have created. A person may labour alone or be a fabricator alone, but ―action 
is completely dependent upon the constant presence of others.‖ Among the 
animals, a human being, as Aristotle said, is uniquely a zoon politikon, a 
creature of political relations. There are other conditions, too, including the 
temporally defining conditions of human existence, natality and mortality: a 
person must be born and must die. Arendt notes that action also has a close 
connection to the condition of natality because ―the new beginning inherent 
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in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer 
possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.‖223  
 
Through interactions with others we gain a distance from the world we are thrown into. 
This distance allows the beginning of something new. Action is generative for Arendt, 
hence her claim of a link between natality and action.  
Through practical actions with others, an individual manifests political action – the 
highest form of human action. Patočka shares Arendt‘s observation that real political 
action is only possible when we distance ourselves from the world that is immediately at 
hand. In an earlier essay, ‗Politics and Understanding‘ Arendt writes that as political 
action aims at a new beginning, understanding is the form of cognition which prepares 
the ground for a new beginning. She argues that understating brings humanity to 
awareness of what has happened and what unavoidably exists.224  I take Arendt to mean 
that understanding gives us a necessary distance from the world so that we can realise 
our potential as a new beginning. Her description of the role of imagination in 
understanding supports this reading. Imagination, Arendt writes, ―alone enables us to 
see things in their proper perspective, to be strong enough to put that which is too close 
at a certain distance so that we can see and understand it without bias and prejudice, to 
be generous enough to bridge the abyss of remoteness until we can see and understand 
everything that is too far away from us as though it were our own affair.‖225  
Mere knowledge, as Arendt terms the kind of knowledge of the natural sciences, 
erects artificial barriers to understanding, which as a consequence inhibit 
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understanding.226 In The Human Condition, Arendt writes about an Archimedian point 
that science revealed which has given an objective view of nature that has disastrous 
implications for human action.227 For Arendt, this ―Archimedean point‖ allows us to see 
what we are doing, ―not as activities of any kind but as processes‖228 – leaving activity as 
process is dangerous because it removes man from the world in the sense that such a 
view ―removes the time honoured protective dividing line between nature and the human 
world.‖229 That is, the reduction of human activity to mere process is a reduction to an 
impersonal machine-like activity; it is reductive to a technological process rather than a 
phenomenon effecting individuals. Real action is not simply a process, but involves 
thinking or the use of imagination if it is to become a real beginning and manifest human 
freedom.  The Archimedean point of scientific imagination reveals the plurality of life and 
makes problematic technological determinations of life‘s processes. This criticism of the 
scientific view reveals Heidegger‘s influence on Arendt; however, as with Havel, there is a 
sense of actual engagement with the political and not the escape from the world through 
thinking that is found in Heidegger‘s thought. Arendt is solely concerned with political 
action. There isn‘t a sense that scientific thinking must run its course without critique. 
I read Arendt to mean that the use of imagination is an action which releases 
humanity from processes. That is the application of imagination is a return to action as 
praxis instead of techne as it allows man to be the beginning which is intrinsic to human 
freedom. Thinking, in the Heideggerian sense of the word, engages with the world as a 
pluralistic entity because life revealed as pluralistic process necessarily entails 
engagement with others. An other is required for there to be a plurality of processes. 
Thinking aimed at understanding is linked to action, since actions necessarily involved 
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with thinking by an individual about engaging with other individuals. Thought then is 
intrinsically linked to deeds. Acting on thought creates a viable community of ideas, 
which conflict with each other, creating relations. Through the temporary consensus of 
many wills, true political power is achieved.230 Returning to the idea of the Archimedean 
point and its relation to thought, thought without deeds is thought removed from the 
world. It has no power and is therefore detrimental to the human condition. Conversely, 
action without thought is detrimental because it lacks that revelatory characteristic that 
is essential to thought engaged with human affairs - understanding.  
For Arendt, science in the modern era has strived for an Archimedean point by which 
to value and understand the world.231 But it has lost its grounding in the world by 
obtaining a universal viewpoint. She cites the invention of the telescope as a move 
beyond the world to such a universal vantage, as the instrument heightens humanity‘s 
senses to sense beyond the world. 
 
But the action of the scientists, since it acts into nature from the standpoint 
of the universe and not into the web of human relationships, lacks the 
revelatory character of action as well as the ability to produce stories and 
become historical, which together form the very source from which 
meaningfulness springs into and illuminates human existence.232  
 
Arendt is concerned about the temporal and spatially significant nature of human action. 
Hence the universal view of science is not the most politically useful one. She is not 
propounding a philosophy of transcendence of the human situation, nor does she 
                                                 
230 As opposed to tyrannical power which substitutes violence for power. 
231 Arendt Human condition, 322. 
232 Ibid 324. 
109 | P a g e  
 
propound a timeless and universal knowledge. Instead, human thought must relate to 
the specificity of the human condition grounded in the world.  Such a view of the role of 
philosophy in engaging with public affairs is key to an understanding of Patočka. 
One essential difference that I wish to spell out between the two thinkers lies in their 
conception of politics. Arendt uses the phenomenon of natality to describe political 
action whereas Patočka is darker in the tone of his terminology. For Patočka ‗strife‘ or 
‗struggle‘ are what create new political situations. In the final Heretical Essay, Patočka 
writes that the human condition in the twentieth century is a condition of war.233 
Exploring the phenomenon of the front line in World War One, Patočka is fascinated by 
the stripping away of everyday concerns that engaging in battle at the front line 
represented.234 There is significant meaning in the violence of the front line for Patočka 
and this has caused many critics to look unkindly on Patočka as an advocate of violence. 
I will read against this view, but engagement with specific critics must come later in this 
chapter. Patočka is fascinated by the proximity of death, which he terms ―the night‖ in 
the experience of the front. The complete disregard for any social status quo that the 
front line soldier has transforms the world. A building is not a dwelling, but a shelter, a 
means of survival, something against the status quo. In other words, war is 
transformative. But does that mean that Patočka is an advocate of violence? I do not 
believe so.  
Patočka contends that the Second World War shifted the experience of the front line 
from trenches and a clearly marked battle front to the private lives of every individual. 
Technological innovations allowed bombings to occur from great distances and therefore 
the front is much more difficult to define. Patočka also argues that at the end of military 
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action in World War Two, the war remained – that is with demobilization, a demobilized 
state of war remains. The front shifts at the end of the War to economics. 
 
The gigantic work of economic renewal, the unheard-of, even undreamed-of 
social achievement which blossomed in a Europe excluded from world history, 
shows that this continent has opted for demobilization because it has no 
other option. That contributes to the deepening of the gap between the 
blessed haves and those who are dying of hunger on a planet rich in energy – 
thus intensifying the state of war.235  
 
Patočka, in a negative eschatological reading, sees Europe as on a path to a terrible 
condition. The fighting might have finished but another less immediately obvious violence 
is still being acted out, transforming, and uprooting Europe. Patočka continues: 
 
Helplessness, the inability to win in a war conceived from the point of view of 
peace, are clearly evident among the erstwhile masters of the world. To shift 
matters to economics is a short-term, short sighted deception because it is 
part of demobilisation even where it mobilizes armies of workers, 
researchers, and engineers: all are subject to the crack of the whip.236 
 
The modern soldier, or front line combatant, lives in a front missing the whirl of shells 
and mortar, but is equally coerced into an ―enslavement to life.‖237 The fear of war 
maintains the peaceful war, appealing to man‘s cynical desire to possess and to live. For 
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Patočka, the sad state of affairs in late socialist Czechoslovakia is a result of this 
unwillingness to sacrifice or risk the status quo. It is a result of this war that peace is 
used as a form of unfreedom.238 
To get out of this predicament Patočka does not advocate a violent destruction of the 
status quo. Instead he invokes the ―solidarity of the shaken‖239 which is the solidarity of 
those individuals that recognise the transformative nature of those who risk the status 
quo – who confront the night and put ―mere life‖ into conflict. Conflict here is Heraclitus‘ 
strife, or the agon mentioned in Chapter 1, and is not necessarily as physical violence. 
Those who realise the inevitability of death will act, not out of a fear of dying, but in 
understanding. By ‗understanding‘ Patočka means fusing knowledge with action. I think 
that Patočka‘s shaken are dissidents. They are those willing to sacrifice themselves in a 
meaningful way to create a rupture with the status quo – to give a vision of another 
possibility or way that is not the passive acceptance of the status quo. I think that 
Patočka saw himself as involved with the solidarity of the shaken when he authored 
charter 77. Writing that document was an act of violence, in a peaceful war, that was 
Patočka‘s front line experience, as mere life is rejected in favour of meaningful action. 
What is significant here is that tied to the transformative nature of political action is the 
willingness to be sacrificed, the willingness to face death. This need not be the 
willingness to do violence. 
Throughout this thesis I make comparisons between Arendt and Havel, but I want to 
draw attention here to this specific difference. Havel is, as will be spelled out later in this 
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chapter, orientated towards this ―solidarity of the shaken‖ rather than the idea of 
natality. This is a key point of divergence between Havel and Patočka, and Arendt. 
 
Patočka, Havel  and History 
For Patočka, it is through ‗thinking‘ the world that the philosopher attains a distanced 
view of the processes of life and is charged with the responsibility to make that view 
problematic. Philosophy is the means by which Being relates to humanity. Thinking 
philosophically is presenting Being to consciousness as a problem – something to be 
resolved. Thinking philosophically also means stepping out of a particular historicity, a 
task that Husserl‘s phenomenology allows. This stepping out of history aids the search 
for the problematicity of the world. 240 Writing against historical materialism (which would 
have been the only acceptable view of history under socialist conditions in 
Czechoslovakia) Patočka contends that history requires an openness to Being, in order to 
aid in what he terms ‗becoming‘. For Patočka, becoming is the continual struggle against 
what is given to remain open to Being. In a Heideggerian move, Patočka writes that the 
task of philosophy is to unconceal.241 Every phenomenon‘s manifestation is linked to its 
concealment, and phenomenology brings its essence into unconcealment.242  
If it is to be helpful in the task of revealing what is concealed, history, as a process, 
needs to be understood in terms of three movements of human life: acceptance, defence 
and truth. Acceptance consists of the ―human need to be accepted and introduced into 
the world‖ – in other words the desire to fit in. Defense consists of the working against 
death. That is we protect ourselves through work. Hence the first two movements are 
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related since the former involves exposing ourselves to the world to be part of it (as that 
throwness of being), and the other involves reproducing life through toil and work. 
Patočka says the following in describing the importance of work:243 
 
Work is essentially this self-disposal of ourselves as being at the disposal of 
others; it has its source in the factual dependence of life on itself which is 
precisely what makes life an ontological metaphor. It is not possible to be, 
that is, to carry out the onset into the universe of individual things, without the 
movement of acceptation and self surrender… As soon as we become links in 
the chain of acceptation, we are eo ipso potential participants in work; 
already the child prepares for it; this preparation is already incipient work.244 
 
In the throwness of life, being confronts death and works as a means of reproducing life, 
thereby escaping death temporarily. Through work, meaning is given to the world in the 
sense that a person is reduced to the social role known through acceptation, and works 
within that role, bearing the inescapable burden of work instead of death. That is, ―if we 
want to live, we have no choice‖245 – we must work. 
The third movement Patočka identifies is the most human movement, the movement 
of truth. This is the movement of life transcending the world of work and everydayness. 
This is the movement where life opens to Being, bringing Being into unconcealment. This 
is done by challenging the bedrock of the world of the second movement. A confrontation 
with death leads to a confrontation with the particulars of existence. This movement is 
only possible because of the inherent concept of freedom in the second world of 
                                                 
243 Note the similarity to Arendt‟s notion of work as producing beyond the immediate needs of the self. 
244 Patočka Heretical Essays ,31. 
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defence. The individual can confront the given, and confront death. By substituting 
acceptance with strife246 a freedom is realised with which to confront the thrown state of 
being and attain the Heideggerian condition of authenticity.  
Essentially, the movement of truth uncovers the natural world that has been lost 
through the passive acceptance of the movement of defence. Hence there is a strong 
relationship between the movement of defence and the movement of truth. Thus history, 
understood by Patcoka, is the unfolding of the three movements with the movement of 
truth being the highest attainment for humanity. Truth, for Patočka, is not the universal 
attainment of Being, but rather the continual strife between what is concealed and an 
openness to Being – in other words, it is becoming. This is why philosophy is so 
important for Patočka. Philosophy, as it was for Plato, is about recovering a sense of 
wonder at the world. It makes problematic the world of particulars, and when through a 
conflict with the world of particulars a search for meaning is undertaken, history begins.  
The task of philosophy is not, as Plato thought, to supply a metaphysical certainty (the 
world of ideas) to the problem of the natural world. It is to continually struggle, as 
Socrates demonstrated in his ceaseless questioning of Athenians. This is not a rejection 
of metaphysics. As Peter Lom notes, metaphysics is inescapable for Patočka because 
moral judgements are inescapable and every moral judgement has a metaphysical 
component; however, for Patočka, philosophy‘s real task is not to describe metaphysics, 
but to describe the problematicity of Being.247 
Philosophy lies in the ―freedom of the polis‖248 because the movement for truth can 
only be realised within a polis where the individual is in a relationship with others and 
has therefore a given situation to question. Patočka, with Arendt, finds the origin of work 
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in the family.249 Life, recreating life in the face of death, produces a family unit to reach 
beyond the individual‘s life through the reproductive process and through the memory of 
others. One does not live one‘s life merely for oneself, but exists in a family unit and then 
in a polis, for others. A free polis is a polis that is open to encourage polemos between 
individuals – not violence but strife. In other words, a free polis allows Socrates to 
question, and the consequent situation of the political is the result of this strife. Free 
individuals questioning the relationship between the given and the concealed, produce a 
support for life which encourages greater improvement and better manifestation of the 
movement of truth. Political action is action that does not have the safety of the 
movement of defence.  
 
Such life does not seek to escape its contingency, but neither does it yield to 
it passively; since it has glimpsed the possibility of authentic life, that is, life 
as a whole, the world opens itself to it for the first time – it is no longer merely 
an involuntary background against which that which concerns us shows itself; 
rather, it itself can now stand forth, as a whole of that which opens up against 
a black backdrop of closed night. This whole now speaks to humans directly, 
free of the muting effect of tradition and myth, only by it do they seek to be 
accepted and held responsible.250   
 
There are some evocative phrases in this passage which need spelling out.  The ―black 
backdrop of closed night‖ is Patočka‘s invocation of an understanding of life as a life 
towards death. The meaning of a life is not merely in its life, but also in its finitude. 
Political acts ―shake‖ the given, as they appear through myth and tradition, and open up 
                                                 
249  Patočka, Heretical Essays, 37-38 
250, Ibid, 39. 
116 | P a g e  
 
new possibilities. In politics, ―everything is cast in a new light.‖251 With such a view of 
history, and with the role of philosophy to bring to light the problemacity of the given, the 
heretical part of the heretical essays is clear. Patočka engages in a philosophical analysis 
of western history to show where particular motifs have clouded the course of history and 
concealed truth from the participants in those events. 
In Plato and Europe, Patočka writes that the problem that Europe then faced was that 
elite power has disappeared and that consequently Europe ―has stopped believing in 
itself, that it had completely accepted the standards and ways of life of its inheritors.‖252 
It is possible to read too much into the use of the word ‗elite‘ – as Tucker does in his 
chapter on Patočka‘s conception of history. I think that there is a clear Nietzschean 
influence on Patočka here which leads him to praise the individual or society that 
struggles for authenticity. This is not, as Tucker presents it, an indication that Patočka is 
angry and critical of the peasant origins of Czech nationalism, and thus led to lament the 
lack of noble ideas which strive for greatness through war.253  
Tucker writes, 
 
Patočka ridiculed Czech nationalism as provincial and petty, leading to the 
tragedies of 1938 and, by implication, 1968 as well. Patočka was sober and 
lucid in his criticism of Czech nationalism and its contribution to the ethnic 
disunity of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Some of his less enlightening criticisms of 
the Czech nation originated from a sense of inferiority in comparison with 
what he perceived as a superior German civilization.254 
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Tucker continues on to write that whereas nations like America and Russia and Germany 
had great motivations driving their expansion, the Czech‘s interests were driven in a 
purely provincial direction of a liberated peasant society.255 Tucker, who in the previous 
chapter of the book gave a clear and thorough summation of the Heretical Essays, 
makes no mention of the theory from that work in his explication of Patočka‘s view on 
Czech history. This is a shame because the whole point of that work is to describe the 
problems with substituting ecstatic goals for authentic ones. Napoleon might have been 
bent on expanding the French empire through war and bloodshed. That does not mean, 
howvever, that the deaths through war are justifiable by the ‗elite and noble‘ goal of 
empire expansion. Instead, the extasis of war and expansion is simply the obverse of 
passive acceptance of a social order. Authenticity lies through philosophy, not through 
war. Indeed Patočka will go so far as to say that they are the different manifestations of 
the same war.256 
Kohák, in his intellectual biography of Patočka, warns against making interpretations 
of Patočka like those of Tucker.257 The idea of responsibility in freedom which permeates 
Patočka‘s work, according to Kohák, must be taken into consideration when evaluating 
the authenticity or merits of a historical phenomenon.258 The polemos that Patočka 
promotes is not war—he is clear enough in his condemnation of war in the Heretical 
Essays—instead the better word is strife. Strife with ideology creates the freedom for 
openness to Being. Patočka is propounding a philosophy of transcendence, not an 
ecstatic embracement of the mundane that is war and empire expansion. By this I mean 
that the claim that the political system and its mundane concerns is worthy human 
                                                 
255 Ibid 98. 
256 Patočka, Heretical Essays, 134. 
257 Kohák‟s work was published before Tucker‟s, I write „like Tucker‟ as the interpretation that Kohák warns 
against is exactly what Tucker supplies. 
258 Kohák, Jan Patočka, 129. 
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action does not lend transcendence to acts of war. An imperial act is based in a faith in 
empire, not in truth. Like Plato and Arendt, Patočka believes that engagement with truth 
is a political activity. Tearing down the structures of an ideology might remove the cave 
walls; however one is then given the task of rebuilding an authentic and open society. In 
the Heretical Essays Patočka calls for establishment of a community of the shaken.259 
This is why, according to Kohák, the Heretical Essays were so influential on Czech 
dissidents. Essential to undertaking the transcendence of ideology is the notion of 
responsibility—in Platonic terms, returning to the cave. Members of communities, rather 
than warring violently with each other, have a responsibility of ensuring that the space of 
interaction with each other and each other‘s ideas remains open.  
The influence of this responsibility to create and maintain a free public political sphere 
is clear throughout Havel‘s writing. An obvious example is the open letter sent to 
Alexander Dubcek in 1969. Facing the invasion of Soviet forces to put a halt to ‗socialism 
with a human face,‘ Havel implores Dubcek to follow the path of truth and resist the 
Soviets. Havel plays on the idea of a free polis and hints that Dubcek, as President, has a 
responsibility to ensure its survival because only in a free polis can one be totally human 
through the struggle for life in truth.  
Patočka Plato & Havel 
Edward Findlay writes on the Platonic element to Patočka‘s conception of freedom.260 
Plato is criticised by Patočka for attempting to supply a dogmatic metaphysics as an 
answer to the human condition and Patočka praises Plato for describing the ground from 
which metaphysical thinking could spring. The central figure of Socrates is a role model – 
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one who we might say embodies Patočka‘s responsible politics of freedom. The oracle at 
Delphi had inscribed above the entrance the maxim ‗know thyself‘. As Findlay points out, 
for the logical positivists, active in Patočka‘s time, this would involve looking for an 
―external experience‖ to describe self-knowledge.261 For Socrates, there also needs to be 
an openness to the experience of ‗we are‘. This is fundamentally an experience of 
freedom as an experience of Being - not diluted nor determined by mundane concerns, 
but illuminated by freedom and openness to Being. Findlay writes, ―Socratic knowledge 
(or ignorance) is absolutely free; the philosopher frees himself from the material and 
objective limitations to which interlocutors remain bound and can thus master them in 
the course of the dialectic.‖262 Challenging objectivity in the natural world in order to 
unconceal Being might be seen to have religious connotations, as Patočka is advocating 
a philosophy of transcendence. Yet this is not the case. Patočka was not religious.263 As 
Kohák points out, religion is just another objectivism that philosophy needs to 
overcome.264  
Instead of searching for a positive answer to the question of Being, Patočka 
propounds a continuous negativity. That is a continuous questioning of what is given. 
Freedom is only realised with a questioning of determining modes of thought. This 
position, which seeks to emulate the example of Socrates rather than the metaphysics of 
Plato, is termed negative Platonism.265 The doctrine of negative Platonism is best 
explained in Patočka‘s ‗Negative Platonism‘. In later works, such as the Heretical Essays, 
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and Plato and Europe, Patočka does not mention the term. However, the concept of 
continuous strife with what is given is maintained and Patočka attempts to assimilate it 
into a phenomenology of world history. The specifics of reading Plato as a negative 
philosophy are not carried over into Havel‘s writings, however we do find in them the 
basic tenant of continuous strife against ideology. Hence my earlier claim about the 
impracticality of claiming that Havel is influenced by a specific text or idea.  
Reading Plato negatively does not entail a complete rejection of Platonism. The 
Platonic taming of the orgiastic practices of Greek tragedy and religion are replaced with 
a care for the soul, manifested in the soul‘s search for truth. Patoka contends that Plato 
tames the orgiastic (the demonic,) with responsibility – responsibility demonstrated in 
the return to the cave. Derrida writes that Patočka is presenting philosophy as the 
incorporation of orgiastic mystery with Platonic responsibility. For Derrida, responsibility 
is an authenticity that confronts death. That is, the responsible individual necessarily 
confronts their own mortality in order to be authentic. Derrida cites Patočka‘s use of the 
word ‗conversion‘ to describe turning one‘s gaze, with Plato‘s philosophy, towards the 
Good.266 This conversion is very important because it entails an appropriation of Platonic 
philosophy, which appropriates that which preceded it—orgiastic mystery. That is, that the 
turn towards Plato, keeps what preceded Plato. I mention this because when considering 
negative Platonism, it is vital not to simply to see it as a philosophy of questioning. 
Instead Patočka intends to promote the polemos of Socrates with the Athenian state as 
the assimilation of the practices of the Athenian state with Socrates‘ mode of life and 
Socrates death. Transcendence within Negative Platonism is not pure. That is, 
throughout negative Platonism, engagement with the world of things remains. In Plato, 
the transcendence of the world of appearance to the world of ideas is total. Derrida is 
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correct to stress that Patočka‘s negative Platonism concerns a responsibility to the world 
of ideas that assimilates with the world of things, or as he terms it, the demonic. Hence, 
rather than losing the self to the orgiastic, negative Platonism is an interior dialogue of 
the soul. The individual remains grounded throughout the transcendence of philosophy. 
If we take the central idea of negative Platonism to be a rejection of the world of ideas 
and an affirmation of the calling of the question of Being that is the siren song to the 
philosopher, then it is safe to say that Havel, whilst not engaging with Platonic texts, 
affirms Patočka‘s concept. Havel‘s allegory of the greengrocer, described in previous 
chapters, is reminiscent of Patočka‘s re-reading of Plato. The greengrocer is not charged 
with the task of remaking society, or organising a revolution. Instead he is charged with 
the task of critically analysing his involvement in ideological processes and removing 
himself from those processes once identified. This is a Socratic birth of the self. Patočka 
and Havel are better viewed as Socratic thinkers rather than as metaphysicians. They 
both aim at bridging the gap between theory and praxis. It is useless to interpret 
Patočka‘s philosophy as a distant or unengaged phenomenology or a removed 
philosophy of history. Instead, the truth that Patočka claims is the target of philosophical 
reasoning is useless unless a philosopher strives for that target. Similarly, with Havel, 
philosophy is useless if it is not grounded in an attempt to recover the question of Being - 
or as Havel would write - a life in truth.  
Patočka clearly finds in Socrates the example of life in openness to Being. The 
continual questioning of the given state of affairs is the fullest example of human 
freedom according to Patočka‘s philosophy. In Ideology and Life in the Idea, Patočka 
writes,  
 
Socrates… contemplates about what is good, with the result that he does not 
state the Good (on the contrary, the definition simply stating what the good is 
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somehow continuously eludes his contemplation), but that he becomes good 
– that the Good is established in life and in thinking itself. 267 
 
Socrates then exemplifies a life in struggle for truth. There is no need for a clear 
definition of truth or a metaphysics of truth. Truth is only meaningful in the struggle for it. 
Eric Manton notes that this leads Patočka to the following position on freedom. Freedom, 
unlike the standard liberal conception of freedom as innate, or as Manton puts it 
―freedom by default‖268, instead exists in the struggle for it.  
Suffering plays a major part in Patočka‘s philosophy. Suffering for freedom is 
authentic living. Patočka‘s own attempt to emulate Socrates questioning and call for 
authentic living is best found in his authorship of the charter 77 document. Charter 77 
will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters but a small note is necessary here. 
The Charter 77 document was a document calling for the respecting of the freedoms and 
rights outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which the 
socialist government had signed up to. Both of these documents have freedom as their 
central aims in the form of freedom of expression, education, and freedom from fear and 
other liberal freedoms. Patočka saw in the failure of the Government to actualise the 
policies that these covenants propounded, a need to highlight the world of appearances 
that the ideology was providing. As a result, Patočka, Havel and other notable signatories 
were detained by authorities. After a lengthy interrogation Patočka died. The significance 
of his death is that it is in line with the dictates of his philosophy. The martyrdom of 
Patočka for Charter 77 could be seen as a Socratic defence of a life in truth. Havel at 
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least took it that way, incorporating the idea of suffering for a life in truth into his own 
thought. 
If we consider the cave allegory from Plato‘s The Republic, we see the idea of 
suffering/struggling. Initially, when the prisoner is turned to face the fire inside the cave 
there is a painful struggle for recognition. Then there is a greater struggle when faced 
with the light of the outside world at the cave‘s exit.269 Implicit is also the struggle to 
move on to the next stage of the allegory—that is the struggle to cease watching the 
world of things and inquire into the sun‘s visage. Then there is the struggle to behold the 
sun; then another struggle when returning to the cave‘s darkness; then again a struggle 
when attempting to convey the world outside the cave to the other prisoners. For Plato, 
as for Patočka and Havel, the idea of truth is intrinsically linked to the struggle for it. The 
struggle of returning to the cave is synonymous with the political struggle for freedom. 
The political is the state of permanent uprootedness as it is the state that struggles to 
stare at the fires of contingency. The moment the essence of the political is set up, 
humanity has again succumbed to the shadows on the cave wall. As Darian Meacham 
points out, Patočka leaves the political as this permanent state of openness, or 
struggling against the given.270 Individuals, in their struggle for freedom, make a space in 
which the struggle against each other can be played out—the political. It is constantly 
being remade through individuals struggling with and against each other for authentic 
expression.  
This philosophy of suffering also has a link to the philosophy of Karl Jaspers. In the 
The Perennial Scope of Philosophy, Jaspers‘ makes clear the importance of the example 
of Socrates in much the same way as Patočka. For Jaspers‘, Socrates struggled against 
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demonology271 in order to pursue the divine (eternal,) call to Truth.272 The philosopher, 
for Jaspers‘, (and note the similarity in Patočka and Havel here,) is constantly in a 
struggle to apprehend eternal truth which is eternally unattainable. Truth is in an eternal 
state of becoming. Hence, rather than looking to the future for authentic being there is a 
responsibility, through philosophy, to realise the present.273 A sacrifice of one‘s life for 
truth is for Patočka an attempt to realise truth in the present moment. Both Tucker & 
Kohák agree that Jaspers and Patočka, on the theme of sacrifice, make for a worthwhile 
comparison. Kohák, as the biographer of Patočka, writes that Patočka was reading 
Jaspers in 1934 and Kohák notes the similarity in their themes. 274, 275 Tucker writes,  
 
Patočka resembles Socrates of the Phaedo.  In his negative-Platonic way, 
Patočka reached conclusions similar to those of Plato‘s Socrates. Socrates 
longed to free his soul of his body to dwell with the ideas. Patočka was 
looking for a transforming experience of Sacrifice to liberate him of 
everydayness and beings, to be reunited with being.276  
 
On Tucker‘s view, Patočka sought, in terms of Jasper‘s philosophy, to become more 
aware of his existenz, or limitless freedom of his being, through a confrontation with pain. 
This is a remarkably strong statement from Tucker, and I‘m not entirely in agreement 
with it. What I will assert, however, is that Patočka‘s authorship of the Charter 77 
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document and his death after interrogation provides a Socratic example from which 
conclusions like Tucker‘s can be drawn. Whether it was Patočka‘s intention to seek out 
pain or not, Havel, like a young Plato at the death of Socrates, finds a strength to 
continue with philosophy because of the vision of authentic life provided by the perceived 
sacrifice of Patočka. 
That Patočka was interested in sacrifice is not in question. Derrida asks, in The Gift of 
Death: 
 
How does one give [death] to oneself in the sense that putting oneself to 
death means dying while assuming responsibility for one‘s own death, 
commiting suicide but also sacrificing oneself for another, dying for the other, 
thus perhaps giving one‘s life by giving oneself death, accepting the gift of 
death, such as Socrates, Christ and others did in so many different ways. And 
perhaps Patočka in his own way?277  
 
Philosophy, as Derrida describes it in The Gift of Death, is a vigil over death, awareness 
of death and a confrontation with death. The concern for death creates the polemos 
through which freedom comes into being. Derrida describes freedom as the concern for 
death.278 The turning to face death, characteristic of philosophy, for Patočka, represents 
a triumph over death.279 The triumph lies in the confrontation as life runs away from 
death, in the Heideggerian sense. Responsibility thus entails a rupture with the normal. A 
dissent against authority280 to bring about this confrontation and, as in the example of 
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the Phaedo, the knowledge of death can become a gift to oneself. That is one can, to 
confront death, give death to oneself. 
My purpose in introducing Derrida‘s interpretation of the giving of death in Patočka, 
and its relation to a sacrifice of life, is to illustrate a concurrence of Havel‘s thought with 
Patočka‘s. Despite Derrida‘s  re-working of Patočka‘s ideas, the themes Derrida 
illustrates are Patočka‘s and are also present in Havel. In Letters to Olga, Havel writes 
that death is a provocation capable of mobilizing and arousing, which in part goes with 
Patočka‘s thought. Even more strongly connected to Patočka‘s thought, is the idea of 
giving oneself a gift of death as a means of dissent.281  This does not translate to a 
glorification of suicide. Instead, the gift of death can be a giving to oneself a 
confrontation with death, a rupture with life. As Havel writes, ―without the awareness of 
death, nothing like the ‗meaning of life‘ could exist, and human life would therefore have 
nothing human in it.‖282 The confrontation with death, for Havel as for Patočka, is a 
triumph over death - a living despite the inevitability of death. That authentic relation to 
death, which Derrida calls freedom, gives life its meaning. Transcendence is only 
possible with the gift of death.  
Patočka’s Critique of Ideology and the Influence of that Critique on Havel 
One of the hallmarks of Patočka‘s philosophy of history is his insistence that all major 
ideologies of the twentieth century, which are seemingly the result of conflict between 
different ideologies, found root in the same idea. They all provide a deterministic theory 
of man which cannot encapsulate the totality of man.283 It is not the specificity of Nazism 
which brings it into conflict with the specificity of liberal democracy. The conflict arises 
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from the workings of the ideology to prevail. The telos of ideology is to succeed. Ideology 
works by substituting the ideological interpretation of man for the concept of a free 
human being. For Patočka, the idea of man is constant; the only change is in man‘s 
historical situation. The historical situation is the shoreline which obstructs a clear view 
towards the horizon of Being. Ideology conflates an historical situation with the idea of 
man. In Patočka‘s essay Ideology and Life in the Idea the mortal nature of ideology is 
contrasted with the immortal nature of the idea of human freedom. I am reminded of 
Rousseau‘s opening to The Social Contract, ―man was born free, and everywhere he is in 
chains.‖284 The effect of ideology is obviously to incarcerate the free individual by 
removing the faculty of philosophy which brings the question of Being into focus, in 
favour of materialistic and deterministic conceptions of human nature. The only 
difference between ideologies is their historicity; in essence they are the same thing.  
Havel‘s famous essay, The Power of the Powerless, draws heavily on Patočka‘s 
critique of ideology explained above.  Consider the following passage by Havel: 
 
Ideology, in creating a bridge of excuses between the system and the 
individual, spans the abyss between the aims of the system and the aims of 
life. It pretends that the requirements of the system derive from the 
requirements of life. It is a world of appearances trying to pass for reality.285 
 
And compare this to a passage from Patočka: 
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The concept of Man is a theory about him, a theory that can stand alongside 
other theories; it is a theory since it does not engage us. Such a concept can 
become myth or ideology which does engage, which accommodates those of 
our tendencies, needs and forces which lay dormant in us so as to lead, direct 
and draw them together for the needs of social action. 
Nevertheless, ideology, although it engages, conceptually grasps, and binds 
us, it seizes Man externally, as certain forces in the overall complex of 
forces.286  
 
Patočka finds myth to be important. He writes, in Platonism and Politics, that myth is for 
those whom can not or will not practice philosophy.287 Myth binds people to action. 
However without philosophical motives, myth (or what has become ideology due to the 
lack of philosophical motivation,) becomes a prison for the self. Both thinkers share the 
same view of the relationship between ideology and conceptualising the human 
condition. The similarity is of course, to be expected; Patočka is the key influence on 
Havel‘s thought.  
Findlay claims that Havel‘s thought can only be considered in light of Patočka‘s 
work.288 He also criticises Havel for not being the rigorous philosopher that Patočka was. 
For Findlay, there is no political philosophy in Havel‘s works; there is just a spattering of 
themes which resonate with political readers.289 I think this is unfair to Havel. There is a 
key difference between Havel‘s and Patočka‘s critique of ideology which separates Havel 
and delineates him as an original thinker, is the removal of the philosophy of history from 
Patočka‘s critique of ideology. The crucial question driving Patočka‘s critique of ideology, 
                                                 
286 Jan Patočka, “Ideology and Life in the Idea,”  Studia Phenomenologica VII (2007): 89-90 
287 Patočka, “Platonism and Politics,” 343. 
288 Findlay, “Classical Ethics,” 403. 
289 Ibid 404. 
129 | P a g e  
 
as is well noted by Derrida, is ―why does [Europe] suffer from ignorance of its history, 
from a failure to assume its responsibility, that is, the memory of its history as history of 
responsibility?‖  The Heretical Essays aim to give a philosophical explanation to the 
problems of historicity from Patočka‘s view that historicity removes the possibility of man 
being a historical construction. The Heretical Essays are heretical precisely because they 
remove the historical determination of man from history. On the other hand, Havel, whilst 
sharing Patočka‘s Heideggerian conception of Being, does not share Patočka‘s valuation 
of the philosophy of history. Instead, Havel‘s philosophy is markedly more dissident. 
Where Patočka elaborates on the historical concealing of Being, Havel elaborates on the 
possibility of uncovering in the present. In his essay to commemorate the twentieth 
anniversary of the Prague Spring, Farce, Reformability, and the Future of the World, 
(rather than describing the historical formulations of it,) Havel explains the historical 
attempts to disrupt ideology. Rather than explaining the Hungarian Revolution, Prague 
Spring, Khrushchev‘s thaw (etc.) as separate historical occurrences, Havel contends that 
they represent a single historical trend towards the natural state of diversity, uniqueness 
and autonomy.290 Havel is concerned with history in so far as history can explain the 
attempt to ground an openness to Being in a particular present. The question of Europe‘s 
identity from the perspective of the philosophy of history is not Havel‘s concern.291 Hence 
Havel‘s philosophy departs from Patočka‘s in the scope of their concern. The analysis of 
history which informs Patočka‘s critique of ideology is not present in Havel. That does not 
mean that Havel disagrees with Patočka; instead, Havel frames his thought differently.  
Havel‘s thought is no less dense than Patočka‘s for this lack of historical analysis. 
Instead, Havel directs his thought directly against the contemporary Czech and world 
                                                 
290 Havel, Open Letters, 360. 
291 Havel, especially Havel the politician, is very interested in the identity of Europe, however, only in so far as 
Europe can be made to be an open society encouraging diversity and freedom. He is a supporter of the EU and 
European integration.  
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situation. Whereas the call to dissent is barely explicit in Patočka (who couched in strict 
explication of the phenomenological method,) Havel is much more practical than 
Patočka. Havel directs his writing explicitly at whatever situation is most concerning to 
him. For example, in Plato and Europe, Patočka elaborates at length on a 
phenomenological analysis of Plato, Aristotle and Socrates, discussing ways in which the 
political example of Socrates represents a life that is open to Being. The life that Patočka 
espouses is then, due to his phenomenological distancing from the historical situation, a 
life for all times. Socrates‘ life is an example for us. Patočka‘s concern for life under 
totalitarian communism in Czechoslovakia is displayed through his presentation of the 
timeless way to live in openness to Being. Havel, on the other hand, does not need to 
hide his concern for the Czech situation. Havel is not a strict phenomenologist—hence he 
is not corrupting the phenomenological method in writing open letters to Czech leaders 
or writing essays on dissident events immediately as they happen. In short, Havel 
grounds his philosophy in an analysis of the present. Jean Bethke Elshtain writes that 
Havel‘s philosophy represents an answer to a crisis in responsibility.  
 
A crisis in responsibility (the ―intrinsic responsibility that man has to and for 
the world‖) is a crisis in human identity and human integrity. To assume ―full 
responsibility‖ is not to lapse into dour moralism, nor to universalise a kind of 
giddy and boundaryless compassion, but to take up the very specific and 
concrete burdens of one‘s time and place.292 
 
This is a fair description of Havel‘s answer to a crisis of responsibility. It is interesting that 
writing on how the post-totalitarian regime came to power in Czechoslovakia, Havel 
                                                 
292 Elshtain “A Man for this Season,” 210.  
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writes to deplore how individuals are being made to be concerned about ideology rather 
than being properly concerned about the natural world. The focus is not on the genealogy 
of totalitarianism, the focus is on the present. This is a Patočkan idea. Nevertheless it is 
Havel‘s take on Patočka‘s thought, not a parrot version of it. 
There is an extra element in Havel‘s philosophy which is not present in the thought of 
Patočka and is yet linked to the critique of ideology. It is the idea of the absurd. The 
absurd enters Havel‘s thinking through his involvement in the world of drama and 
through his reading of Franz Kafka. For Patočka, ideology is best described in a Platonic 
sense as constituting the world of appearance. Hence the real or natural world becomes 
the Idea. For Havel, by contrast, ideology is best described as a Kafkaesque scenario. 
Many of Havel‘s plays, such as The Garden Party or The Memorandum, are in fact 
critiques of ideology where the aim of the play is to instil in the audience a sense that the 
world around them is in fact absurd. The actors on stage, at times, are reduced to 
speaking babble, seemingly unaware that what they are saying to other characters 
makes no sense; indeed the other characters react as if what was said was perfectly 
reasonable. Only in the audience is the privileged onlooker (distanced from the historical 
situation of the stage, and yet linked to it through thinking,) able to understand that the 
world of the characters is false and can be overcome through thinking, through 
dissenting from the given world of the stage. The theme is Patočkan but it is a Havelian 
move. 
Conclusion 
Findlay is right to argue that Havel is best understood through a study of Patočka‘s 
philosophy. However, it is a mistake to think that Havel is unoriginal, as Findlay does. 
This chapter has explained the major themes in Patočka‘s work which find a place in 
Havel‘s thought. Without fully committing himself to any specific part of Patočka‘s 
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philosophy, Havel has appropriated in his writing what I would call the ‗example‘ of 
Patočka. Havel shares a view of the meaning of history as an opening to Being that 
Patočka propounds, whilst not engaging with the historical explanation of that openness 
(or concealedness) through the history of philosophy. Havel shares the critique of 
ideology present in Patočka‘s thought, while adding to it the concept of the absurd that is 
taken from Havel‘s engagement with drama and Kafka. Havel also critiques ideology in 
the present; his thought is much more directed to the contemporary than Patočka‘s and 
that is a deliberate move away from his thought. The next chapter will further delve into 
some of Patočka‘s major themes and explore their influence on Havel. 
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Chapter 4: Further Explorations of a Patočkean Thread in Havel‘s 
Writing 
 
Introduction 
Building on the previous chapter‘s discussion of Jan Patočka‘s influence on Havel‘s 
thought, this chapter will investigate the influence of  Patočka‘s theory of negative 
Platonism and explore how some of the themes that arise in a discussion of negative 
Platonism can be used to appraise similar themes in Havel‘s work. Johan Arnason‘s 
paper ―The Idea of Negative Platonism,‖ will be a key text in this discussion. I further 
explore some of the points made by Arnason and add to the discussion by examining 
some of Patočka‘s later thoughts, found in his collection of informal lectures, Plato and 
Europe, his essay ‗Negative Platonism‘ and the Heretical Essays. As I argued in Chapter 
3, Jan Patočka‘s philosophy is the strongest influence on Havel. Chapter  3 introduced 
the idea of negative Platonism and briefly touched on the argument of the Heretical 
Essays and in this chapter I want to take that analysis further. I want to explore negative 
Platonism, and its later incarnations in Patočka‘s thought in the context of Patočka‘s 
project of an asubjective phenomenology. 
 
Asubjective Phenomenology 
Patočka had difficulty with Husserl‘s notion of the epoche.293 I cannot give a full 
account of Patočka‘s asubjective phenomenology because currently the main papers by 
                                                 
293 The epoche is the imaginative exercise of suspending from position taking when considering phenomenon, 
combined with reducing the critique of phenomenon to its essences. The epoche reveals the life world through 
its reductions to the transcendental ego to which the life world appears. 
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Patočka which treat with this break with Husserlian phenomenology are not available in 
English. However, enough scholarship exists for me to make a useful comment on the 
issue. 
Findlay writes that Patočka borrowed from his mentor Edmund Husserl the idea that 
the world is a universal that is given phenomenologically; but at the same time, Patočka 
rejects the reduction of the world to the transcendental subject.294 Patočka‘s problem 
with the epoche has been neatly summarised by Ivan Chvatik, who is the director of the 
Patočka archives at Charles University.295 For Husserl, the reduction involved in the 
bracketing of the epoche stops at the transcendental ego to which the life-world appears. 
This is problematic to Patočka because for him the reduction can be taken further, that is 
to the self appearing to the self. As Ivan Rodriguez points out, ―[t]he limitation of the 
epoche is due to Husserl‘s subjectivistic preference, which takes subjectivity as 
absolutely given with all its contents.‖296 Patočka wants his phenomenology to reflect on 
lived experience itself. Chvatik notes that as a consequence, for Patočka‘s asubjective 
phenomenology, ―we no longer believe that the reflection on our lived experience gives 
us access to our actual experiencing.‖297 This is actually quite a Heideggerian move, as 
Michael Staudigl notes, for meaning, in this asubjective phenomenology, is not reducible 
to an achievement of the ego.298 Instead, for Patočka meaning is grounded in our Being-
in-the-world.299 
                                                 
294 Findlay, Caring for the Soul, 27. 
295 Ivan Chvatik, “Jan Patočka‟s Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology” (Paper presented to the conference 
workshop Responsibility, Formal Knowledge and the Life-world, Murdoch University, November 28-29, 2011), 
6. 
296 Ivan Rodriguez “The Relevance of Jan Patočka‟s Phenomenology in Questions of Science and Religion” 
Pensamiento 64, (2008): 990. 
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135 | P a g e  
 
Patočka writes that ―we need to conceive of reflection as a vital act, placing it in the 
context of an existence on the way to itself, seeking itself, understanding itself, that is, 
understanding its possibilities‖300 Construed in this way, Patočka‘s phenomenology aims 
at an understanding of identity as that which has transcendence as a part of its very 
being. In other words the self is not a fixed identity, but rather a thrown being, in a 
specific time and place in the historical world, that constitutes itself through the search 
for itself. 
In explaining Patočka‘s understanding of human rights as those things worth 
sacrificing one‘s life for, James Mensch confronts the seeming contradiction of Patočka‘s 
view of rights and his asubjective phenomenology.301 For Mensch, if there is no 
substantive subject then the question appears, what exactly has rights? For Mensch it is 
when we conceive of the soul as movement that something substantive appears which 
can be endowed with rights. Motion for Patočka, as Mensch describes it, is the motion of 
existence.302 This can be fitted to Patočka‘s ideas of the three movements of care for the 
soul outlined in Body Community Language World. 
 
 Having a body at our disposal is at the same time the basis of life and an 
understanding of its most basic possibility. In our self movement, we 
understand that we move a body and that its guidance depends on us. If we 
did not understand that, then all our higher mental life, all lived experiencing 
                                                 
300 Jan Patočka, Body Community Language World, trans. Erazim Kohák, ed. James Dodd, (Chicago: Open 
Court, 1998), 165-166. 
301 James Mensch “Patočka‟s Conception of the Subject of Human Rights” Idealistic Studies 41, iss ½ (Spring, 
2011):1-10. 
302 Ibid 9. 
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over and above that, would become impossible. So it is not just that 
movement belongs to existence, rather existence is movement.303 
 
Patočka continues to write that movement is realization.304  Hence for Mensch, we can 
understand Patočka‘s defence of human rights in terms of this motion. If existence is 
motion, the subject is that which gives the world its appearing as the world unfolds itself 
through that motion.  
 
Abstractly considered, the world is simply, in Patočka‘s phrase, ―an open field 
of possibilities.‖  What transforms these into appearing is our ―I can.‖  Thus, 
because I can use water to douse a fire, it can appear as such.  Because, I 
can use it for drinking and bathing, it can also manifest these aspects.  This, 
of course, does not mean that every possibility is open to me.  Possibilities 
belong to the world.  I cannot create them.  I can only disclose them as means 
for my projects.   Such disclosure is, however, not static.  My ―I can‖ changes 
with the technology available to me and, with it, the appearing of the world.  
Thus, I can now look through a microscope or look out of the window of a 
plane—possibilities that were not available in previous ages.‖305 
 
In terms of the political space in which rights are considered, motion for Mensch is 
questioning, or calling into question. When the subject calls itself into question through 
engaging in public space, the public space is created and maintained. The being whose 
existence is motion in public is the subject endowed with rights. 
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Havel does not carry into his work the theme of movement which characterises 
Patočka‘s explanation of the self. I argue, though, that there is in Havel the sense that 
the subject is not privileged with a complete disclosure of the world. The problem of 
appearing that arises in Patočka‘s asubjective phenomenology has influenced Havel, I 
argue, to the extent that he also claims that the self requires a search for itself to be 
known. The self becomes known through the act of publicly calling the given into 
question. 
 
Language and Patočka 
Patočka was a philosopher involved in existentialism and phenomenology at the 
period when a battle was being waged by the logical positivists of Vienna Circle against 
what they termed the ‗sophistry‘ of existentialist thinkers. The anti-metaphysical bent of 
logical positivism led it to attempt to unmask what Arnason calls the fictions of an 
employment of language free from critical analysis.306 A part of Patočka‘s project, 
therefore, is to contribute to the defence of the phenomenological existentialist project. It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to closely examine Patočka‘s contribution to this 
defence; however, I mention this as an issue in Patočka‘s philosophy because it 
introduces Patočka‘s particular concern for the concept of language. Logical positivism 
tried to set up conditions of linguistic meaningfulness on empirical foundations, such as 
reference to sense data. Metaphysical concepts like the soul, essence, or substance 
were tossed into the fire as no sensory experience could help verify applications of these 
concepts. Famously, and ironically, what became known as the verifiability principle, that 
a statement is meaningful only if it is in principle empirically verifiable, itself requires a 
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metaphysical underpinning. There seems to be no empirical experience that could 
demonstrate the validity of the verifiability principle. Patočka concludes from this line of 
thought that logical positivism is ideological. Patočka held that logical positivism requires 
a conscious ignoring of the plurality of the experience of language.  
 
Language is history, not a once and for all structure; it is not given, but 
created through our acts and efforts, which aim at an ever broader reach and 
ever richer contents, without ever achieving all round completion; thus in 
contrast to the passive sense data of the animal, the human being constantly 
perceives and grasps new meanings. But this historicity of the very structure 
of language is only possible because man is undetermined by sense data 
(and more generally speaking, by anything that is complete and fixed before 
him or outside him); he is ‗free‘.307  
 
Patočka is advocating a transcendental claim that given that radical freedom is 
established on the basis of the historicity of language as an inescapable feature of our 
experience of language. Patočka is describing a pluralistic world which is in part created 
by discourse but which relies, nonetheless, on a certain sense of the metaphysical. For 
Patočka, there is an aspect to the human condition which is universal. It is important to 
note, as Peter Lom does in ‗East Meets West – Jan Patočka and Richard Rorty on 
Freedom‘308 that Patočka accepts, with Heidegger, the death of metaphysical thinking. 
This does not mean that he seeks in his philosophy to cast aside metaphysical thought 
as if it were wholly dispensable. He aims, instead, to reinvigorate a sense of the 
importance of metaphysics despite its failure to provide a total answer to the human 
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condition.309 For Patočka, the human mind, despite the failures of metaphysics, 
constantly returns to rethink metaphysics as if there is something in the language of 
metaphysics which provides a reference to ineliminable aspects of the human condition.  
For Patočka, every ethical claim intrinsically relies upon a metaphysical ground. As 
Lom writes, 
 
But how does it follow... that life does not allow complete neutrality in ethics 
that every kind of ethical claim is in one way or another always accompanied 
by a metaphysical position? Patočka answers by way of an example. He points 
out that every antimetaphysical position, despite its intentions, still makes 
metaphysical claims. He cites nihilism and positivism as two illustrations of 
this point. The positivist wishes to distinguish between facts and values, and 
he claims that reason may tell us nothing about values, that they are merely 
arbitrary constructs. But behind the positivists position is the assumption that 
values will not sustain rational evaluation because there is nothing to reason 
about and that means that our world, and by implication, our universe, itself is 
not susceptible to reason or rational evaluation. Similarly, in his reflections on 
nihilism, Patočka notes that in denying the possibility of any kind of rationally 
defensible moral principles, the nihilist oversteps the bounds of his doubts 
and slides into dogmatism. His denial of morality is accompanied by the 
metaphysical position that the nature of this universe is a chaotic one: 
―nihilism demonstrates itself to be dogmatic as soon as it proclaims 
meaninglessness as the final and incontrovertible fact‖ of the nature as a 
whole.310 
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The argument against logical positivism is the argument that Patočka uses to rescue 
some measure of meaningfulness for metaphysical thought. This is not to say that 
Patočka is a metaphysician. He is not committed to the discovery of a final answer to 
questions of metaphysics. Nonetheless, he robustly defends the significance and 
importance of certain kinds of metaphysical thinking. He is in agreement with Heidegger 
and Nietzsche, as stated in Chapter 3, that the greatest error in philosophy is Plato‘s 
provision of an answer to Socrates question of Being.  One of the main aims of The 
Heretical Essays is to demonstrate that Christian metaphysics ought to bear its share of 
responsibility for the great war of the twentieth century and the wars of European history, 
in the sense that out of Christian metaphysics, the turn to the secular is initiated. The 
Christian empire, coming out of the Roman empire, for Patočka, transforms care for the 
soul as a search for law and justice, in to a search for a justice set by a divine being, a 
being outside of this world.311 Patočka argues that from this paradigm care for the soul 
transforms from a care to be, to a care to have.312  The interest in Europe is for a 
conquest of nature. This change occurs in the sixteenth century and the Empire 
expansions of that time are for Patočka a result of this change of interest.313 For 
Patočka, the Christian viewing life only in its immediacy, not as a world in flux through 
shaking, is the root of nihilism. One cannot avoid this nihilism and hold one final, 
exclusive metaphysical position which would stagnate history.314 But interestingly one 
cannot, as we are historical beings, avoid thinking metaphysically, in so far as the 
thought of the day is our thought as well. One must step into and out of history 
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simultaneously so as to shake history and realise the potential for change within the 
immediate.315 
The job of the philosopher, to retrace some of the argument from Chapter 3, is not to 
provide whole and total answers to the question of Being and the question of the 
universe, which for Patočka are analogous questions. Instead the job of the philosopher 
is to demonstrate the plurality of positions that can be taken and to warn that adopting 
dogmatically a traditional form of metaphysics is to pin down (and consider) what is 
essentially not determinable. As Lom points out, Patočka finds the place of philosophy in 
the confrontation of the unknown as a totality (that is, the universe as unknown) and the 
subsequent feeling of wonder. Wonder at a specific reality which gives the impression of 
being tameable by reason is more the province at science.316  
Patočka is turning back to the early Greeks and their experience of wonder.  
 
For Patočka, the experience of wonder is important, not only because it 
signals the beginning of freedom, the precise moment when man begins to 
philosophize, but also because it constantly points to humility: the 
acknowledgement that man is not the most powerful and most knowing 
element in the universe.317 
 
I am reminded of an idea from a selection of Nietzsche‘s notebooks, published under the 
title Philosophy and Truth where he writes, 
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And just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the proudest of 
men, the philosopher, supposes that he sees on all sides the eyes of the 
universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought. 
It is remarkable that this was brought about by the intellect, which was 
certainly allotted to these most unfortunate, delicate, and ephemeral beings 
merely as a device for detaining them a minute within existence. For without 
this addition they would have every reason to flee this existence...318 
 
Where Nietzsche goes on to suggest that the experience of the totality of the universe 
reveals morality to be a relative human construct, Patočka, like Havel, emphasises the 
experience of wonder at what Heidegger and Patočka would call the mystery of Being. 
For Patočka, the possibility of pluralism should engender a feeling of humility when 
making decisions for action. Rather than the will to dominate nature, a feeling of wonder 
before Being leads us to see ourselves as a part of nature and not as the master of it. 
Hence, humility before nature makes us responsible to it in so far as we are a part of 
nature and being responsible for ourselves entails a responsibility. In a sense, a person 
is inseparable from their surroundings and hence being responsible for oneself must 
entail being responsible for the place in which one is, for the nature that provides the 
psychical conditions of existence. 
Freedom for Patočka is a kind of transcendence. It is the ability to use thought and 
action to refer beyond the concrete and historical condition of our Being. Freedom is 
―transcending facticity through projecting possibilities.‖319 However, for Patočka, 
freedom is, as Ivan Chvatik notes, rooted to a concrete situation. Freedom is hence, in 
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my view, political. The Socratic inquirer whom Patočka imagines is, within their concrete 
situation, using freedom to project new possibilities within their situation. Hence being 
open to freedom is transcendence of the specificity of a situation. Returning to the idea 
of negative Platonism, the role of metaphysics is not to provide dogmatic answers to 
metaphysical questions but to hint at the possibility of transcendence, to provide a 
glimpse at freedom to transcend the mundane that only comes with humility before the 
totality of the natural world.   
Kenneth Zagacki, in his paper ‗Václav Havel and the Rhetoric of Folly‘, writes that in 
Havel‘s rhetoric there is an emphasis on the recognition of folly in history, which opens 
up a space where history can be challenged and new possibilities discovered.320 For 
Zagacki, Havel as President, through his rhetoric of folly (his speeches which highlighted 
the errors of history,) brings a sense of hope for the future. This hope comes through the 
space opened by the recognition of mistakes, and the certainty of future mistakes. This 
space allows a greater number of controversial subjects to be examined.321 Havel‘s talk 
of what Zagacki calls the ―fragility‖ of the human condition (and which I have been 
emphasising as its plurality,) serves as a ―difficult reminder that one could never be 
certain that one‘s own position was right.‖322 When Havel and Patočka talk about the 
transcendent, they mean the human capacity to think beyond one‘s immediate situation. 
I would like to link Zagacki‘s discussion of the recognition of folly to the discussion of 
transcendence that I have presented by claiming that recognition of folly, or humility, is 
what creates the space for a recognition of freedom, and hence transcendence.  
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Discourse is a medium through which the given can be called into question by 
recognition of the historical and ahistorical nature of language. Discourse speaks from a 
certain situation and hints at the freedom of transcendence. This is most obvious in 
ethical questioning. When I ask, ―must I?‖, I am asking a specific situation to reveal its 
possibilities. In the language of questioning is revealed freedom. In fact the very 
possibility of freedom lies in the possibility of posing a question, a pragmatic mode of 
utterance. Havel, by engaging in a discourse about the past errors of Czech people in 
their complicity with socialism, can be considered to be opening up a discussion for 
future behaviour. His discourse is a reminder of freedom. 
Patočka’s Thoughts on Plato and Logos 
Even though, as stated in Chapter 3, negative Platonism involves a rejection of the 
attempt by Plato to supply metaphysical certainty to the natural world, Patočka still finds 
in Plato the preparations for a ground in which metaphysical thinking is possible. This 
acceptance of Plato‘s confrontation with the natural world is the platonic aspect of 
negative Platonism. As Edward Findlay points out  
 
Jan Patočka is both a critic of metaphysics and a defender of transcendence. 
[He] argue[s] forcefully that any attempt to understand the full scope and 
complexity of the human condition will require that we grasp its core 
possibility: the ability of human beings to transcend their immediate and 
simply given context. It is in reaching beyond the limits of given reality, in 
questioning and in seeking the whole that encompasses our world, that we 
begin to live according to our potential as human beings.323 
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Hence even though Patočka denies the separation of two worlds that platonic 
metaphysics propounds, in the sense that a Platonic Idea is objectifiable, the ground of 
thinking that allows for transcendence is central to Patočka‘s project, and is also central 
to the doctrine of Ideas.324 In Plato, the world of ideas points to a physical reality. That is, 
the idea of a horse illuminates a physical horse – or all physical horses owe their 
essence to the idea of a horse. The Idea of a horse is separate from the Idea of a peach. 
For Patočka the problem is not the separation of Idea and appearance, which is fine and 
even necessary given his description of the possibility of transcendence. Instead, for 
Patočka, the focus should be on the distancing between Idea and reality. Patočka 
focuses on the link between the two worlds – the chorismos. Chorismos can be 
described as separation. Aristotle‘s criticism of Plato‘s doctrine of ideas criticises the 
idea of chorismos.325 Aristotle‘s criticisms are important because Patočka turns his 
attention to them, and to the Nicomachean Ethics, (in Plato and Europe) in order to 
elaborate upon the role of philosophy. Although Plato and Europe does not refer to the 
idea of negative Platonism, the theory still fits the present discussion because it 
illuminates Patočka‘s thinking about Plato and metaphysics.  
Aristotle‘s criticisms of Plato‘s doctrine of ideas have been neatly summarised by Erich 
Frank. 
 
Aristotle rejects the transcendence, the chorismos, of the ideas, i.e. Plato‘s 
conviction that true existence, the idea, is absolutely separated from the 
objects of this world; in their finite, particular, and perishable existence these 
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(accessed July 14, 2011).  
146 | P a g e  
 
objects reflect only an image, as it were, the eternal and universal 
subsistence of an unique idea; they ―imitate it‖ and ―partake of it‖ (Aristotle, 
Metaphysics, 987 b10), without ever being able to reproduce it themselves. 
For Plato, therefore, the idea has a form of existence entirely different from 
that of particulars, of which nevertheless the idea is predicated. Between idea 
and particular there is the same relation – to use Aristotle‘s own example 
concerning this Platonic conception – as there is between the real Callias and 
his wooden portrait.... 
It is the Platonic principle of chorismos which Aristotle attacks most ardently. 
The existence of the idea, as Aristotle formulates it in the general notion, the 
definition is separated only in thought from the particulars whose real 
character it expresses, whereas in reality it is imminent in the particulars.326 
 
Patočka is interested in Aristotle‘s move past Plato, especially in his announcement, in 
Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, that every single particular action heads for a good of 
its own. With people there is a multiplicity of goals, with the goal being determined as the 
good. Hence for Patočka, as with Aristotle, there can be a multiplicity of goals.327 Patočka 
is thinking about different concepts at the same time. In thinking about Aristotle and the 
rejection of the chorismos, Patočka also considers Aristotle‘s idea of the telos of an 
action. Essentially, what is important about Aristotle‘s rejection of Platonic forms for 
Patočka is his announcement that what Plato calls forms, are just ideas inherent in the 
substance themselves. That is, there is no universal idea of blackness. Instead the black 
of my keyboard is inherent in the substance of the keyboard.  This is important because, 
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as Patočka develops his notion that the chorismos is the bridge to transcendence, 
Aristotle‘s claim that the idea is inherent in the substance is quite useful. Rather than 
transcendence giving substance its existence, transcendence is an inherent part of 
substance. 
For Patočka it is bridging the chorismos which is the task of philosophy and so he 
turns his attention to Aristotle as well as Plato.  In The Republic, Plato‘s Socrates sees 
revealing justice as the ultimate task of philosophy, that is knowing the form of justice. 
For Patočka this is not possible. In Plato and Europe he turns to Aristotle to find, in Greek 
thought, an understanding that the condition of man is freedom and that the goals of 
man are pluralistic writing, 
 
When for example, Aristotle says that philosophy, at least the kind he lays out 
in the Nicomachean Ethics, is not concerned with knowing what is, nor about 
knowing what are moral values so that they can be theoretically analysed, but 
rather that we philosophize in order to become good people.328  
 
Patočka, in Plato and Europe, focuses on the idea of motion in Plato‘s and Aristotle‘s 
description of ‗care for the soul‘. For Plato the movement is vertical - from appearance to 
Idea (as explained in the allegory of the cave). For Aristotle the movement is horizontal, 
regarding human action to achieve a goal. It is this focus on human action, in a 
horizontal rather than vertical sense which is attractive to Patočka. This is  because 
Aristotle recognises that the goal of man is not as easily defined as it is in Plato.   
Patočka, in analysing Aristotle and Plato, rejects the idea that chorismos is not 
important. He writes that chorismos is a significant phenomenon which cannot be 
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ignored or silenced.329 As discussed above, and in Chapter 3, freedom for Patočka is the 
experience of transcendence, of distancing from things as they appear, and the 
chorismos is the experience of transcendence. Hence it is no surprise that chorismos is 
important to Patočka. Patočka‘s reinterpretation of Platonism, in negative Platonism, 
posits the idea as neither an object nor a concept.330 Instead the ideas are that which 
give freedom, the force which ―sustains our ability to resist ―mere reality.‖‖331 Rather 
than understanding Plato‘s metaphysics as positive systematic knowledge, Patočka 
seeks to understand Plato‘s ideas as the possibility of distancing from any possible 
object. This is not a distancing in the sense that one is removed from what one is 
considering. Rather, one uses the chorismos to remain attached as the bridge between 
the distanced thought and the embedded in-the-worldness of what is being considered. 
Rather than the idea being an objective reality, the idea becomes the possibility of 
transcendence and the chorismos the experience of transcendence. Aristotle‘s criticisms 
of the chorismos are important because the chorismos is attached to every object, not to 
its universal form, but as its transcendence. 
Aristotle helps Patočka to see the plurality of guises of freedom which every situation 
contains and so for Patočka every human action contains both the horizontal movement 
of Aristotle (action towards a goal) and the vertical movement of Plato (movement 
towards transcendence). Of course Patočka notes that these movements can be 
negative. One has the freedom to be evil, or one has the freedom not to act to achieve a 
goal. However the point still stands that Patočka is here fusing central ideas of Plato‘s 
metaphysics and Aristotle‘s ethics. For Patočka, the philosophy of Aristotle serves to 
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show that the experience of the cave contains a richness which escaped Plato.332 
Aristotle, according to Patočka, understood that everything is inside the cave.333 Patočka 
acknowledges the world outside of the cave without giving definition to it. The sun that 
illuminates the world of Plato‘s allegory, and which represents the good, is manifold in its 
appearance, and hence is not able to be positively described – it is simply the call to 
transcendence which makes transcendence in the cave a possibility. Aristotle‘s rejection 
of the forms is not important to Patočka. He writes that perhaps Aristotle understood the 
forms better than Plato did.334 What Aristotle achieves is the politicising of Plato‘s 
vertical movement. As Patočka writes, 
 
Aristotle is the first philosopher in the entire tradition who thematizes action, 
the acting of man. This moment, the analysis of human action in Aristotle, 
which he does not see something as exterior, but rather as determinant, 
which takes place within the soul, which takes place in the sense of the good 
life and has an influence on life in its whole – this acting actually concretely – 
is the experience leading Aristotle to bend into the horizontal that vertical 
movement that the Platonic philosopher carried out.335  
 
Rather than the philosopher escaping from the cave into the ideal world of forms, thus 
making an absolute break with the physical world of the finite and changeable, the 
importance of Aristotle lies in his announcement that a life of politics can procure a good 
life as can the life of philosophy. What actions are done inside the cave are under the 
scrutiny of Aristotle and it is this idea that Patočka would like to carry into twentieth 
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century philosophy. Aristotle‘s transformation of Plato is ―the existential experience upon 
which philosophy leans.‖336 Patočka is clear that being a philosopher, for Aristotle, was 
not simply a profession but a way of living.  
Language is the key to understanding Patočka‘s conception of freedom. Chorismos is 
bridged through language. Arnason writes that Patočka sees language  as ―an ongoing 
creation of new conventions and systems‖.337 The creative aspect of language reaches to 
transcendence linking the actual with the idea. Consider the following passage from 
Plato and Europe regarding care for the soul: 
 
In Plato, it is the specific vertical movement, vertical in the sense that it heads 
from that place where, so to speak, we originally, usually, and first of all are – 
in the lowlands of existence – to its peaks, to that from which springs 
existence and from which it develops, to the principles in Plato‘s sense. The 
possibility of this movement shows itself to us in that, in the sphere of logos, 
in the sphere of meaningful speech, the decadent manner of existence 
announces itself in its decadence as incoherence, whereas care for the soul 
takes place in logos, makes the person whole. It makes him close to the 
principles in that sense; he who withstands the examination of the care of the 
soul is concentrated within himself. He is not in contradiction; he is unified in 
his entire perceiving of life; and just in this way he gets to the proximity of the 
unifying measure, which measures all actualities here around us. This 
unifying measure is just the idea. For this reason, the movement the soul 
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performs in the concern, care of the soul for itself, is the distinctive 
experience if you like, that there exists something like the idea.338  
 
This is quite a cryptic passage. However, what shines through is the role that language 
plays in realising transcendence. Care for the soul, as the realisation of transcendence is 
achieved as a vertical movement towards the form. Meaningful speech reveals the world 
as transcendence, that is what is immediately given, all actualities are measured against 
their transcendence. The unifying measure is the non-objective idea, or transcendence 
itself. Hence for Patočka, the inquiry of logos as the realisation of transcendence reveals 
the idea not as an objective or subjective reality, but as the possibility of transcendence 
– the chorismos.  
For Patočka, transcendence is achieved through logos and a questioning of the 
immediately given. The incomprehensible nature of the Idea means that language, as the 
bridge over the chorismos between the world of Idea and world of appearance, is in 
constant struggle with what is given and what cannot be fully known. The natural world 
never gives itself totally to reason and yet in logos there is a struggle with perception that 
reveals, if the discourse is meaningful, an accurate and useful account of the world. 
Through questioning discourse, the radical freedom that characterises the human 
condition is revealed and the individual can understand themselves as freedom. This 
means that through discourse, the transcendental ground of the Idea can be located. 
Meaningfully employing discourse to reveal this radical freedom is a form of caring for 
the soul, hence there is a sense that care for the soul is about a pragmatic discourse that 
questions the world.  
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In Patočka‘s focus on philosophy as a practical activity of transcendence in the works 
of Plato and Aristotle, there are echoes of a contemporary of Patočka‘s – Hans-George 
Gadamer.  Famously, Gadamer announced that ―being that can be understood is 
language.‖339 Gadamer‘s own interpretation of this statement, which applies to this 
discussion of Patočka, is that in language, our understanding of being-in-the-world comes 
to be known.340  
There is much in Gadamer and Patočka that is similar. Both are heavily influenced by 
Heidegger and see language as the means of realising freedom. The Heideggerian idea 
of thrownness is ineluctable for both thinkers.  Historicity and traditions are also 
ineluctable as they are a part of the condition of thrownness. I am introducing Gadamer 
because when Havel appropriates Patočka‘s thoughts on language, there is significance 
for the field of hermeneutics. Patočka never openly writes a text on hermeneutics. 
However, his work seems to prefigure a lot of the ideas of the main figures in 
hermeneutics. Paul Ricoeur wrote the preface to the French edition of Patočka‘s 
Heretical Essays. Ricoeur states that the most important argument of the essays is the 
consideration of the possibility of Socratic politics awakening ―a solidarity of the shaken‖ 
to refuse mobilisation in the context of the state of total war in the twentieth century. 
Despite the analysis of pre-history and history that the Heretical Essays engage with, the 
idea of dialogue with tradition to transcend tradition is still central to Patočka‘s work, and 
prefigures the politics of hermeneutics. 
The question that Ricoeur points to is central to the work of Gadamer, Patočka, and 
Havel. Within the context of thrownness, Gadamer argues that all understanding arises 
only in and through our prejudices. Dermot Moran writes that for Gadamer, ―we have to 
engage in dialogue in order to bring out and make transparent to ourselves our own 
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presuppositions and prejudgements.‖341 For Moran, what Gadamer is trying to do is to 
critique the enlightenment conception of an opposition between tradition and pure 
reason. For Gadamer, reason operates within tradition. It is through dialogue that the 
motion of Plato and Aristotle, which is described above, is achieved towards the good. 
This motion is achieved inside the cave, as it is impossible to escape the state of 
throwness. Philosophy for these thinkers does not delude itself into thinking that some 
total description of truth is even attainable, instead philosophy must start with the 
Heideggerian recognition that human consciousness is historical and finite.  
There is a tendency in the phenomenology of Patočka and Havel to see the role of 
philosophy as one of cutting through ideological distortions.  This is not purely a 
phenomenological task. Investigating the way in which phenomenon appears must be 
aimed at understanding if it is to be politically useful, and if it is to clarify the muddy 
waters of ideological distortion. Hence there is, to use Gadamer‘s thought again, a 
hermeneutic element to Patočka and Havel‘s philosophy. The word ‗hermeneutics‘ 
contains the name of the Greek god Hermes – the messenger of the gods. Hermeneutics 
is a study of the bridge over Plato‘s chorismos because Hermes delivers messages from 
the gods to humans. I wish to demonstrate in the next section how the themes of 
Patočka‘s reinterpretation of the ancient Greek philosophers have been taken up in a 
phenomenological/hermeneutic interpretation of the contemporary moment in Havel. 
Havel, to borrow a phrase from Foucault, offers a mode of historicising the present. 
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Havel’s appropriation of the Greek Element of Patočka’s Thought 
Patočka‘s practice of philosophy, in the mode of samizdat342 lectures and essays is 
Patočka‘s mode of interpreting the present by interpreting the traditions which have 
given rise to the present. His life, as much as his philosophy, is an education in living 
under totalitarian conditions. As Lau put it: 
 
Patočka‘s heroic resistance against political persecution under a socialist 
regime in his home country, by incessantly pursuing independent 
philosophical research and private philosophical teaching practically under 
the eyes of state police, is an eminent example showing that it is possible to 
continue to philosophize under adverse social, political, and institutional 
conditions (he was allowed to teach philosophy only during eight years in his 
whole intellectual life, from 1945-1949, and then from 1968-1972, and had 
been under almost total isolation during the 1950s). The way he exercises the 
freedom of thinking and conducts his moral conscience at the risk of his own 
existence is an act of affirmation of the basic civil rights prescribed verbally by 
the law of the socialist state but proscribed in fact under a totalitarian regime. 
This act comprises not only an educational content directed towards the 
younger generations of his own country, but also a political message of 
protestation against institutional violations of these rights under such a 
regime.343 
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Havel is not a historian, nor is he a professional philosopher. All of his doctorates are 
honorary, earned for his actions throughout his life. However, the example of a life in 
truth is just as clear in Havel as it is in Patočka. Havel, as mentioned in chapter 3, 
theorises the present, where Patočka illuminates the present by reference to ancient 
history.  
A central aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the analysis that Patočka applies to 
ancient philosophy in his writing finds root in Havel, even though Havel does not analyse 
the same classical texts as Patočka. With the above discussion of Patočka‘s philosophy 
in mind, consider the following letter from Letters to Olga. 
 
My family, friends, acquaintances, fellow prisoners, the unknown weather 
woman, my fellow passengers in the streetcar, the transport commission, 
those who go to see my plays, the public, my homeland and the state power 
structure; countless relationships, tensions, loves, dependencies, 
confrontations, atmospheres, milieus, experiences, acts, predilections, aims 
and things with which I am loosely or closely connected - all of that forms the 
―concrete horizon‖ of my relating, because all of it is my world, the world as 
my home, the world in which I am rooted in a complex way, to which I 
ceaselessly relate, against the background of which I define myself, through 
which I simply am. It is the world of my existing, such as it presents and opens 
itself to me, as I make myself at home in it, as it constitutes itself for me 
through my experiences and I - in one way or another - make it meaningful. 
Thus my ‗I‘ creates this world and this world creates my ‗I.‘344  
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Here we find the familiar concept of thrownness. Havel is writing that his I is a product of 
contingency. His world is defined by the interactions that he has with the world. As 
Heidegger would present it, there is an element of the world which is already defined 
before the I asserts itself or knows itself. The next chapter will explore the existential 
nature of a life in truth but here I want to make a comparison with the philosophy of John 
Paul Sartre. Sartre also writes about transcendence, and there is a similarity in meaning. 
For Sartre the For-itself can direct itself beyond what is given to consciousness in a new 
project of itself. For Havel and Patočka, transcendence has this quality, but it is also in 
relation to an ultimate transcendent – Being. Being is not a no-thing in Havel and 
Patočka as it is for Heidegger. When Patočka talks about the vertical movement of 
reflection and Havel talks about the horizon of my horizons, or my absolute horizon, they 
are invoking something more than the phenomenological concept of transcendence. 
 
And yet: my existence in this world and the way I relate to my ―concrete 
horizon‖ cannot be explained , as it may seem at first, by some one-sided and 
unqualified clinging to them as such, by surrendering to their actually existing, 
isolated, relative, self exhausting, phenomenal and superficial manifestations. 
It depends rather, on something else: on the extent to which I direct my 
existence-in-the-world toward Being: not, of course, toward Being as 
something outside the world and which can be attained only by ―leapfrogging‖ 
or ignoring the world, but on the contrary, toward Being as something that is 
―in the world‖ far more radically than anything the world declares and offers 
itself to be at first sight: that is towards its own Being, i.e., to the very Being of 
this world. This can only mean that through my life, through my life, through 
the experiences and trials I undergo, I gradually penetrate beyond the 
different horizons of my ―concrete horizon,‖ I attempt to widen them, to step 
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past them, to see beyond them, to get what is on the other side of them - until 
ultimately I aspire towards a place beyond its ultimate conceivable limit, the 
―horizon of all my horizons,‖ to what I call the ―absolute horizon‖ of my 
relating. And only then - as I gradually come to realise (though failure to do so 
won‘t change the essence of things) - does this horizon breathe into my world, 
my existence in it and the way I relate to my ―concrete horizon,‖ its proper 
substance, coherence, meaning, perspective and direction; it is this in which 
the language of the world - as that which is ―unexpressed‖ in it - first 
addresses me in a way that truly demands commitment, and thus ultimately 
becomes the only true, firm, and final focus of my relating to the world and my 
existence in it, the only true firm and final background of my self constitution 
and self definition, the only genuine, and genuinely determining ―co-
ordinates‖ of my true identity.345 
 
One of the key claims of the above passage is that a higher horizon, or the ―absolute 
horizon‖ speaks to Havel as the language of the unexpressed. He does not see that he 
sees it, or feels it, or even intuits an ultimate transcendent (Havel calls the transcendent 
a ―a place beyond conceivable limit‖). Instead, that which is unexpressed, is revealed 
through a language. It is to go one step further to say the ‗unexpressable.‘  I interpret this 
in the light of the above discussion of Patočka‘s reinterpretation of Plato‘s cave allegory. 
It appears to me as though a higher horizon, which is intuited through a gradual increase 
in intelligibility as one pushes further the ―concrete horizon‖ with the understanding that 
there is something more to push to, is analogous to the world of ideas calling to the 
philosopher from outside the cave. Once the siren song of the absolute horizon has been 
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heard, it breathes life into the concrete horizon, giving a sense of transcendence to the 
mundane. Havel is not suggesting that the absolute horizon is intelligible. Instead, just as 
Patočka does, Havel is attempting to find a space for metaphysical thinking in a post-
metaphysical world.  
Havel, in a playful but forceful manner, rejects the possibility of metaphysics. More 
precisely, he rejects metaphysical answers; he writes that it is impossible to leapfrog 
from the appearance to the thing-in-itself. Instead, as Patočka writes, the call of the world 
outside of the cave hints at a responsibility to illuminate the world inside of the cave 
without ever having to leave the cave. The term ‗horizon‘ has been used by Havel and 
Patočka quite regularly but has escaped analysis in this thesis thus far. It would be 
valuable to show here how useful this term is for both thinkers. The idea of pushing a 
horizon back best characterises the post-metaphysical project of Havel and Patočka. 
‗Horizon‘ is a term common amongst phenomenologists. It is used to describe the 
limits of our awareness of our temporal, spatial and our attention to our surroundings. 
Havel and Patočka speak of multiple and hierarchal horizons. Just as in the vertical 
movement of Plato, through intelligibility one pushes the boundary of one‘s concrete 
horizons making new horizons. However, this movement is more accurately thought of as 
the bending of the vertical movement to the horizontal which Patočka analysed and I 
discuss previously in this chapter. Rather than making an absolute split between 
horizons, listening to the language of the world enriches one‘s concrete experience of it. 
The ―language of the world‖, for Havel, is the unexpressed authentic world behind the 
veils of appearances. It is, to go back to a point from the previous chapter, the call of 
Being to the self in a state of throwness. Through Socratic politics, or the politics of 
inquiry, the concrete horizon is demonstrably much wider than originally conceived. 
Hence human action is never, as one‘s first horizon might suggest, only restricted within 
the confines of the immediately apprehensible. Instead the world is a much richer, 
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deeper and complex web of connections than the concrete horizon reveals to the ‗I‘. 
Again the bridge over the chorismos between the absolute horizon and the concrete 
horizon is logos. Through language one can be heretical towards history, one can speak 
past the horizon of historicity and expand one‘s thought, oriented towards the higher, 
―absolute horizon.‖ 
For Plato, there is a call from the Ideas, a responsibility towards them. In a similar way, 
for Havel there exists a responsibility oriented towards the absolute horizon, as 
unintelligible as it is. This unintelligibility leaves us within the cave, using all the 
resources of language to appreciate the possibilities beyond it; we contemplate the 
ungraspable complexity of existence-in-the-world.  Havel‘s project, like Gadamer‘s and 
Patočka‘s, is not about separating out the traditional and the rational; it is about 
employing the rational within tradition. One‘s concrete horizon is inescapable. Also 
inescapable is humanity‘s freedom. The combination of freedom and the concrete 
supplies the motion to widen the horizon of the ‗I‘ to increase one‘s understanding of 
one‘s situation, which Havel and Patočka both claim correlates to an increase in 
responsibility for one‘s situation. 
Letter 140 continues to speak of responsibility: 
 
Thus if it seems at first that my responsibility - as responsibility ―toward‖ - 
simply meant responsibility toward my immediate surroundings, to my ―non I,‖ 
to my world and thus to my ―particular horizon,‖ then it is obviously not 
entirely true: I am genuinely, fully, and reliably responsible for my immediate 
surrounding only if that responsibility is permeated by, based on and 
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subordinated to responsibility toward my ―absolute horizon.‖ Any form of 
clinging to that surrounding as such ends up as ―worldly‖ utilitarianism.346  
 
This is not a philosophy of individualism in the sense of a libertarian or neoliberal 
understanding of the individual as responsible to themselves only. Havel does however, 
promote the integrity of the individual; hence Havel is offering here a liberal individualism 
where the quality of the individual is the starting block for a good society. In other words, 
for Havel, responsibility is an issue for the individual. In Chapters 7 and 8 I will explain 
how Havel‘s sense of responsibility (what he has here called ―worldly utilitarianism‖ 
based on his analysis of the self,) leads one to a liberal philosophy. Here, though, it is 
sufficient to say that Havel‘s sense of the self is only interpreted in the self‘s relationship 
to a non-immediate other - to the other outside the cave. This responsibility to the past, 
present and future is not a limiting of the responsibility, a demarcation of what one is 
responsible for. Instead, the self‘s critical examination of the life-world reveals the extent 
to which one is responsible for the past, present and future. For Havel, identity is 
understood as the actions that one makes in relation to the past present and future. 
Being calls to the self in its condition of throwness, calling for the self to widen its moral 
circle and to act more responsibly in the knowledge that one‘s actions affect the past, 
the present and the future. 
Havel‘s letters to Czech leaders at times of political crisis are arguably based on this 
philosophy from Letters to Olga and the Patočkan reinterpretation of the Greeks. In 
Disturbing the Peace, Havel is asked about his early dissident activities and what effect 
he thought he could produce in the political situation. Havel makes no bones about his 
naivety. He refers to himself, self-deprecatingly as a young hooligan who thought he 
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could take on the establishment. Indeed the title of the chapter in which he discusses 
these activities is ‗facing the establishment.‘ For Havel, the establishment was not 
accessible to his concrete horizon. Some manifestations of the regime were definitely a 
part of that but the leaders of the regime, the people who Havel‘s actions were trying to 
reach, were beyond his immediate awareness. Indeed, he speaks of his great nerves, 
and his feelings of being out of place when he is invited to a political dinner attended by 
Alexander Dubcek.347 
Despite his assertion of naivety, Havel is aware that his actions had effects in that 
they became part of a wave, or collection, of dissent action that effected real change, if 
even, in the short term this was simply a change in tactics on the part of a regime which 
was not used to organised dissent in the form of mass petitions by major cultural figures 
and other such activity. Despite Havel‘s inability to include in his concrete horizon the 
upper echelons of the communist regime, Havel recognised that these people, and their 
decisions, were a part of his experience, hence he expanded his horizons to involve 
them. Similarly, with the trial of The Plastic People of The Universe, Havel notes that the 
music they created did not appeal to him at all when he heard it at first. He had no 
dealings with the band and yet the idea of their self-expression being halted filled him 
with a sense of responsibility to fight for their freedom. My point here is that Havel is 
expanding or widening his horizon to recognise the interrelatedness of causes, or goals, 
despite the pluralistic and differentiated appearance of them. Havel‘s actions as 
dissident demonstrate an awareness that although he might not be dealing with the 
regime immediately, his actions are still framed against an understanding of a larger 
reality than that which appears to immediate awareness. Hence his actions go beyond 
their specificity and the result is political effect. The open letters ―Dear Dr Husak‖ and 
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―Letter to Alexander Dubcek‖ betray Havel‘s complete lack of personal dealings with 
either political leader. Havel is not scholarly in these letters. That is, he is not engaged 
simply in criticism. Instead he is inserting his will for reform into the letters and 
addressing them to the Czech people. The public nature of these letters represents a 
step beyond the samizdat lectures of Patočka, in that they reach beyond their specificity 
in a much wider public space. Patočka‘s authoring of the charter 77 document is his only 
contribution to widening the concrete horizon of the Czech nation in line with Havel‘s 
dissident project. My point is that Patočka speaks of strife with the political regime and 
enacts such strife, albeit on a small underground scale, whereas Havel‘s actions 
represent a truly front line responsibility towards the regime.  
The final section of this chapter will give a brief overview of Patočka‘s theorising of the 
front line experience of the two world wars of the twentieth century and his description of 
―the solidarity of the shaken‖ which is the experience fundamental to the front line. 
Patočka sees in these experiences the possibility of rescue from ideological force. The 
discussion is important to this chapter as I aim to elaborate on Havel‘s realisation of 
freedom through strife with the regime.  
Wars of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War 
For Patočka, the defining events of the twentieth century were the two world wars, 
brought on as a result of revolutionary Germany‘s industrialisation of warfare, and the 
playing out of the ideas, represented in the philosophy of Nietzsche, that meaning is 
superfluous to power. Patočka argues that the First World War‘s creation of the front line 
is a result of technology influencing warfare. The terrible conditions in the trenches were 
compounded and necessitated by massive increases in fire power. Patočka calls the 
front line of WWI ―absurdity par excellence‖348 - the space where everything that is 
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valued by humanity is destroyed. The result of this is the creation of a desire to follow any 
leader or idea that promises to make the possibility of the front line disappear. This 
desire led, in Patočka‘s eyes, to a transformation of the will to war from fighting for a 
result to fighting for peace. The Second World War can be understood in this context. 
With the increase in industrialisation and technological sophistication, the front of the 
second world war is less easily defined. It impinges upon the homes of ordinary, non-
enlisted citizens and thereby becomes an experience for anybody. What is most 
interesting about Patočka‘s descriptions about the two world wars and the logos of the 
twentieth century is his assertion that the second world war did not result in peace, but a 
continued state of war: not war as traditionally understood, but a kind of war-like state 
nonetheless. 
With the development of nuclear weapons, war becomes a constant and immediate 
possibility. (It could start and finish before most are informed of it.) War in recent times, 
can be hot, cold or smouldering. The demobilisation of Europe after the World War II, for 
Patočka, has not made for a state of peace in the sense that war is not present. Instead 
war has appropriated peace.  
 
We continue to be fascinated by force, allow it to lead us along its paths 
making us its dupes. Where we believe we have mastered it and can depend 
on it for security, we are in reality in a state of demobilisation and are losing 
the war which has cunningly changed its visage but has not ceased.349  
 
Life desires peace, but for Patočka, life‘s attachment to force creates the will to war 
hence within life there is a tendency for war. I refer back to the third chapter of this 
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thesis and Patočka‘s contention, with Heraclitus, that being is strife. In the post-WWII 
world, the force of economics mobilises ―armies of workers, researchers, and engineers.‖ 
Patočka asks if the demobilisation of Europe and the gradual disappearance of 
systematic terror at extremes such as with Stalinism, represent a true demobilisation, or 
a ―cynical demobilisation‖ where individuals are forced to make a separation between 
truth and the public realm, as they are mobilised into obedience with new forms of 
power. Patočka anticipates here some of the major themes of critical theory and their 
analyses of the bureaucracy and industrialisation of modern lives. However, what is quite 
remarkable in this analysis is Patočka‘s insistence that it is through confronting the 
reality of the front, rather than running to life, that true demobilisation can be possible. 
Patočka locates power, or more accurately freedom, in ―the solidarity of the shaken,‖ 
that is, in the experience of the front from WWI translated into a contemporary 
experience away from the battle-field.  
Patočka draws on the experiences of the front of Ernst Junger350 and Teilhard de 
Chardin.351 Both writers described a sense of transcendence in their front line 
experience. Teilhard described the front as the crest of a wave that is crashing towards a 
new destiny. Junger noted that the front was an experience of transcendence from what 
one previously was - that is, one cannot retreat from what one is taking part in. For 
Patočka, what is significant about the front is the complete suspension of involvement in 
the world to take part in the events immediately at hand - ―freedom from all the interests 
of peace, of life, of the day.‖ Day and night are two symbols of the Heretical Essays for 
life and death. Both are equally a part of the human condition and yet we turn more to 
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351 Tielhard de Chardin was a French Jesuit philosopher who wrote on his experiences of the front line in 
World War 1. 
165 | P a g e  
 
the day, ignoring the night. War, as the experience of the night is an experience of 
something as equally human as life. Patočka writes: 
 
This absolute freedom is the understanding that here something has already 
been achieved, something that is not the means to anything else, a stepping 
stone to..., but rather something above and beyond which there can be 
nothing. This is the culmination, this self-surrender which can call humans 
away from their vocations, talents, possibilities, their future. To be capable of 
that, to be chosen and called for it in a world that uses conflict to mobilize 
force so that it comes to appear as a totally objectified and objectifying 
cauldron of energy also means to overcome force.352 
 
Patočka is arguing that the motives that led to the front are consumed in the front. The 
danger of the front, coupled with the immense freedom of the front, negates the will to 
life that created the conditions for the front in the first place.  
 
All everydayness, all visions of future life pale before the simple peak on 
which humans find themselves standing. In face of that, all the ideas of 
socialism, of progress, of democratic spontaneity, of independence and 
freedom appear impoverished, neither viable nor tangible.353 
 
This is an interesting understanding of freedom that Patočka is putting forward. On the 
one hand soldiers were being forced to charge to their possible deaths and on the other 
Patočka is arguing that they exhibit a freedom. For Patočka, the freedom that front line 
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soldiers have is to imagine themselves without the distractions of the mundane which 
cloud caring for the soul in a consumer‘s life in peace time. The soldiers are free to not 
think; they dream about the future, free from attachment to the past, and free to tear 
down the society which created the war in the first place. There is no other experience 
than the immediacy of war, the front line is absent, for Patočka, from ideology. 
For Patočka, the front, or the willingness to sacrifice one‘s life can be traced to a 
Christian appropriation of pre-history‘s understanding of the necessity of death and 
Plato‘s taming of death with the immortal soul and Christianity‘s appropriation of this. 
Patočka is scathing towards those who would accept everydayness in its givenness. 
―Humankind will not attain peace by devoting and surrendering itself to the criteria of 
everydayness and of its promises. All who betray this solidarity must realise that they are 
sustaining war and are the parasites on the sidelines who live off the blood of others.‖354 
Returning then to the question posed earlier about why the wars of the twentieth century 
did not make any lasting peace, Lubic Ucnik gives the following answer from her reading 
of Patočka: 
 
Peace has become nothing more than war fought with other means, 
―appealing to the will to live and to have‖ Leaving their front experiences 
behind, survivors accept that life is geared only towards things, life of 
consumerism: carpe deim, enjoy the pleasures of the moment without 
concern for the future! Not life in itself, but things make life pleasurable.355   
 
                                                 
354 Ibid 135. 
355 Lubica Ucnik. “Patočka on Techno-Power and the Sacrificial Victim”, in Jan Patočka and the Heritage of 
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In other words, the war continues on in a demobilized form using ordinary citizens as 
peaceful combatants, in a war of economics. Any actual combat is far from our shores 
and used as evidence that our way of life is the superior means of attaining eudemonia. 
We are told that a soldier from Australian or the U. S who dies in the Middle East is 
protecting our way of life. The unspoken assumption is that the things of this world are 
worth a war‘s continuation.  
The contemporary front, for Patočka, is a battle of logos. Those who suspend the 
given, who escape the ordinary everydayness and realise human freedom, have a 
responsibility to speak ―like Socrates‘ daimonion‖ in warnings and prohibitions.356 I 
mention Patočka‘s use of the term daimonion because it appears to me that Patočka is 
referring to the wisdom that appears to come from outside of the cave, illuminating the 
inside of the cave. Socrates‘ inner voice speaks with divinity, but refers to the mundane. 
It is for Patočka the voice of freedom. In a demobilized age still in the mode of war, 
Patočka again urges strife in the form of warning and dissent against whatever regime or 
form of force is manipulating human being. This is a rare explicit incitement to action in 
Patočka‘s work. In the sixth essay of the Heretical Essays, Patočka urges action in the 
present: recapturing logos by renouncing whatever meaning one already has been given. 
In Chapter 3, I claimed that it is the example of Patočka as much as the philosophy which 
is most important in understanding his influence on Havel. We do not have the benefit of 
Patočka the person to inquire into here, and so his texts, and the testimony of Havel that 
Patočka lived by his philosophy, will have to serve as the guideline for our understanding 
of Patočka‘s motivations. I would like to add to this claim thesuggestion that Havel‘s 
engagement with late socialism as a dissident seems to be similar to this incitement to 
action, which is usually implicit, but here explicit in Patočka‘s thought. However, Havel 
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does not explicitly quote the ―solidarity of the shaken‖ despite the fact his political 
philosophy shares so much in common with it. Patočka‘s ideas were being discussed 
amongst the circle of dissidents, and Havel did have a relationship with Patočka; hence 
the similarity is likely more than coincidence. 
The turning towards death which is intrinsic to Patočka‘s philosophy is also part and 
parcel of Havel‘s thought. Havel does not write about death very often. However, in 
Letters to Olga, he does muse on the ramifications of mortality. The discussion is thought 
provoking, and when considered with the rest of Havel‘s writings, illuminating. In Letter 
97, Havel writes about the inevitability of death and the importance of facing that 
inevitability rather than hiding from it. Havel muses on whether it is, or should be, a 
feature of consciousness to push thoughts of death from our minds - as Patočka would 
write, focus on the day instead of the night - Havel comes to the conclusion that it is not, 
and should not be. He contends that an awareness of death is ―the most essential 
starting point for any genuinely human... will to life.‖357 I believe that Havel is here 
echoing the thoughts of Patočka in the Heretical Essays. This is not a Heideggerian 
musing, because there is no mention of anxiety in the face of death. Rather a statement 
that an awareness of death that breathes life into life. 
Death, for Havel, makes life meaningful. Acting in the knowledge that we are not 
permanent, engenders a sense that actions go beyond the self, towards Havel‘s ―horizon 
of Being.‖ Of course for Havel, writing from prison, the meaning and method of dissent is 
not a topic that would pass through the censors, and so it is not possible for him to make 
a direct comparison to Patočka‘s claim that the front line is a place of absolute freedom. 
However, Havel‘s insistence of an ineliminable significance of a recognition of mortality, 
taken with his other writings on dissent and life in truth, show a genuine connection to 
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Patočka‘s particular call for action. Havel is willing to sacrifice his life for dissent. The 
sacrifice need not result in death, but his dissent represents a confrontation with 
mortality that ruptured his involvement in the mundane. True, many of his letters to his 
wife from prison do focus on the mundane. His constant thoughts about relieving pain 
from haemorrhoids, and his joy at receiving parcels and letters from his wife and friends 
show a real attachment to the quotidian. However not once does Havel express a desire 
to leave the prison to return to the ordinary if it would come at the cost of denying his 
sense of duty to speak a warning to the polis about the dangers of the regime.  
Havel, also writing on death, has an interesting point to make about fanatics which is 
relevant here. After the above discussion about Havel‘s talk about the necessity of a 
confrontation with one‘s mortality, and Patočka‘s exclamation about the need to throw 
oneself into a front line, it might seem that an argument could be made that Havel and 
Patočka would advocate the disruptive tactics of the suicide bomber. The suicide bomber 
confronts death. Indeed he or she is willing to suspend all mundane attachments, for a 
rupture with the regime which dominates their political situation, and, in their death, they 
become a victim among the other casualties of their action. However, this is not what 
Havel and Patočka are advocating at all. The simple difference between a dissident and 
a fanatic is the presence of ideology. Even in the choice of death the suicide bomber 
does not attain freedom. There is, in general, an ideological dullness and conformity 
behind the suicide bomber‘s actions. Also Patočka and Havel are not advocating a will to 
death, but instead are attempting to infuse life with a sense of greater meaning. The 
actions of a suicide bomber transcend the self and yet, they do not give meaning to the 
life of the bomber other than the meaning of the immediate suffering that is caused. 
Suicide bombers do not engage in the front, but are practising what Havel describes (in 
his description of the dangers of fanaticism), as a dangerous self-alienated faith. Their 
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actions are born from the belief that an idea is capable of solving human situations.358 
This replaces an orientation towards Being, with an orientation towards ―human 
product.‖359 
 
Its tragedy lies in the fact that it takes the beautiful and profoundly authentic 
longing of the human ―pre-I‖ to take the suffering of the world upon itself and 
transforms it into something that merely multiplies that suffering. 360 
 
Shaping the confrontation with death and subsequent dissidence to logos is necessary 
because only through self-dialogue can one break with ideas. The single act of suicide 
has a rupture with life that cannot be challenged. In language, however, there is a front 
line of battle which is capable of being redrawn as the conditions change. Consciousness 
can be aware of death, and be ready to give up the mundane without requiring a will to 
death.  
Patočka talk of ―the solidarity of the shaken, ‖ fits this view of death and sacrifice. The 
shaken are those who understand that they can say no to the forces which make this 
state of war continuous. They are those who can recapture the freedom of the front and, 
by bringing the historical situation into doubt, affect change. Patočka claims,  
 
The solidarity of the shaken is built up in persecution and uncertainty: that is 
its front line, quiet, without fanfare or sensation even there where this ruling 
Force seeks to seize it. It does not fear being unpopular but seeks it out and 
calls out wordlessly. Humankind will not attain peace by devoting and 
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surrendering itself to the criteria of everydayness and its promises. All who 
betray this solidarity must realize that they are sustaining war and are the 
parasites on the sidelines who live off the blood of others.361 
 
Notice how the shaken ―call out wordlessly.‖ I take this to mean that the shaken speak 
with Socratic irony. They give no position but reveal the folly in the position they are 
dissenting against. Patočka then invokes Heraclitus whom he claims saw his idea of war, 
that is a struggle for freedom, as a divine law which sustained life. Patočka calls this this 
―the will to the freedom of risk in the aristeia.‖ The aristeia is the scene in an epic work 
where the hero has their finest moment e.g. Achilles kills Hector. Essentially, Patočka is 
asking people to risk their comfort in order for real peace. To be a sacrifice not for the 
things of life, but for life itself; to choose not to live if living means not living with the 
Good. Patočka is thus not advocating martyrdom. The irrational death of the martyr for a 
specific ideology overlooks the fact that we are finite human beings that are not 
reducible to calculable and therefore controllable beings. Hence, dying for ideological 
causes is not caring for the soul. Patočka means living responsibly, responsible for 
ourselves, for others, and for the world, because life is not about living in the sacrifice of 
others, nor about consuming finite resources.  
I take the shaken in their solidarity, and their emphasis on sacrifice for responsibility, 
to be the driving idea behind Václav Havel‘s essay ‗The Power of the Powerless.‘ For 
Patočka, the philosopher has a duty to not remain silent about any noticed injustices. As 
Ucnik explains, this voice is most fitting despite what discomforts or lack of 
understanding from others might arise out of the discourse.362 The power of the 
powerless, which is discussed in Chapter 1, laments the way in which people deliberately 
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live a lie in order to avoid discomfort at the hands of an ideology. The ―aims of life‖ which 
for Havel is the search for authentic being, are ignored in favour of coerced behaviour 
and identity through the fearful intimidations of ideology. The power of the powerless is 
the power of the solidarity of the shaken. The community of the shaken is the powerless 
who say no to ideology. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has further explored Havel‘s debt to Patočka philosophical thought and 
associated concepts of the expansion of the horizon of care and responsibility. Building 
on the discussion of the debt to Patočka in more general terms made in Chapter 3, I 
have demonstrated how many of the major themes of Patočka‘s work find root in Havel. 
By describing Patočka‘s debt to ancient Greek thought in Plato and Aristotle in defining 
his idea of care for the soul, I have shown that there is a strong pedigree in Havel‘s 
notion of a life in truth. By describing Patočka‘s idea that Aristotle had made Plato‘s 
vertical transcendence out of the cave a horizontal movement, I claimed that Patočka 
opened the way for the kind of political philosophy espoused by Havel - a life devoted to 
speaking words of alarm at the current political situation, wherever necessary. Finally, I 
explored a call for action that is made explicit in Patočka‘s Heretical Essays and is acted 
upon by Havel. Where Patočka describes the twentieth century as perpetual war and 
writes of a need to confront the night of death by suspending involvement with the 
mundane, Havel‘s actions show a desire to create political change that seems to be 
analogous to Patočka‘s call to action. Overall, I sought in this chapter to explain Havel‘s 
dissent by drawing on some of the more intricate aspects of Patočka‘s thought to show 
the intellectual debt to Patočka owed by Havel and to demonstrate how in acting as 
much as writing, Havel moved beyond Patočka‘s thought and should be considered the 
more fully dissident figure. Because he wrote about events in the present, Havel‘s 
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thought is indicative of Socratic politics - that is a constant questioning of the given, as 
what is given in a state of war must be fought with and against. 
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 Chapter 5: Living in Truth as an Existential Concept 
 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 explained how the concept of a life in truth did not presuppose a 
metaphysical underpinning. This chapter will explore how a life in truth is best 
understood in existential terms.  
A good way to understand Havel‘s idea of living in truth is through a comparison with 
Jean Paul‘s Sartre‘s concept of ‗bad faith‘ from Being and Nothingness. A brief 
discussion exploring these Sartrean ideas will be illustrative because the functioning of 
bad faith as a lie to oneself that is not recognised as a lie is a good point of comparison 
for Havel‘s thoughts on life in truth. It is not clear that Havel closely studied Sartre‘s 
philosophy. There are two references to Sartre in Letters to Olga, and both are quoting 
famous lines that even those who have never read Sartre are likely to be aware of.363 Yet 
there are some striking similarities between Havel‘s writing and Sartre‘s philosophy. 
When, in Letters to Olga, Havel describes a news reader becoming aware of herself, on 
camera, as all of the other equipment fails around her – the description of the news 
reader‘s coming to self-awareness and her feeling of vulnerability are strikingly similar to 
Sartre‘s description of Antoine Roquentin‘s feeling of nausea as he has moments of 
existential revelation.364 Also in Letters to Olga, Havel recounts an existential awareness 
that he achieves whilst looking at and contemplating a tree.365 The sight of the tree gives 
him a sudden awareness that he finds difficult to describe in words, that the image of the 
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tree against the sky and its movements revealed suddenly the entire history of Havel to 
himself. In encountering the tree, the finiteness of his existence is overcome as his 
childhood memories race back into his consciousness, which he expresses as a 
revelation of all he has ever been at once. Havel believes that he has encountered what 
he terms the memory of Being. For Havel, all events that have occurred are stored in the 
memory of Being, and the being of a person contains every event that has ever occurred. 
The individual subject is a part of the memory of Being. In describing the memory of 
Being, Havel writes; 
 
Nothing that has once happened can un-happen; everything that once was, in 
whatever form, still is – forever lodged in the ―memory of Being.‖ And 
everything we consider real, actual, present, is only a small and vaguely 
defined island in the ocean of ―imaginary,‖ ―potential‖ or ―past‖ Being. It is 
from this matrix alone that it draws its substance and its meaning; only 
against this background can we experience it in the way we do. Along with 
everything that ever happened in whatever way (or could or should have 
happened) and what can now no longer un-happen, human personality, 
human existence too will endure, once and for all, in the ―memory of Being.‖ 
366   
 
Havel‘s encounter with the tree takes him to the memory of Being, self-consciousness 
slips away, and he writes to his wife that he felt himself slipping into the abyss.  
Compare this experience to Roquentin‘s encounter with a chestnut tree in Nausea. After 
sitting on a bench in a park, Roquentin examines a chestnut tree and finds that his 
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description of the tree, its colour, shape etc, are descriptions of things which do not exist. 
The tree exists but the concept of colour, which he knows the tree as being constituted 
of, does not exist. The tree, for Roquentin, exists in an inexplicable way. Inexplicable 
because language cannot point to the tree as such, as it appears to consciousness, yet 
language, as the driver of consciousness keeps supplying names for the experience of 
the tree which are not the experience. Roquentin succumbs to the nausea that this 
realisation brings and sinks into the abyss of the absolute or what Sartre also calls, the 
absurd. What Roquentin comes to understand through his meditation on the tree, as 
Havel does, is that existence is a vast and overwhelming presence and that descriptions 
of existence are just masks for the absolute nothingness of existence. In each instance 
the experience is fundamentally different. Roquentin‘s attitude is towards the world, to 
the inexpressible thereness of things, and Havel‘s encounter is towards the totality of 
himself, towards his link to Being. Yet in each instance the encounter with the tree 
begins an investigation of Being. Havel‘s is fundamentally a positive experience and 
Sartre‘s is not. 
It is telling that Havel, after Sartre, uses an encounter with a tree to describe a coming 
to an understanding of Being. However Havel is not, I think, a deep reader of Sartre. The 
comparison above shows that Havel too has similar existential concerns to Sartre, and 
the concept of bad faith takes this similarity further, although without betraying Havel as 
a closet reader of Sartre. I think what is most likely is that Sartre‘s fiction has been read 
and digested by Havel, who is a great reader of fiction, and the symbol of the tree, with 
its large roots and shimmering leaves, has captured Havel‘s imagination. 
The Existential Nature of a Life in Truth 
I want to situate Havel‘s life in truth amongst major existential phenomenological 
themes before undertaking the comparison to the specific theme of bad faith. The best 
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starting place would be Husserl‘s Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology for showing the presence of phenomenological themes in Havel‘s life in 
truth. This is the starting point for Patočka, and hence is present in Havel, in some sense. 
Husserl writes, 
  
…though the objects of the life-world, if they are to show their very own being, 
necessarily show themselves as physical bodies, this does not mean that they 
show themselves only in this way; and we...though we are related through the 
living body to all objects which exist for us, are not related to them solely as a 
living body... 
...Thus in whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal 
horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each ―I-the-man‖ and all 
of us together belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and 
the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely 
through this ―living together.‖367 
 
What Husserl is claiming is that man is essentially a being-in-the-world, but not just a 
physical body. Consciousness is transcendent of the physicality of the body in the sense 
that consciousness is not pure animal consciousness , i.e., consciousness of survival and 
reproduction and nothing else. The world we live in, the world conditioned by 
consciousness, is a communal world; hence responsibility is an important concept. That 
is we live in the world with others which implies that how we live in the world with others 
is an important question. This was an earlier theme in Husserl‘s work found in his Kaizo 
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articles.368 The article ‗Renewal: It‘s problem and method‘, is concerned with the idea of 
a society ethically renewing itself after the devastation of World War One. Husserl claims 
that ―[w]e are men, free willing subjects who are actively engaged in our surrounding 
world, constantly involved in shaping it. Whether we want to or not, whether it is right or 
wrong, we act in this way.‖369 Husserl‘s aim is to ground action in a science of the apriori 
essences of the spiritual socio-ethical world. That means that the phenomenological 
method can be used to ground universal norms which are rationally founded on universal 
practical reason. Havel shares a similar aim; however he does not set out in to uncover 
the rational apriori ground of responsibility. Havel assumes there is such a ground. The 
point is that Havel is taking from the existential phenomenological tradition the key idea 
that authenticity comes through an inquiry into essences in the life-world. 
Jeffner Allen notes that for Husserl, the distinguishing feature of the socioethical 
realm is that it is sustained in the inward consciousness of individuals in their mutual 
understanding of it.370 Allen also notes that for Husserl, renewal is an infinite task.371 
This infinite critique is clearly a part of Havel‘s living in truth. Husserl‘s claim is that the 
validity of the world is established in consciousness through this living with others. I think 
that Havel‘s story of the greengrocer, explained in Chapter 1, has relevance here. The 
meaning of the world is established through the actions of the greengrocer with others. 
The ideology is supported by his complicity. Others see his obedience in placing the 
placard and the idea that the world is controlled by ideology is reinforced.  
The previous chapter introduced the influence of Jan Patočka on Havel‘s thought. I 
want to demonstrate the existential nature of Havel‘s conception of living in truth by 
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showing Patočka‘s care for the soul‘s existential grounding. In Plato and Europe, Patočka 
writes that our life is in a constant state of crisis because human cognizing about the 
essential questions, such as good and evil, truth or untruth, can never be certain.372 To 
discuss the positivity that Patočka locates in this crisis, it would be useful to introduce 
the existential understanding of transcendence that is a possession of what Sartre called 
the for-itself, or what Patočka would call the soul - of a certain faculty that allows a 
becoming of something that one currently is not. The soul can choose, in this crisis, to be 
in a constant conversation with itself; that is, to make itself aware of the crisis that 
comes from a lack of certainty and constantly rechoose, in the new situation, what is 
good and evil through careful deliberation. This is Patočka‘s conception of care for the 
soul. It is grounded in the specificity of a certain situation in a certain time and a certain 
place. In Plato and Europe Patočka is less concerned about what Being is, than in how 
beings appear or show themselves.373 This is because care for the soul is about 
evaluating the appearance of things. Hence care for the soul shows a trend in Patočka‘s 
existential phenomenology that is independent of epistemological concerns in 
phenomenology.374 
There is a strong connection between care for the soul and Havel‘s living in truth. It is 
the critique of one‘s specificity which links the ideas together. A life in truth is mindful of 
time, place and circumstance; just consider the greengrocer whose act of living in truth 
would be to not place the slogan-filled placard. The transcendence described in The 
Power of the Powerless is clearly political and existential in nature. In the previous 
chapter, I came to the conclusion that a life in truth is about revealing the mendacious 
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structures of ideology and not living by its coercions. In other words, a life in truth is 
about manifesting a concern with how things appear. It is about recognising that 
cognition is in a crisis with the manifold ways of showing that things in the world reveal. It 
is more importantly about an awareness and concern with the way that politics can 
influence this showing. It is from this explicit concern with the political that I tease out a 
Havelian standpoint from a Patočkean one. This is not to say, however, that for Patočka 
politics is not important. Rather my claim is that Havel is explicitly concerned with 
current, and actual appearances in the political sphere - this and nothing else - whereas 
Patočka is more the phenomenologist concerned primarily with the appearance of things 
in the life-world in a more general way. 
This focus on real current events that defines Havel‘s writing and speeches is 
criticized by Karel Kosik in his article ‗The Third Munich.‘ He argues that concern for 
realpolitik lacks imagination. He lumps Havel‘s party-free politics in with left and right 
wing ideologies as lacking real imagination.375 I think this is unfair. Kosik makes the 
point that ―any politics that considers the cave its field of action sooner or later 
degenerates into a bad routine, into a politics not worthy of the name.‖376 I do not think 
that Havel, despite being concerned by the real political events happening around him, 
debases his thought. At all times Havel is careful to step back and consider his 
responsibility in the situation he is responding to. It is a credit to Havel that he manages 
to fuse together his concern for realpolitik and for moral theory.  
It is my contention that Havel‘s writings on a life in truth contribute to an existential 
understanding of freedom and responsibility. The situatedness of a person, in history, in 
time, and in space which Havel‘s writings pre-suppose suggests that a life in truth is 
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about realising transcendence in one‘s facticity. Havel‘s concern with authenticity under 
post-totalitarian conditions reminds me of Maurice Merleau-Ponty‘s concern with 
freedom in Nazi-occupied France, explained in his essay ‗The War has Taken Place‘.377 
For Merleau-Ponty, how people act together gives the world its meaning.  He writes that 
anti-Semitism is not just a lie told by authorities and published by press who knew better; 
instead anti-Semitism was a world myth that was shared by the givers of the orders and 
ordered.378 That the non-Jewish French went from taking their freedom, and shared 
humanity for granted, to seeing the enemy as something else, and less valuable than 
themselves.379 He writes, ―We have been led to take upon ourselves and consider as our 
own, not only our intentions – what our actions mean for us – but also the external 
consequences of these actions, what they mean in a historical context.‖380 Havel would 
fully agree with this sentiment, although for him, the state of politics does not need to be 
a state of war for this realisation. What took a war to awaken in Merleau-Ponty is brought 
to life in Havel through the experience of late-socialism. This has relevance in the current 
world situation because the simple unpacking of a life in truth, in the light of Husserl, 
Patočka and Merleau-Ponty is that an authentic being is one who recognises that actions 
have relevance in a historical context. They make the world valid in its sharedness. A life 
in truth critiques the validity of the world, sees the world as a problem, and exerts the 
transcendence which is a part of the human condition.  
The next section will look at John Paul Sartre‘s concept of bad faith and make a 
comparison to a life in truth. If bad faith can be characterised as the failure to recognise 
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freedom then there is rich material for a comparison with a life in truth whose opposite, 
living a lie, could be defined as a refusal to recognise freedom. 
 
Comparison of Havel’s Thoughts on Language to ‘Bad Faith’ 
When individuals live according to the dictates of an ideology out of fear, Havel argues 
that they are living a lie. Living a lie could also be described as wilfully accepting that the 
way in which things and others appear in the political world is fixed. In essence, I argue, 
that living a lie is a rejection of transcendence as an aspect of the soul. The certainty 
with which the person living a lie thinks that things cannot be otherwise leads me to think 
that the existential nature of a life in truth and a life in a lie would be well elucidated 
through a comparison with John-Paul-Sartre‘s idea of bad faith. 
Bad faith is explained in Sartre‘s, Being and Nothingness. The definition supplied in 
the work is:  
 
A lie to oneself exists within the unity of a single consciousness. Through bad 
faith a person seeks to escape the responsible freedom of Being-for-itself. 
Bad faith rests on a vacillation between transcendence and facticity which 
refuses to recognize either one for what it really is or to synthesize them.381 
   
In bad faith, persons sees themselves as a thing in the world. An example Sartre uses to 
explain the vacillation between transcendence and facticity is of a woman on a first date 
who refuses to recognise the compliments of her date as a desire by him for sexual 
intercourse. When he takes her hand, she does not feel her hand in relation to the man‘s 
intentions for the rest of her body and instead postpones the anguish of having to make 
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a choice about whether or not to engage in intercourse with her date. She contrives not 
to think about the hand-holding and leaves her hand passive and inert in his. Sartre‘s 
point is that she is enjoying the flirting without wanting to think of it as flirting; that the 
man‘s suddenly taking hold of her hand threatens this understanding of the situation, 
and dissociating from her hand is the best way of maintaining her enjoyment without 
acknowledging the man‘s sexual intent.  
Human freedom, for Sartre, is felt through anguish - that is, through a recognition that 
a nothingness slips in-between my present and my past, and my present and my future. 
This leaves me to choose my future and to judge my past.382 We can flee from this 
anguish, which, as in Kierkegaard‘s writing, is a fear of something inside the self. We can 
turn ourselves into a Not.383  As a Not, the anguish of freedom is escaped. Bad faith, for 
Sartre, is a difficult phenomenon to describe, and he will call it an evanescent state, 
because it seemingly annihilates itself. Because bad faith is a lie to oneself, it 
presupposes that the self knows the truth that is being hidden. Consciousness is 
conscious of the hiding of truth, which is the normal phenomenon of lying when a person 
lies to another person. Hence, it seems unreasonable that bad faith can exist, because 
the self would have to know of its existence. This is why Sartre called bad faith 
evanescent, or ‗metastable‘ because the affect of nothingness that surrounds the being 
of consciousness should reveal the lie, and hence restore a condition of good faith. But 
not always. Sartre argues that bad faith can exist for an entire life time, as a person flees 
anguish.  It is in this paradoxical state that bad faith exists. We are free, in bad faith, to 
deny ourselves the freedom which is our being. This denial is the self, pretending its 
character is fixed and unchangeable. 
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Is living a lie, in Havel‘s thought, similar to Sartre‘s bad faith? Both involve the lying to 
oneself, and both posit the existence of a veiled truth (of sorts) which one hides from 
oneself. This is a difficult question to answer because Sartre is not altogether clear on 
the exact nature of bad faith. The structure of bad-faith, as a lie told to oneself to fix 
one‘s identity, is very similar to ‗life in a lie‘. One adopts ideological language to fix one‘s 
life within ideology. The fear of the loss of the comforts of life, that for Havel motivate 
living a lie, do fail to recognise the possibility of changing one‘s character, as in Sartre‘s 
conception of bad faith. However the sense of anguish at the recognition of the freedom 
we possess to change our states is not present in a life in a lie.  
The story of the greengrocer from The Power of the Powerless which was discussed in 
chapter 1 of this thesis bears upon the absence of metaphysics in Havel‘s political 
philosophy. The greengrocer‘s lack of dissent seemingly stems from a fear of being 
reported to a warden, and a subsequent fear of negative consequences for acting 
against the ideology‘s determination. In this case the greengrocer deliberately hides his 
freedom which Havel, like Sartre, argues is the ground of his existence. The greengrocer 
carries in his consciousness a sense of himself as a puppet. He tells himself, ‗I must 
behave this way.‘ To put the story of the greengrocer in terms of Sartre‘s philosophy, the 
greengrocer sees himself as an Other and cannot facilitate the knowledge that he has 
freedom to choose another project. This is because he has, through the vision of himself 
as Other, identified as an instrument rather than as freedom. The fear of negative 
consequences makes the greengrocer feel that he is bound to his set of circumstances 
and hence he escapes the feeling of anguish at having to choose how to act. Instead he 
thinks he is bound to in his circumstances. The story fits bad faith. The greengrocer is in 
bad faith, yet Havel is not primarily concerned in the story with the greengrocer‘s flight 
from anguish. For Havel It is not a fear of confronting one‘s freedom that drives the 
greengrocer to complicity, it is the comfort of the crowd. I don‘t think that Havel fully 
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shares Sartre‘s concept of anguish; a least he doesn‘t give it the prominence Sartre gives 
it in Being and Nothingness. (At times Havel seems bemused that people act in bad faith, 
or choose to live a lie.)  
Freedom for Havel is not anguish, it is somewhat ecstatic. In The Power of the 
Powerless Havel writes that the essential aims of life - freedom to be a dignified human 
being - are naturally present in every person. More than that, when this freedom is taken 
away, or hidden away by ideological manipulation of a being‘s identity, there is a longing 
for this ―rightful dignity.‖384 In fact, the very first paragraph of the essay is a statement by 
Havel about the inevitability of dissent returning humanity to a more dignified position. 
Leaving aside ideological manipulation does not reveal existence to be an anguished 
state, but a homecoming. The above comparison of Havel‘s and Sartre‘s similar 
encounter with a tree demonstrates that whereas the tree brought on a feeling of nausea 
for Sartre‘s protagonist, for Havel the feeling is one of elation - something he had been 
longing for and was delighted to have discovered. Like Plato‘s forms, Havel‘s authentic 
Being calls to the self. 
Perhaps this lack of emphasis on anguish by Havel can be explained by the context in 
which he is writing. Freedom is not anguish in Letters to Olga, because to Havel, in 
prison, the idea of freedom is hard to associate with a negative emotion. Some part of 
the self, free from coercion or social construction must have seemed radiantly positive to 
him.  Were the greengrocer to choose to act against the system, and live in truth, it would 
not be to face up to a horrible anguish of making that choice; it would be to enrich the 
political situation by revealing to others their own freedom. For Havel, the bad faith of 
living a lie is closely related to the critique of technology derived from Heidegger.385 Havel 
moves past Sartre‘s existential and psychological account of lying to oneself and gives it 
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a political and moral dimension. For Sartre, bad faith is a way of dealing with anguish, it 
is not a moral failure. There is something of Sartre‘s view in Havel‘s announcement that 
when a totalitarian system manipulates ideology, people wrap their identity in ideological 
language and behaviour to maintain some semblance of ease in their life. This is not to 
avoid anguish at feeling the nothingness behind human action, rather it is to avoid 
physical or social punishment.386   
Havel notes that when the greengrocer places the placard in his window, there is no 
immediate identification with the semantic content of the sign.387 The dissident can 
employ language which is once used to deceive the self and can be used to undeceive 
the self, to awaken the idea of freedom in others. The historical situation, which Sartre 
says the subject erroneously feels bound to in bad faith, in Havel is something to be 
opposed. Freedom is not absolute, but one can dissent from the historical reality. The 
dissident can write a pamphlet or organize a reading of dissident material, or challenge a 
legal ruling made on ideological grounds. In so doing he or she denies, (in Sartre‘s 
terminology; ‗negate,‘) the reality of the ideology which is defining the historical situation. 
The language of bad faith, for Havel, is the way in which individuals adopt bureaucratic 
and ideological language and anchor their identity to the false discourse this language 
perpetuates. It is a willing choice to employ semantic content that one has no 
attachment to. In this sense one is always aware that one is lying. It is fear that motivates 
the lie rather than an avoidance of anguish, whereas for Sartre fear of freedom is what 
motivates bad faith. 
Bad faith is described by Sartre as seeking to ―flee the in-itself  by means of the inner 
disintegration of my being.‖388 That is, in bad faith consciousness flees what it is, or 
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becomes a lie of itself. In order to ensure that it is not recognised as a lie, bad faith 
―denies this very disintegration as it denies that it itself is bad faith.‖389 Good faith, on 
the other hand, flees from the disintegration of being, that is from being what one is not, 
to being what one is –an authentic for-itself. But within consciousness is this tendency to 
flee the authentic and become in bad faith. Hence even good faith will, without great 
resistance, become bad faith. Exactly what actions one should perform, is not an issue 
for the Sartre of Being and Nothingness for whom it makes no difference whether one 
sits alone in a room and drinks or organises the masses to resist foreign occupation in 
the sense that one is equally free to do both.390 Rather the issue for Sartre is that 
recognise the freedom to act, and in so doing act in good faith. For Sartre the action 
which comes out of good faith, in recognition of the anguish of freedom, is an action that 
is responsible for itself. The action out of bad faith lacks this responsibility. This is the 
extent of Sartre‘s moralising. Franz Adler writes that: 
 
Sartre's view of moral responsibility corresponds to the scientist's view that 
there is no valid basis in science for the selection of values. Man can live in 
our world, which is rapidly growing secularized, without going to pieces only if 
he is willing to admit to himself that there is no generally accepted value 
system available in his culture and that he must make an independent choice 
of himself.391 
 
I agree with Adler. The Sartre of Being and Nothingness, whom I am analyzing in this 
chapter, is not a political Sartre. There is a clear absence of moral concern in Being and 
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Nothingness which is an excellent counterpoint to Havel‘s obvious concern for 
moralizing. I am offering this brief discussion of bad and good faith because, for Havel, 
being authentic is better understood in terms of this fleeing from self-disintegration.  
For Sartre, the fleeing from a self-disintegration is a fleeing from alienation and the 
feeling of anguish in an alienated being. However for Sartre, when one lets go of bad 
faith there is also, alongside the anguish, something wonderful occurring. Sartre writes, 
―There is a certain type of flight before facticity, a flight which consists precisely in 
abandoning oneself to this facticity, that is… in trustingly reassuming it and loving it in 
order to try and recover it.‖392 For Sartre our actions have value because they are chosen 
in anguish.393 The natural ambiguity of the self, (in Sartre‘s terms, its radical freedom,) 
for Havel is an event only to be celebrated – the anguish is absent and replaced by a 
concern for doing things truthfully, but this concern is not anguish. The multiplicity, 
complexity and ambiguity of the self is something that Havel revels in. For Havel, the ‗I‘ 
can be understood as a search for meaning.394 The I has within it a longing for a ―being 
in Being‖ – this longing stems from the ‗I‘s‘ throwness from Being and it‘s throwness in 
the world. Through some experiences, for Havel, the ‗I‘ has moments of meaning, which 
he describes in a really nice way, as being like a series of connected lanterns throwing 
light on our relationship to Being. Far from fleeing from anguish and alienation, for Havel, 
recognising freedom and feeling ―spellbound‖ by the possibility of freedom is the surest 
means of feeling joy in the presence of Being.  
Freedom is the means through which Being in Being is found. He writes to Olga: 
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Being spellbound within me and Being spellbound within the world can join 
hands anytime, anywhere and in any way: when I look into the crown of the 
tree or into someone‘s eyes, when I succeed in writing you a good letter, when 
I am moved by an opera on television, when a passage from Levinas sets my 
head swirling, when our visits work out, when I understand the meaning of my 
compassion for the weather woman, when I help someone or someone helps 
me, when something important happens, or when nothing important happens 
at all. But whenever and however it happens, such moments tend to be rare 
and fleeting. Given the contradictory nature of separated Being, it can‘t be 
any other way and it is right that it should be so: after all, the uniqueness and 
the unpredictability of such moments combine to create their meaning: it is 
the meaning of ―islands of meaning‖ in the ocean of our struggling, the 
meaning of lanterns whose light is cast into the darkness of our life‘s journey, 
illuminating all the many meanings of its direction.395 
 
To paraphrase Havel‘s sentiment in the above section in Sartrean terms, the search for 
good faith, or the full acknowledgement of freedom, gives the self moments of real 
meaning, of close and authentic connection to the events and phenomena of one‘s life. 
These moments of meaning add up to a collection of ―islands of meaning‖, which give 
the self an authentic relationship to the memory of being. That is, for Havel, all events in 
the past are real existent events and the freedom of a person gives a person meaning, 
rather than anguish, in their recognition in the free creation of those phenomenon which 
comprise the past. For Havel, acting in a way that is most fitting to a particular situation 
and then doing what is most fitting, is determined through a mixture of intuition and the 
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phenomenological critique of the life-world; and as each situation differs extensively, 
each action will be different. The understanding of freedom is therefore not analogous in 
the two thinkers in the sense that Sartre claims that freedom is something that the self 
runs from and for Havel it is something that calls to the self. Nonetheless, Sartre‘s 
language of bad faith can go some way to clarifying Havel‘s thoughts on what exactly a 
life in truth is, as there are also similarities.  
Rather than giving strict definition of good faith, good faith can be, in Havel‘s thought, 
illustrated through the mechanism of good faith as the negation of bad faith – fleeing 
towards what one is.396 Havel‘s description of the thrown state of being is half in and half 
out of being - as he terms it, being-in-Being.397 That is, a being is linked to the horizon of 
meaning, that is its transcendence, out of which it is thrown into its facticity. In other 
words, I take Havel‘s analysis of throwness and separation to be a conception of our lives 
as lying between our facticity, our responsibility, and what we can become. This is 
illustrated in Letters to Olga when Havel writes: 
 
On the one hand we are constantly exposed  to the temptation to stop asking 
questions and adapt ourselves to the world as it presents itself to us, to sink 
into it, to forget ourselves in it, to lie our way out of ourselves and our 
―otherness‖ and thus to simplify our existence-in-the-world. At the same time 
we are persuaded over and over again that we can only reach toward 
meaning within the dimensions of this world, as it lies before us, by being 
open to the opening out of meaning within the world.398 
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Despite being thrown into a world, the I longs to make sense of the world and to return to 
what Havel terms the integrity of Being, which, he writes, is experienced as 
meaningfulness. The experience of meaningfulness in the integrity of Being is Havel‘s 
version of good faith, or being conscious of living a life in truth. 
 For Sartre, good faith is consciously choosing one‘s actions and accepting full 
responsibility for them. It is relating to the in-itself aware of the full manner of its 
appearance. For Havel, being authentic, involves becoming aware of what Sartre calls 
one‘s facticity or what Havel calls one‘s relationship to the world of appearances and in 
so doing, becoming aware of one‘s freedom to be one‘s transcendence.  
Facticity and Responsibility in ‘Audience’ 
Facticity is another useful concept for explaining Havel‘s thought. It is analogous to 
Havel‘s idea that one is responsible for one‘s past. In Sartre‘s philosophy, facticity is the 
relationship of the for-itself to the in-itself. It is consciousness‘s relationship to its past 
and its concrete situation. This section will explore facticity, freedom and responsibility in 
Havel‘s play Audience, from the 'Vanek' trilogy. The Vanek trilogy is a series of plays with 
the central character of Vanek being a somewhat autobiographical character. Vanek is a 
playwright dissident who in Audience, the first of the trilogy, is placed in a brewery to work 
and is asked by the manager to report on his friends in exchange for an easier job. Vanek 
refuses, claiming that he cannot abandon his principles. 
Facticity reveals the ineluctability of both freedom and throwness. Havel‘s strong 
charge with responsibility comes from the understanding that awareness of throwness 
and awareness of freedom generate the possibility of reforming the thrown state to bring 
the separated halves of Being together in authenticity. The character Vanek, confronts 
the facticity of his situation - as a brewery worker whilst acknowledging the truth of his 
dissident past, and when invited to seek comfort in the possibility of easier work and 
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increased consumption of alcohol, he flees from the desire for a comfortable life in which 
he would simply melt into the ‗they‘. His comfort would come through a simple choice to 
use language irresponsibly and say what the authorities want to hear. He has been asked 
by the brewery owner to provide information on his dissident friend‘s activities even if 
that information is false; to just say something to get the authorities off the brewery 
owners back and hence make his own position much more comfortable. However, for 
Vanek, the possibility of being irresponsible to Being by adding to the false use of 
language in the memory of Being and reinforcing the ideological restrictions on his 
freedom, is too high a price. In his recognition of both his freedom and his throwness, 
Vanek chooses to remain silent on his friend‘s activities and to live by his ―principles‖. 
 In all of his communications Vanek is careful to remain authentic. This care is the 
manifestation of his freedom despite the political limitations placed on him by the regime 
which has confined him to the brewery for work. Conversely the manager of the brewery 
is in bad faith. He ignores the possibility that the regime might, in future, target him in 
the way they are targeting Vanek. He thinks only of the present possibility of a more 
comfortable personal situation. He tells himself that he is not free and must succumb to 
the political demands placed on him whilst simultaneously recognizing the freedom to be 
political that is his possibility. He exhibits the paradoxical nature of bad faith that Sartre 
describes with his example of the waiter.399 The example of the waiter, who acts too 
much like a waiter, for Sartre, shows that paradoxically, in choosing to act like a waiter 
and in acting like a mechanism, or an ―automaton,‖ he recognises his freedom. The 
Brewery master, in choosing to deny that he has principles, reveals that he has principles. 
What is quite brilliant about the play Audience is the way that the foreman is brought 
to confront his facticity through the non-compliance of Vanek. He admits his intention to 
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spy on Vanek and even asks him to be complicit in his informing – all without 
acknowledging his freedom to not inform. He sees himself as compelled to comply with 
the regime and hence remains in bad faith for the refusal to consider his freedom.  What 
is significant for me is that in Audience, the difference between bad and good faith 
seems wholly tied to the responsible use of language. 
A small example will make this clearer. Vanek thanks his boss and his boss says, ‗and 
all you‘ll have to do is report on your activities and your friends for me because the secret 
police are asking me to spy on you.‘  Vanek responds that he couldn‘t do it, that it would 
be inauthentic of him to even make up a report he could give the police. The brewery 
master gets angry. He yells, 
 You bloody intellectuals… Fine gentlemen, sprouting words. You can afford 
to, because you always come out on top, you‘re interesting, you always know 
how to wriggle out of things, you‘re on top, even when you‘re down, but an 
ordinary bloke like me can work his bloody fingers to the bone and what has 
he got to show for it – sweet fanny adams – that‘s what – no one to turn to, 
everybody does him down, everybody gives him the boot, everybody has a go 
at him, he leads a bloody miserable life, and then what – a gent like you 
comes along and says that I have no principles. You‘d take a nice cushy job 
from me, wouldn‘t you, but a bit of the dirt I‘ve got to wade through every day, 
that you don‘t want. You‘re a clever lot, you are, very clever, oh yes you know 
what all right, you can take good care of your bloody selves. Principles! I‘m not 
surprised you hang on to your bloody principles – they come in handy, don‘t 
they, you know how to make a mint out of them you do, they give you a living 
– but what about me? Nobody gives me a hand, nobody is scared of me, 
nobody writes about me, nobody gives a blind bit of notice what I do, I‘m just 
about good enough to shovel the muck out of which your principles can grow, 
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I‘m good to find you cosy warm spots for you to play the hero in, and what do I 
get for all that – nothing but a raspberry. One fine day you will go back to your 
actresses, you‘ll boast about the time you worked here rolling barrels, 
showing off what a big fine he-man you are – but what about me heh? What 
about me? I aint got nowhere to go back to have I? Where can I go? Who‘ll 
take any notice of me? Who cares what I do? What has life got to offer me? 
What about my future? 400 
 
It‘s a scathing criticism and definitely one to note because of the honesty of it. What do 
lofty principles mean for the ordinary citizen involved in the machinations of the 
mundane? What is the point of principles for the worker who feels the butt of the joke no 
matter what regime signs the pay-cheques? But there is something somewhat 
eschatological in this speech worth noting as well. The foreman says that Vanek will 
return to his position, hinting that he intuits the eventual end of the current order. What 
he fails to feel though, is any kind of telos in that eschatology. For him, it will remain the 
same. When he breaks down in his depression, he invokes the very things that Vanek has 
rejected on principle: comfort, a career, in short, hopes and aspirations for a comfortable 
life. This relates to the theory of the previous chapter which describes Patočka‘s  
pronouncement that the wars of the twentieth century have culminated in a war for 
peace. For this chapter though, the significance of the desires of the brewery master lie 
in their direction at comfort and complicity with the ideology. 
What is also worth noting is that there is a freedom in Vanek. Whether the order ends 
or not is insignificant because Vanek is not a part of it; he is risking comfort for the sake 
of authentic life. But the foreman remains unmoved by Vanek‘s example. Vanek‘s actions 
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are an unconscious example to the foreman; that is, despite the persecution and lack of 
understanding on the foreman‘s part, Vanek‘s principles have an effect that isn‘t 
immediately cognized by the foreman. That doesn‘t make them useless. Far from it. The 
good of Vanek‘s actions is in refusal to be complicit. 
 Conclusion 
The idea that one needs to confront the actuality of a situation in order to recognise 
the freedom that one possess to change it, was compared in this chapter to Sartre‘s idea 
of bad faith. The claim that Havel read Sartre cannot be made confidently. However, 
there is enough of a thematic similarity to utilise Sartre‘s thought to shed light on the 
intricacies of Havel‘s thought and to show that in many ways Havel‘s existentialism 
comes up with very different answers to a questioning of freedom and transcendence. 
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Chapter 6:  Havel‘s Concern for Meaningful Political Discourse 
 
Introduction 
The political use of language is a major concern of Havel‘s political philosophy. In 
particular, Havel is concerned with the political effect of language, an effect that stems 
from a manipulation of historical meaning by an ideology or an individual. The theme of 
the political effect of language emerges in Havel‘s work, and an account of it is absent in 
much of the literature on Havel‘s thought. This chapter will describe Havel‘s thoughts 
about the political significance of language and lay the foundation for that discussion in 
the next chapter. The exploration will be based on my reading of a selection of Havel‘s 
plays, speeches, essays, and letters. Through an analysis of these writings it will be made 
clear that language is a major concern of Havel‘s. 
Havel scholarship mostly misses the concern with language in Havel‘s political 
philosophy. There are two exceptions. One is James Pontusso‘s Václav Havel; Civic 
Responsibility in the Postmodern Age, which contains a short analysis of Havel‘s 
dissident views on the distortion of meaning by ideology and which will be expanded 
upon in this chapter. The other is Martin Matuštík‘s Postnational Identity; Critical Theory 
and Existential Philosophy in Habermas, Kierkegaard, and Havel. I will build on 
Pontusso‘s and Matuštík‘s discussion by looking at a broad range of Havel‘s writings over 
his long career to show that throughout his life as dissident, playwright and politician, the 
political significance of discourse has never been far from his mind. 
Havel’s Writings and Thoughts Regarding Language 
Throughout Havel‘s writing, language is seen as a political phenomenon. In his first 
major speech, delivered to the union of Czechoslovakian Writers, Havel lambasts the 
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organisation which is responsible for allocating funding to literary projects for its 
selectively privileging safe and homogenous literary styles. It thereby manipulates the 
political sphere with a stagnating force. The speech has been published as the essay, ‗On 
Evasive Thinking.‘401 The opening of the speech has Havel paraphrase a newspaper 
article that chastises citizens for complaining about window ledges falling in the centre of 
Prague, causing deaths. The writer urges citizens to focus on the good points of progress 
in Czechoslovak living conditions and to illustrate his point he notes that women now 
wear the latest fashions from the streets of Paris rather than the grim grey clothes 
usually associated with socialist homogenising of fashion. The problem for Havel is that 
the author of the article is trying to make citizens forget or evade thinking about the very 
real issue of falling window ledges. The article employs language manipulatively to 
institute what Havel terms ‗evasive thinking.‘ Women‘s fashions have nothing to do with 
the issue of poor building maintenance. For Havel, there is a responsibility to use 
language to point to things as they really are. This is not a metaphysical attempt to 
uncover things in themselves, but to reveal things as they appear to us. That language 
can change the manner of appearance of an object is a cause for concern as well as for 
hope. Hence Havel is distrustful of the manipulative nature of language, yet hopeful of a 
language that can possibly enliven the political sphere. I am reminded of an old soviet 
joke that illustrates Havel‘s concern. Two farmers are looking at a tractor with a broken 
wheel, one farmer laments, ‗It is useless, the wheel is broken.‘ The other farmer retorts, 
‗You are looking at this all wrong comrade; three wheels are working fine.‘402 The 
suggestion of the joke is that simply by changing the language that describes the 
situation, the understanding of the situation changes. 
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The newspaper article that evades discussion of falling window ledges is a real 
example of the absurd worlds of Havel‘s plays. That language can shape and distort the 
manner in which a thing appears to consciousness is quite a point of interest for Havel. 
He highlights his interest in this in Disturbing the Peace. 
 
I‘m interested in [language‘s] ambivalence, its abuse: I‘m interested in 
language as something that fashions life, destinies, and worlds; language as 
the most important skill; language as a ritual and a magic charm; the word as 
a carrier of dramatic movement, as something that legitimizes, as a way of 
self-affirmation and self-projection. I am interested in clichés and their 
meaning in a world where verbal evaluation, inclusion in a phraseological 
context, linguistic interpretation are often more important than reality itself, 
and ―real reality‖ merely derives from clichés.403  
 
Havel is not promoting the control that language has over a perception of real events. 
Instead his plays are a means of drawing attention to the problematic nature of 
language, thereby unsettling the audience into a state of reflection on their own 
interaction in the world.  
Matuštík notes that for Havel, ―words always deceive unless they are rooted in one‘s 
thinking and acting.‖404 Matuštík makes an excellent point that when the use of 
language in discourse is rooted in such a way, it becomes, for Havel, possible to talk to 
other individuals as individuals.405  Havel‘s refusal to identify with slogan-like words such 
as what the term ‗socialism‘ had become, or how ‗capitalism‘ was being used at the the 
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end of the revolution, for Matuštík displays Havel‘s concern for existentially authentic 
language, not a concern for using the correct definitions of words. It is what the speaker 
wishes to say that is important, not what the technical meaning of the words used are.406 
The following sections will analyse Havel‘s plays to describe how his views on language 
inform his political philosophy. Matuštík begins to briefly analyse Havel‘s play The 
Memorandum to show its concern for existentially authentic discourse; it is my aim to 
extend this analysis.407 
 
The Garden Party 
Havel‘s play The Garden Party is a perfect example of his interest in, and critique of, 
language. It is a difficult play due to the constant twists and turns of language usage by 
characters. Even characterisation is difficult to fathom as characters take on roles of 
other characters mid-dialogue simply by taking over another character‘s conversation. In 
the opening scene, the protagonist, Hugo Pludek, is playing chess with himself whilst his 
father and mother attempt to give him life advice in the form of muddled clichés. As Hugo 
jumps from side to side of the chess table he is repeatedly asked how he is going. 
Depending on which side of the table he is standing, he says either, ‗badly‘ or ‗really 
well.‘ The point, at this moment of the play, is the deceptive nature of language use: how, 
to draw on the earlier joke, the tractor can either have one broken wheel, or three 
working ones. Both are correct and true statements, and this illustrates the point that 
simply calling ideology a form of lying is too simple. In the play, the audience is 
positioned to be unsettled by the exchange. All the relevant statements are true; none of 
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them indicate what is really going on. This is a persistent theme in the play and is well 
illustrated by an example from the text where Hugo is finishing the game of chess. 
 
Hugo: Super, Mum! (Makes his move) Checkmate! 
Pludek: You lost? 
Hugo: No, I won. 
Mrs Pludek: You won. 
Hugo: No, I lost.408  
 
Rather than gaining an insight into the nature of any character, it seems that the 
discourse has a stronger presence than the characters. The personalities of the 
characters are lost in multiple meanings and broken clichés. 
A strong example of a loss of characterisation takes place when a clerk and secretary, 
attempting to have a real conversation after the prompting of a motivational inaugurator, 
give up and return to the mechanistic and meaningless use of paradoxes and muddled 
clichés. For example, at the prompting of the inaugurator who keeps appearing and 
asking how the conversation is going, the two have a conversation about what is 
immediately before them in the garden.  
 
Clerk: Look- 
Secretary: Yes? 
Clerk: Look – a sparrow! It‘s flying – moss blossoms – meadows are a-
humming – nature! 
Secretary: What? 
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Clerk: I say, sparrows are flying – the boss mlossoms – the meadows are a-
humming – 
Secretary: Oh, I see – nature! 
Clerk: Yes. Well now. You have hair! It‘s pretty – gold – like buttercrumbs – I 
mean buttercups – and your nose is like a rose – I‘m sorry – I mean like a 
forget-me-not – white – 
Secretary: Look -  a sparrow.409 
 
My reading of this fragment is as a declining move away from the sight of the sparrow 
into a muddled mess of a conversation, with mixed up clichés and a complete failure to 
describe what is seen. The conversation continues in this way until the Clerk responds to 
the Secretary, ―The Large Dancefloor A is indeed large. I admire the courage with which it 
has been revealed to us.‖410 The absurdity of this conversation should be read within the 
context that the inaugurator is encouraging free conversation to promote motivation at 
work. Read in this light the whole garden party is an ideologically controlled life. People 
feel they are living, but are mere cogs in an ideological machine which is turned by a 
false identification by the characters with work rather than with what Havel might term 
the real aims of life. Hence the failed attempt to describe the sparrow and the flowers 
becomes a comfort taken in the ideology‘s interpretation of the size of the dance floor, a 
matter the two had been debating for some time previously in a glut of bureaucratic 
language. Ultimately, as the secretary and the clerk identify with the language of their 
profession, they fail to have a real conversation about a phenomenon as it is. 
Indeed it is as if no specific character is even necessary in the play for any role as all it 
takes to become another person is to start speaking for them. The ritual that sustains the 
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ideology is more important than the individual performing it.  This point is explained very 
clearly in Power of the Powerless where Havel, writing about the greengrocer, remarks 
that the greengrocer need not believe the slogan. He just has to obey the dictate to place 
the placard in his window.411 This is supported in the play where, at one point, whilst 
awaiting one of the father‘s friends to take Hugo under his wing, the father remarks ―If he 
doesn‘t come, somebody else will.‖412 Indeed, in a Beckett-like manner, the person they 
are waiting for never arrives and Hugo is sent to find him. The man is shown to be 
unnecessary for Hugo‘s future, Hugo rises through the bureaucratic institutions where 
the father‘s friend works simply by assuming other people‘s roles, even as those other 
people are performing them. All he has to do is to adopt their language and take over 
their speech. In other words, life under ideology, removes the importance of the 
individual by placing significance on certain ideological words being spoken by any 
individual. That is, it does not matter who is speaking as long as someone is speaking 
the discourse which sustains the ideology. The loss of self is taken to extreme measures 
in the final act of the play as Hugo arrives home from his new job, awaiting the return of 
Hugo, asking, as the door bell rings, if that is himself. Hugo has lost a sense of self 
identity because he has assumed a role in the machine of the ideology which has 
demanded a certain kind of speech and this has taken Hugo away from his authentic 
self. 
Such a reading of The Garden Party is supported by Paul Trensky, who writes that  
 
[Havel] shares with other absurdist playwrights the conception of modern 
man‘s identity as a vacuum; consequently, man can become anything at any 
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time, depending largely on the influences to which he is exposed. All his 
characters are soulless, mechanical creatures who are formed and defined 
only by their environment. The human world is an impersonal world in which 
humans are exchangeable.413 
 
I share with Trensky the idea that the language of the play, or its manipulation, is more 
important than the characters. For Trensky, words loom as a threatening presence in the 
play and give the impression that they could take over the play and their victims.414 
Another point made by Trensky, which I use as scholarly support for my own reading of 
the play, is that language in the play is purely mechanical.415  
 If anything can be made clear in The Garden Party, it is that the chess-playing Hugo 
has an identity, even if the act of playing chess by oneself at first appears absurd. It is 
entering the world of work within the bureaucratic institutions of 1960‘s Czechoslovakia 
that is the really absurd situation. Adopting and performing the ridiculous roles that are 
required in this secondary world are what constitutes the truly absurd for Havel. These 
roles are prescribed, and have a set nomenclature to assist the definition. Alienation 
springs, not from a pluralism within the self – the two-sided chess player – but out of the 
abandonment of the pluralistic self in the bureaucratic structures and bureaucratic 
language of work. The final piece of dialogue from Hugo is an exasperating statement of 
the human condition. 
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Hugo: ...I don‘t know whether you want to be or not to be; but I know I want to 
be all the time and that‘s why all the time I must a little bit not be. You see, 
man when he is from time to time a little bit not is not diminished thereby! 
And if at the moment I am – relatively speaking – rather not, I assure you that 
soon I might be much more than I‘ve ever been – and then we can have 
another chat about all these things, but on an entirely different platform.  
Checkmate!416 
 
The account of Kenneth Zagacki on folly and irony in Havel‘s political speeches as 
President can serve here as an explanation for the above passage.417 Zagacki mentions 
Raymond Aron‘s position on life under oppressive conditions that under such conditions, 
individuals become ―frantic or resigned, prisoners of an implacable fatality, the 
playthings of an inhuman force.‖ 418 Hugo Pludek‘s loss of self through a frantic use of 
bureaucratic language fits Aron‘s description. His exasperation at not recognising himself 
is a result of him relating to himself through the force of ideology rather than through self 
critique. Zagacki‘s point is that in Havel there is an emphasis on humility. He argues that 
humility for Havel is the starting point for any liberation from the fatality of the ―inhuman 
force.‖419 Zagacki writes that this push for humility in Havel is a discourse on folly - on the 
inability of human consciousness to fully understand any position. Hence out of 
humbleness comes a space where real self reflection can happen because the false 
certainty of ideological self discourse is replaced with a humble recognition of 
uncertainty – a Socratic knowledge of not knowing. Zagacki writes, 
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...Havel‘s discourse on folly encourages a consciousness of human frailty and 
―meekness‖ which places Havel and his audience in a position to transcend 
themselves and act in unique ways... He appears to use humility to open a 
heretofore impossible realm of political possibility.420 
 
Hugo Pludek‘s line that in order to be he must sometime not be is on my reading an 
obvious call for humility. His rejection of the kind of speaking that got him his 
employment can be read as a return to humility as he claims that he is at that moment 
―not‖ and there is also the hope that because at that moment he is in a mode of self-
critique he will later be ―much more than he has ever been.‖ I think that Havel is implicitly 
saying that the language employed by the characters is only supporting the ideology and 
that a self-critique, engaged internally, is the solution to ideology‘s control over language. 
Trensky, in contrast to my view, sees Hugo‘s final speech as a tirade against dialectics. 
There is plausibility in this view, but I don‘t  agree, since the didactic flavour of the 
speech stands out strongly.  In Trensky‘s interpretation, the final scene shows the play to 
be a critique of ―man‘s obsession with thinking in categories which prevent him from 
facing ultimate realities and therefore also tending to undermine his ethical self-
awareness.‖421 I agree with Trensky on this point; however, I read the final speech as a 
much more explicit statement by the character that this is what the play is about rather 
than seeing it as implicit because the play criticises the dialectical method. 
Another point that The Garden Party suggests is that performing a definite and 
prescribed role, by adopting the appropriate forms of language and reductively identifying 
humanity with that role, is the root cause of alienation. Havel is retelling a version of 
Nietzsche and Heidegger‘s critique of metaphysics. In fact the above quoted speech is 
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prefigured by Hugo declaring that ―the time of static and unchangeable categories is 
past.‖422 Hence Havel, like Heidegger and Patočka, is doing philosophy (albeit in the form 
of drama in Havel‘s case) in a post-metaphysical world. The central concern of The 
Garden Party is also found in Havel‘s philosophical writings.  A life in truth, according to 
the ideas advanced in The Garden Party, is a life undetermined by a job role or a colour 
of a chess piece; it is a life open to a plurality of experience and a shifting, ambiguous 
identity. This is a little more naive than the explication of a life in truth in later essays, yet 
very much along the same lines. Havel‘s intention is to create in the audience an 
awareness of the absurdity of the roles they themselves perform as mirrors of Hugo, 
using language in a way that promotes alienation as the language of their roles causes 
them to sink further into the ‗they.‘ The language employed in sustaining the 
machinations of ideology obscures the self‘s identity to the self. This thereby incites an 
inquiry into the mendacious nature of life under post-totalitarian ideology.     
 
The Memorandum 
The same exploration on the absurd use of language is a major theme of The 
Memorandum (1965), Havel‘s most popular play, which won an Obie award in 1968 for 
the best foreign play.423 Rather than authentic identity being swallowed by meaningless 
clichés, as occurs in the Garden Party, the political manipulation of language in The 
Memorandum obscures the appearance of things and even hides their existence. Phyllis 
Carey writes that the ―institutionalisation of language in closed systems‖ is what creates 
the absurd element of the play. 424 For example, at the beginning of the play, Gross, the 
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manager of a bureaucratic institution, gives his secretary money to buy an incoming-mail 
book. The secretary completes the purchase. However the Department of Authentication 
refuses to authenticate the book because it was bought with non-institution funds, hence 
the secretary declares that the book does not exist. The premise of the play is that in 
order to maximise efficiency and move up the corporate ladder, Gross‘s deputy has 
invented a new and complex language which is incomprehensible to Gross. In spite of its 
incomprehensibility, the entire department is being trained in its usage.  This language is 
later supplanted by another, equally complex, language to deal with the problems of the 
first, and Gross finds himself thrust into various roles as others take over his position. 
The theme of changing roles from The Garden Party is also present in The Memorandum 
in the way the audience witnesses the process of alienation that a manipulative language 
enacts when it becomes the yardstick by which to know how a thing appears to the 
subject. 
That Havel is relying on the audience to supply affect to the play is evident in the 
play‘s conclusion. In The Garden Party Havel has Hugo deliver a didactic summation of 
the play‘s themes. In The Memorandum, by contrast, all of the characters find comfort in 
their life in lies, and march in a conga line off stage to a party at the play‘s conclusion. As 
Carey notes, ―the play comically depicts the human collusion in its own enslavement to 
an impersonal mechanism.‖425 I like this reading as it points out that through the use of 
institutional language, individuals become ―enslaved‖ to the system that requires that 
language. The characters on stage do not appear to have any real agency, affective 
response to their lack of agency is left for the audience. Carey claims that the play is a 
lens for the audience to notice this enslavement.426 Havel is not telling the audience how 
to interpret the play. He is also, importantly, not fusing the words of the play with a 
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specific meaning - at times the characters‘ communication with each other resembles 
gibberish. Instead, the audience recognises the fluid nature of words and longs for 
something that makes sense – perhaps a historically grounded language that is more 
meaningful. Through the hyperbolic treatment of language in the play, the audience 
comes to desire a solid ground of meaning. That the play‘s life mirrors the audience‘s 
own life, engenders a desire in them for a grounding in their life. The mirror is quite 
clearly the absurd language of the play and the longing of the audience does not 
necessarily acquire a target in the content of the play. However the audience, if they are 
to find comfort, will not do so in the absurd and meaningless conversations of ideological 
life and must search for a more authentic dialogue of self-critique. 
The increased Difficulty of Concentration 
Another play is worth noting for its demonstration of the theme of this chapter. A 
concern with a loss of identity through discourse also has a major thematic presence in 
The Increased Difficulty of Concentration, as there is in all of Havel‘s plays. This play has 
been treated in chapter 2 already. There is a unique example in this play, though, which 
does not appear in other plays. A small section from the play, featuring Huml dictating to 
his secretary Blanka, will suffice for analysis: 
 
Huml: ... –and thus attach to various things various values – full stop. 
Therefore, it would be mistaken to set up a fixed scale of values, valid for all 
people in all circumstances and at all times – full stop. This does not mean, 
however, that in all of history there exist no values common to the whole of 
mankind – full stop. If those values did exist, mankind would not form a 
unified whole – full stop... At the same time , an individual scale of values is 
always somehow related to other – more general – scales of values – for 
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instance, to those belonging to a given period – which form a sort of 
framework, or background, to the individual scales – full stop. Would you 
mind reading me the last sentence? 
Blanka: (reads) ‗At the same time , an individual scale of values is always 
somehow related to other – more general – scales of values – for instance, to 
those belonging to a given period – which form a sort of framework, or 
background, to the individual scales – full stop. Would you mind reading me 
the last sentence?‘ 
Huml: That‘s pretty good. Let‘s go on...427 
 
The play is discussed by both Sire and Pontusso; however neither of them discuss the 
quoted section above.428 To me, Huml‘s thoughts in this passage seem to match Havel‘s. 
The perspective on individual and shared values is not an absurd statement as it would 
be in Memorandum, neither is it cliché as it would be in The Garden Party. However there 
is still something unsettling about the exchange. The sentiment of the dictation becomes 
absurd when Huml asks for it to be read back to him. That is, the absurdity lies in his 
attempt to fix the meaning of happiness in textual semantic chains. This is significant 
because a key point I am making about Havel‘s views on language is that language is a 
tool of critique rather than a way of fixing meaning. Hence despite Havel‘s seemingly 
wise words, the attempt to dictate them and thereby make the meaning static, actually 
takes meaning away from the words. There is a strong potential for Huml‘s dictation to 
become cliché. Havel seems to be making fun of the process of explicating the structure 
of values philosophically, and throwing in a use/mention joke for good measure. 
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Language and Discourse in ‘Letters to Olga’ & ‘Open Letters’ 
In Letters to Olga, the criticism of language in post-totalitarian society is more fully 
worked out. Havel writes to his wife about his reading of Saul Bellow‘s Herzog.429 This 
novel is apt for considering Havel‘s philosophical meditations on language as the titular 
character is addicted to ideas, so much so that he loses his grip on nature. Yet Bellow‘s 
novel, unlike Havel‘s plays discussed above, and in line with the more mature thought of 
Havel‘s philosophical writings, signals that redemption can be obtained through 
reconnecting with the world. For Havel, Herzog represents a character who has an 
intellectual crisis in a world with no restrictions on intellect. That is, with complete 
freedom, his ideas lose all meaning as they have nothing to anchor them.  Havel writes, 
―He clearly lacks what we do not, which is to say a situation where words have so much 
weight that you must pay quite dearly for them.‖430 I am surprised that such a blatant 
criticism of post-totalitarian attitudes to free-speech made it past the censors of the time. 
The abuse of language by post-totalitarianism is a prevalent theme in much of Havel‘s 
writing and yet Letter’s to Olga is suspiciously empty of reference to language. I deduce 
that this is probably because any discussion of language inherently calls into question 
the mendacity of the system that imprisoned Havel – hence the censors would be likely 
to remove it. Yet the discussion of Herzog made it past the censors. This allows Havel to 
tie the novel into his own thinking about the relationship between ideas and the world, or 
as Havel terms it in Letters to Olga, ‗words‘ and ‗deeds‘.431  
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In Letter 123, Havel writes that experts on responsibility needn‘t be responsible 
because that isn‘t what they are paid for. They are, he implies, paid for describing the 
idea of responsibility; the deed is left up to the readers of the experts. The expert, who 
performs their role as expert, is lost in a world of ideas which have no anchor in reality. 
The need to re-anchor is a much richer aspect of his criticism of the possible abuse of 
language than we find in the plays. Havel writes, 
 
Words that are not backed up by life lose their weight, which means that 
words can be silenced in two ways: either you ascribe such weight to them 
that no one dares utter them aloud, or you take away any weight they might 
have, and they turn into air. The final effect in each case is silence.432 
 
Havel‘s words carry ‗weight‘ partly because of the situation of their composition. Havel is 
not indulging in abstract speculation on the relationship between speech and action. 
Instead, Havel writes while imprisoned for attempting to re-anchor his words to his 
actions. This is more clearly explicated when Havel, without restrictions on composition, 
describes the nature of language in his acceptance speech on being awarded the Peace 
Prize of the German Bookseller‘s Association. The speech was published as A Word 
About Words. Havel opens the speech by referring to the full potential and proper role of 
language as the mediator of our sense of spirit, our self awareness, our ability to 
comprehend and make sense of the world, and to confront death. In essence, language 
is the source of all human action. In what I read as a veiled attack on religious doctrine, 
Havel writes that to consider the ‗word‘ as the beginning is to miss the point that the 
word is only meaningful when it is related to the deed. Hence for Havel, in the beginning 
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there was also action. Words for Havel have a wonderful ability to step outside of their 
specificity. That is, they are not simply historically rooted. Through language, history can 
be called into question, hence human action, when coupled with this questioning ability 
of language, is able to progress. Yet ideology attempts to stagnate language. It confuses 
language so that it is not rooted in any real action.433 Havel refers to Czech distrust of the 
word ‗peace.‘ For Czechs, the word peace, under post-totalitarian conditions, translated 
into larger armies to ‗keep the peace‘ by force. Hence Havel expresses a desire for 
authenticity in language. Under ideology, a word‘s meaning has its historical meaning 
removed. Havel asks us to consider the use of key words within the French Revolution. 
 
I referred to the French Revolution and the splendid declaration that 
accompanied it. That declaration was signed by a gentleman who was later 
among the first to be executed in the name of that superbly humane text. 
Hundreds and possibly thousands followed him. Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite – 
what wonderful words! And how terrifying their meaning can be. Freedom in 
the shirt unbuttoned before execution. Equality in the constant speed of the 
guillotine‘s fall on different necks. Fraternity in some dubious paradise ruled 
by a Supreme Being!434 
 
Discourse has the ability to change history. It is through language that the mystery of the 
world is tamed. One relates, if religious, to God, through prayer. One relates to nature, in 
primitive societies, through incantations or spells. One describes the world in terms of 
scientific theories, and we organize ourselves around political theories. All of these ways 
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of relating to the world are expressed linguistically. Havel continues with this theme to 
suggest that there is something latent within the writings on Jesus that contain the call to 
commit the horrors which have been justified under Christianity (e.g. the crusades). This 
is one of the major themes of Patočka‘s Heretical Essays. Words about the words of 
Jesus, presented in the Gospels, have structured behavior for two millennia. Living a life 
in truth involves being distrustful of the meaning of words as they come to us. Again the 
philosophy of negative Platonism strongly influences Havel‘s thought. In fact, he 
paraphrases Andre Glucksmann who had claimed that the role of the intellectual is to 
emulate Cassandra435 in being wary and watchful of the language of authority in order to 
forewarn society of any impending danger or inherent evil in the use of language.436  
Foresight comes through a distrust of hegemonic language and by inquiring into how a 
phenomenon, for example peace, appears through a particular use of a word or phrase. 
If one has peace as a goal for life, and peace, under totalitarian conditions, translates to 
no peace, then the intellectual is to reveal the manipulation of the word. The practitioner 
of negative Platonism, in being distrustful of ideological language, thus employs 
language as a means of living in truth. That is, through a questioning of language and 
through a re-rooting of language to an authentic experience of the world, the individual 
authentically engages with the world. 
Charter 77 and Meaningful Political Discourse 
The link between language and life in truth can hardly be overstated. Language is the 
tool for inquiry, and it is the means of expression of truth. Language also reflects the 
pluralistic nature of life as no word contains a universal meaning. Hence, ideological 
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attempts to fix meaning do not reflect the nature of the world. This is shown in Hulm‘s 
attempt, in The Increased Difficulty of Concentration to fix the meaning of happiness in 
his dictation to his secretary and then leaping outside of the contents of that dictation to 
make a sexual pass at his young secretary. Havel writes, 
 
The stifling pall of hollow words that has smothered us for so long has 
cultivated in us such a deep mistrust of the world of deceptive words that we 
are now better equipped than ever before to see the human world as it really 
is: a complex community of thousands and millions of unique, individual 
human beings in whom hundreds of wonderful qualities are matched by 
hundreds of faults and negative tendencies.437  
 
The intellectual who queries the meaning of phrases or points out the emptiness of 
clichés enriches the public sphere by pointing to the pluralistic nature of the political 
sphere. It is not merely a linguistic task, but an ethical one for Havel. Rather than 
obtaining a historically grounded language that might be yearned for, in A Word About 
Words, Havel leaves the reader feeling that even historical meanings of words should be 
questioned. The point is not to reach back into a previous organisation of the world. 
Instead, seeking understanding through pluralistic meaning engenders communication 
which creates and sustains the political sphere. Havel shares with Habermas this 
communicative foundation for the political (I will elaborate more on Havel‘s link to 
Habermas‘s thought in a later chapter). Havel‘s involvement with the charter 77 
movement is illustrative of his concern for language and inquiry, since it was a civil 
society movement aimed at encouraging critical examination of the rhetoric of the Czech 
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government. It called them on their bluff by requesting the written commitments of the 
government to be backed up by deeds corresponding to those commitments. 
Havel writes that Charter 77 is ―a citizens‘ initiative in which a wide variety of people 
have joined together to demand that the laws be observed, that basic human rights be 
respected.‖438 Havel‘s involvement with, and attitude towards, Charter 77 is discussed at 
length in later chapters. However, in this chapter I want to examine the concern with 
language in the charter and track the connection between its concern for language and 
Havel‘s political philosophy. This exploration is necessary because Havel makes a 
mistake in claiming that the charter is essentially not a political document and that the 
chartist signatories are not involved in a political project because what they represent is 
pure plurality. Havel‘s vision of a healthy polis involves the free clash of opinions under 
the banner of promoting the free clash of opinions. Hence fundamentally the charter is a 
political document. Because the political aspect comes through the agonistic clash of 
ideas, it requires an attitude to language which is the core of Havel‘s thought. Ideological 
differences between some chartists will be discussed in a later chapter; however, it is 
worth noting that the specific meaning of charter 77 is fundamentally different between 
different chartists. In fact Havel contends that most charter signatories were not 
ideologically motivated, that is they did not believe any one particular system of politics 
would cure all of society‘s ills. In his essay Two Notes on Charter 77, Havel writes that the 
lack of ideological belief in most of the signatories, combined with the extreme difference 
of ideological belief in some of the authors (e.g. socialist, catholic, democrat),  makes the 
charter document a non-political document. 
Havel writes that it is absurd to ―speculate on the Charter‘s political make-up or the 
direction the Charter might take on the basis of past political or political opinions of its 
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spokesman.‖439 Havel, though, draws the wrong conclusion from the non-ideological 
character of much support for the Charter. The non-ideological character of many Charter 
77 signatories does not make the act of signing it a non-political one. Charter 77 was a 
political movement, broadly conceived, because singing the document was a political act, 
aimed at creating a political sphere of human action. As the Charter states, 
 
Charter 77 is not an organization; it has no rules, permanent bodies or formal 
membership. It embraces everyone who agrees with its ideas and participates 
in its work. It does not form the basis for any oppositional political activity. 
Like many similar citizen initiatives in various countries, West and East, it 
seeks to promote the general public interest. 
It does not aim, then, to set out its own platform of political or social reform or 
change, but within its own field of impact to conduct a constructive dialogue 
with the political and state authorities, particularly by drawing attention to 
individual cases where human and civil rights are violated, to document such 
grievances and suggest remedies, to make proposals of a more general 
character calculated to reinforce such rights and machinery for protecting 
them, to act as intermediary in situations of conflict which may lead to 
violation of rights and so forth.440 
 
The document does not represent a political philosophy, Havel is correct in that claim; 
however, the charter is aimed at instigating a critical examination of the ruling ideology by 
asking it to honour its word or be revealed as a liar. Obviously the aim was to return to 
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meaningful political action through an articulate and active suspicion of the words of the 
Czechoslovakian government – and through creating a civic venture in which ideas could 
be shared between individuals with the only political motive being the continuance of the 
space for the sharing of ideas. Signing the charter was an act of living in truth. The only 
authority of the charter ―is the authority of truth and the authority of the conscience that 
demands it speaks the truth.‖441  Hence involvement with the charter was an act of living 
as if the ruling ideology did not determine one‘s identity. Havel is therefore incorrect to 
suggest the Charter was not a political movement. Havel‘s politics are liberal, focusing on 
the individual‘s responsibility to live responsibly. Havel‘s liberalism will be addressed in a 
Chapter 6. Here, though, it could easily be argued that the Charter‘s claim that it will 
focus on ensuring that individual rights are protected by state machinery is clearly a 
leaning towards a liberal political philosophy. Charter 77 was a political phenomenon 
precisely because it encouraged political action and engaged with political concerns. I 
have suggested that the Charter was a broadly liberal movement. However, it does not 
even need to offer, or even hold an ideological position, in order to be political or engage 
with the political. 
The political element of the Charter lies in the space the Charter creates through the 
free involvement of many individuals communicating their desire for an open political 
discourse. It is not a revolutionary document and it is not a document to inspire specific 
action. For example, reading the Charter was not a call to protest in the streets. Instead 
the Charter was a space for individuals to express their desire for a political solution. As 
Slovakian dissident, Miroslav Kusy, in his essay Chartism and ‘Real Socialism’ wrote, 
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The moral strength of the Charter... carries within it a fundamental political 
weakness. A moral programme cannot inspire the public to mass protests, to 
mass actions. It is a commitment taken by individuals upon themselves not to 
betray their own consciences and to remain faithful to their own principles in 
the face of opposition. It is an aspect of their personal philosophy. Therefore 
Chartism, as originally declared, is neither an organized political movement 
nor an organized mass movement, but no more than a free association of 
individuals, an exclusive community of personalities in which each person 
represents only himself or herself. Each person‘s faith is put to the test by the 
power of the state and its security organs, by the hardship of the dissident life 
in the real socialist cage, while the rest of society can only wish it luck.442 
 
Kusy seems to agree with Havel about the non-political nature of the Charter. However, it 
is clear that Havel‘s political philosophy is central to the charter. The plurality of 
perspectives is central to the Charter‘s existence. As Kusy notes, the Chartists become 
political in their denial of political affiliation. The Chartists had to continually announce 
that the Charter was not socialist or was not democratic. The defence of the pluralist 
position becomes a statement of a political aim. Kusy wants the Charter to offer a 
recognisable ideological alternative to socialism, but we don‘t have to follow him with 
that assertion. Instead, by asking the ideology of late-socialism to define and stand by its 
written commitments, the Charter infused political language with a sense of meaning. It 
was not a closed off community or a self-sufficient polis or a mass movement. It was a 
phenomenon that forced engagement with the political, even if, as an outsider, that 
engagement is simply sympathy for the aims of the Chartists.  
                                                 
442 Miroslav Kusy “Chartism and „Real Socialism‟” in Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless, ed. John 
Keane, (New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc, 1985), 173. 
219 | P a g e  
 
The essential message of the charter is that a governing body should uphold any 
treaties that it puts its signature too. This makes the charter a fight against the misuse of 
language. Patočka writes regarding participants in the Charter movement:  
 
Their sole concern is to purify and reinforce the awareness that there is a 
higher authority, binding on individuals in virtue of their conscience, and on 
governments in virtue of their signature on important international treaties, 
placing them under an obligation not only when it suits them... but by their 
commitment, represented by their signature, to subordinate politics to justice, 
not vice versa.443 
 
The point on which the charter movement is based is that of holding the authorities to 
their word. They are not protesting for liberal rights or a reformed Marxism, they are 
arguing for an honest use of words. Havel mentions the difficulty of writing a charter 
document because of the different political persuasions of its members; however the 
clear point of agreement is that the importance of political action being tied to a 
responsible use of language and a strong emphasis on the relationship between words 
and deeds.444 That the authorities would say one thing and do another is the kind of 
injustice upon which the charter is founded. 
The central concern of critiquing language in post-totalitarian society that is prominent 
in Havel‘s plays is clearly a part of his involvement with Charter 77. The audience of The 
Memorandum or The Garden Party is encouraged to see its life as one lived within a lie; 
to the public that reflects on Charter 77, the same false identity is revealed. Even so, 
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President Havel often remarked that when he is not careful with comments, political 
outrage ensues. He was at pains to ensure that the public is aware that media reports 
are not always right. This sounds obvious, but Havel goes to great lengths, by writing 
Summer Meditations, to give his version of events. Then, in To the Castle and Back, he 
offers the ‗inside‘ view on political events that he was involved with. These works are not 
just a settling of scores or an attempt to define his own legacy, as political memoirs tend 
to be. These books, (especially To the Castle and Back) represent an attempt at real 
transparency of political processes. To the Castle and Back is a mixture of diary 
reflections, memos during Havel‘s presidency, and an interview in which he reflects upon 
decisions. Havel offers his version of events without being didactic. He does not claim 
that Czechs couldn‘t understand political office and hence are incapable of 
understanding the separations of Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Instead the work is 
Havel‘s attempt to show his thought processes through and during his presidency whilst 
reflecting on his attitudes before his presidency in order to compare them to his actions 
as President. Readers are left to make up their mind through engagement with Havel‘s 
perspective. Its honesty reveals the role of President to be the role of a fallible and 
remarkably candid human being. To return to the theme of this chapter, Havel‘s post 
presidency works demonstrate a real commitment to a careful use of language to avoid 
the pitfalls of charismatic opinions, or the sustenance of ideology. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the theme of the political effect of discourse in Havel‘s 
writings. Throughout Havel‘s career, language and the way in which it can shape a 
political situation has been a major concern. From critiquing the manipulation of 
discourse by an ideology in his dissident essays to his satirical presentation of the 
manipulations of language by late socialist governments in his plays, Havel‘s criticisms 
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remained constant. However, by showing how language can be manipulated Havel also 
hints at the freedom of language to manipulate language to return to the actuality of a 
situation or phenomenon. Havel‘s plays are not just satires; they are also intended to 
instil in the audience the recognition of the power in their own use of language to shape 
a situation and create a political sphere. 
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Chapter 7: Václav Havel‘s Political Philosophy as a Liberal 
Philosophy. 
 
Introduction 
A central claim of this thesis is that the political philosophy of Václav Havel offers an 
interesting new way to understand liberalism. Offering a succinct definition of liberalism 
is difficult because even amongst liberals there is much disagreement about its 
definition.445 I agree with the basic definition of liberalism provided by Will Kymlicka, that 
is the organising of social institutions in order to promote individual liberty and 
equality.446  
Making the claim that Havel is a liberal is contentious because commentators usually 
highlight Havel‘s own insistence that he has no political standpoint. It might also seem at 
odds with earlier chapters which have highlighted the tendency in Havel to promote a life 
in truth as a negative concept. That is, he promotes discovering what a life in truth isn‘t, 
rather than provides a concept giving recommendations for specific political action. There 
is no contradiction involved in making the claim I am making. In this chapter I will 
describe Havel‘s liberalism as what I term ‗agonistic' since for Havel, the role of social 
institutions is not to prescribe behaviour but to protect the individual liberty and equality 
of all citizens by promoting a political discourse which best enables individuals to realise 
their own version of the good life. 
 This chapter will defend my claim that Havel is a liberal by comparing his thought to 
that of other key liberal thinkers John Rawls and John Stuart Mill. I will show how Havel is 
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more of a classic liberal who emphasises liberty than he is an equality liberal like Rawls, 
who emphasises distributing social goods equitably. This chapter will then develop an 
account of Havel‘s liberal position by exploring how the critique of technology and the 
concern with the ability of language to distort a political situation have informed his 
liberal standpoint. 
Havel’s Liberalism 
Havel‘s involvement in what he saw as the unjust trial of the band The Plastic People 
of the Universe has hallmarks of a liberal philosophical standpoint. I want to analyse 
Havel‘s views on the band‘s trial and demonstrate Havel‘s leanings which are, I think, 
those of a classical liberal like John Stuart Mill. 
Havel writes that the ―climate‖ that led to the creation of Charter 77 developed 
around the trial of the underground band The Plastic people of the Universe (PPU).447 
Their trial did not cause the charter, but the trial of these musicians for, as Havel saw it, 
playing a style of music which had existential meaning for them created a sense of 
solidarity between like-minded people who were fed up with the way in which the 
possibilities of life were being narrowly defined. 
As Havel recalls in Disturbing the Peace, notification of the trial reached him while he 
was not in Prague and he immediately returned to the capital as he felt that it was up to 
him to organise a public response to the arrest of the band. At first Havel was not taken 
by their sound at all. Havel had thought the band to be the kind of experimental band for 
whom the point is to be outlandish at the sacrifice of listenability. Upon hearing 
recordings given to him by the band‘s front man Ivan Jirous, Havel notes that he had 
been completely mistaken. Where he had seen only long hair and an excessive use of 
offensive words, Havel, upon listening to the recordings, heard ―a disturbing magic in the 
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music, and a kind of inner warning.‖448 For Havel, there was existential value in the 
music of the PPU. Havel sensed in their music an authentic expression - that is, the band 
members were making music that expressed their own, freely chosen version of good 
taste and art, and this is what attracted Havel to their music. What Havel appreciates in 
PPU‘s music is that the music was free of ideological coercion. In Disturbing the Peace 
Havel writes about his encounter with the music, ―Here was something serious and 
genuine, an internally free articulation of an existential experience that everyone who 
had not become completely obtuse must understand.‖449 I am interested in Havel‘s use 
of the term ‗obtuse‘ here. It shows a great concern for liberty as a condition of humanity. 
An obtuse person is someone who is slow to understand and in the sentence that Havel 
employs the word it is conditioned by the word ‗become‘. For Havel, the totalitarian 
mechanism seemingly in control of the institutions of society, had been coercing citizens 
and slowly manipulating thought and behaviour so that the ability to hear something in 
the unofficial forms of art had been confounded. In other words, people who are 
complicit in the machinations of an ideology, people living a lie, are unable to see art in 
unofficial sources.450 What Havel likes about the PPU‘s form of expression is that it 
reaches beyond this coercion. Hence the trial is not about two views of what constitutes 
‗proper‘ music, instead it is about the liberty of citizens to give expression to their 
existential experiences. 
The focus on liberty that is central to Havel‘s concern with the trial of the PPU is strong 
evidence of the liberal character of Havel‘s political philosophy. I argue that this concern 
for liberty is central to all of Havel‘s political writings. In short, Havel argues that social 
institutions should encourage individuals to give self-expression publicly to their own 
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existential experiences. Havel lambasts social institutions which restrict this expression. 
The phenomenological analysis of the life world, which is the key to a life in truth, 
requires this respect for liberty. An exploration of similarities I have found in Havel‘s 
writings with John Stuart Mill‘s thoughts on liberty will make the liberal in Havel much 
clearer. The comparison with Mill has never before been made to the best of my 
knowledge, and Havel himself never mentions reading Mill. However, drawing out exactly 
what Havel‘s liberalism is like is an easier task if we consider it alongside the liberalism 
of Mill because of the similarities and differences between them which show Havel‘s 
consistency of thought. 
John Stuart Mill‘s essay is concerned with what he identifies as a tendency in society 
to impose its values on individuals. He criticises institutions that prohibit individuals from 
giving self-expression to their ideas and opinions.451 An example of this tendency that he 
gives is of people with views considered heretical not being allowed to express their 
interpretations of theology. This tendency is of concern for Mill because ages, 
civilizations and cultures have a track record of fallibility.452 Truth is not accessible to 
people in its fullness according to Mill and different ages give different expressions of 
truth, with each historical expression of truth containing some part of correctness and 
some part of error. Mill writes that ―in the revolution of opinions one part of the truth sets 
while the other rises.‖453 Hence it is vital to understand that opinions contra the norm 
might be expressing truth and hence it is vital that they be considered in public. Mill 
argues that ―complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinions is the very 
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condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action.‖454 The similarity 
to Havel‘s conception of good politics is clear. 
In the previous chapter I quoted Kenneth Zagacki, who argued that the strong sense 
of humility which he reads as central to Havel‘s politics is a reminder that one can never 
be certain that our position is right.455 Indeed, a life in truth is not so much a matter of 
living a certain way, but of continually justifying one‘s actions by exposing them to 
Socratic scrutiny. Mills‘ insistence that no society is free unless it respects the freedom 
of each individual to pursue their own good in their own way is Havel‘s claim as well. 
Havel also shares Mills‘ concern that restricting which opinions can be held only forces 
those who hold opinions contrary to the accepted norm to hold those opinions privately. 
This is to the detriment of society which loses its credibility and hence its assurance that 
it is promoting the right values and opinions.456 The main difference I see between Mill 
and Havel is that for Havel the fundamental principle that society should encourage is 
the free expression of authenticity, whereas for Mill the foundation is the sovereignty of 
the individual defined by the harm principle. The harm principle is that interference with 
an individual‘s liberty is only justified if their actions cause harm to others. 457 
Havel does not share Mill‘s faith in the harm principle; instead Havel‘s anti-
paternalism is directed at the things that matter most. What matters most is avoiding 
restrictions on a person‘s capacity to live authentically and independently. The harm 
principle has been criticised effectively by Arthur Ripstein who argues that a better 
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foundation for restricting state intervention is what he calls the sovereignty principle.458 
Ripstein‘s argument is that the harm principle does not fit with Mill‘s pronouncement 
that persons are sovereign over themselves, their body, and their mind. Ripstein‘s 
sovereignty principle is that ―the only legitimate restrictions in conduct are those that 
secure the mutual independence of free persons from each other.‖459 The sovereignty 
principle respects that harm is difficult to define and that wrong-doing and harm are not 
equivalent. I am attracted to Ripstein‘s sovereignty principle because I think that it is a 
better statement of liberalism than Mill‘s harm principle, but this still doesn‘t quite fit 
Havel‘s position.460 Both the harm and sovereignty principle, for Havel, would be 
excessively anti-paternalistic. I will illustrate this with an example. 
For Mill, society should not impose restrictions on individuals which restrict their 
sovereignty unless they would harm others. Henry Magid points out that for Mill, the 
individual who is in full possession of themselves should lose that sovereignty only if 
their actions would harm others.461 This would mean that a law requiring citizens to wear 
seatbelts would be unjustified as the law is removing an individual‘s sovereignty despite 
the fact that not wearing a seatbelt can only be harmful to oneself. I think it can be safely 
argued that a law requiring seatbelts to be worn is not really restrictive, nor do the 
majority of citizens feel violated while putting their seatbelt on every time they enter a 
vehicle. Yet it represents an example in which governmental concern for the well-being of 
its citizens must take a back seat to the preservation of the sovereignty of the individual. 
Mill sticks to his dictum that society can only interfere with an individual‘s sovereignty 
when that person harms others. Ripstein would argue that the seat belt law restricts an 
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individual‘s sovereignty. The same hardline stance is not required by Havel‘s version of 
liberalism. Liberty is an essential feature of his thought, not to promote individual 
sovereignty, but to give citizens the ability to express themselves authentically and to 
endorse their views on what is authentic in a public forum. Hence for Havel, a law 
concerning seatbelts is not a curbing of essential freedoms as it in no way affects a 
person‘s ability to be authentic. This brings up an essential difference between the 
sovereignty liberalism of Ripstein and what I‘ll here call the authenticity liberalism of 
Havel. For Ripstein the self is created through the exercise of sovereignty whereas for 
Havel, the self is created through meaningful self-agonism, or self-inquiry into the self. 
Hence for Havel, seat belt laws are not necessarily anti-liberal. 
Never the less, the similarity between Mill‘s liberalism and Havel‘s thought is 
undeniable. The focus on authenticity rather than sovereignty does not involve an anti-
liberal tendency. Returning to the earlier discussion of the trial of the PPU, I want to give 
one further piece of evidence of a general similarity in thought between Havel and Mill. In 
Disturbing the Peace, Havel writes that it was important for him to get involved in, not 
because of the specifics of the case, but because symbolically the case was also a trial 
of the state‘s right to dictate social norms. 
This case had nothing whatsoever to do with a struggle between two competing 
political cliques. It was something far worse: an attack by the totalitarian system on life 
itself, on the very essence of human freedom and integrity. The objects of this attack 
were not veterans of old political battles; they had no political past, or even any well-
defined political positions. They were simply young people who wanted to live in their own 
way, to make music they liked, to sing what they wanted to sing, to live in harmony with 
themselves, and to express themselves in a truthful way.462 
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For Havel the danger of the trial was that it could set a precedent that the state could 
incarcerate anyone for individual expression. Havel involves himself in the trial as the 
protector of individual self-expression because it is only through a plurality of self-
expressions that something akin to authenticity can be expressed. Both Mill and Havel 
argue that society is richer when individual self-expression is encouraged. For Mill this 
richness comes from progress through a continual advancement towards the good that 
comes with a deliberative rejection of those forms of self-expression which, upon being 
exposed to well-balanced critique in a public arena, are shown to be detrimental to the 
individual. For Havel the richness comes through the celebration of the inherent plurality 
of the human condition. It is as fitting for the PPU to express themselves through their 
music as it is for Havel to express himself through organising their defence or the 
greengrocer to refuse to put the placard in the window. The key here is that both Mill and 
Havel see liberty as the key object of social organisation that needs to be protected. 
That tendency in Mill to promote sovereignty of the individual as a means by which 
society may  progress, through the progress of individualism, has led some 
commentators to label Mill‘s utilitarianism a perfectionist politics. Aviezier Tucker makes 
the claim that Patočka and Havel are perfectionists, in the next section I will consider 
these arguments and explain how Havel‘s political philosophy is not a perfectionist 
political philosophy.463 
Is Havel a Perfectionist? 
It is worthwhile asking the question of whether or not Havel is a perfectionist as Tucker 
provides a compelling argument for Patočka‘s perfectionism. It has turned out so far that 
most of Havel‘s ideas have some origin in the philosophy and personal example of 
Patočka and so it would not be surprising if it turned out that the perfectionism of 
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230 | P a g e  
 
Patočka, if indeed he can be called a perfectionist, found its way into Havel‘s thought. It 
is my contention, however, that Havel is not a perfectionist. In my mind he is too 
concerned with plurality and a kind of neutrality of the state to be a perfectionist 
advocating a specific kind of the good.   
Perfectionism is a general term for a political or moral theory that argues that the 
state should take sides in promoting a specific version of the good life. The perfectionist 
is, as F.H. Buckley describes, ―a moralist who is prepared to ignore our deepest wishes 
when these are deemed unworthy. Instead he identifies the good ends which we should 
pursue and directs us to seek them whether we want them or not.‖464 Mill could be 
argued to be a perfectionist because he sees the role of Government as promoting a 
specific version of the good. That good is a levelling-up along a moral staircase from its 
current position. For Mill there is a hierarchy of goods, or in his terms higher and lower 
pleasures.465 Famously, Mill declared that it is better to be an unhappy Socrates than a 
satisfied pig.466 Mill could condone despotism for non-western communities if it helped 
the communities attain a higher moral ground in which case despotism is abandoned.  
This is his Victorian racism shining through. For Mill such communities would be 
incompetent and would require a despot to drag them to the experience of higher order 
pleasures. For Mill the best society is the one which respects the sovereignty of the 
individual because the most able minded in that society, exercising their individual 
opinions, will eventually create the highest value experiences for its citizens. Mill writes: 
 
Individuality is the same thing with development, and…it is only the cultivation 
of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human 
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465 John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism” in On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), 139. 
466 Ibid 140 
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beings…what more can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it 
brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? or 
what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents 
this?467 
 
Steven Wall argues that this ―is not just a theory about politics: it is a substantive, 
perfectionist, moral theory about the good. And, on this view, the right thing to do is to 
promote development or perfection, and only a regime securing extensive liberty for each 
person can accomplish this.‖468 Hence a regime that refuses to interfere in citizens lives 
except to prevent harm, will bring about the good life through its enabling of its citizens‘ 
to employ their individuality.  In other words, laws that interfere with individuality, hinder 
the growth of our most important faculties. I have some problems however with calling 
Mill a perfectionist. It is a stretch to say that in promoting individuality the state is making 
a conscious choice about the good. Mill has, as already noted, expressed doubts about 
the State‘s ability to know the good. Mill does hold that the higher pleasures are 
independent of an individual‘s opinion, and are those judgements that fully informed 
individuals would prefer, but the state‘s ability to interfere with sovereignty is only 
regulated by the harm principle. This ambiguity is an interesting platform from which to 
ask the question if Havel is a perfectionist. 
To answer this question I will do three things. First, I will explore Tucker‘s claim that 
Patočka‘s philosophy is perfectionist and see what influence it has made on Havel‘s 
thought. Second, I will explore Havel‘s dissident thoughts on state sponsored versions of 
the good life. Third, I will explore Havel‘s actions and speeches as President and see if 
                                                 
467 Mill “On Liberty” 71. 
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there is a perfectionist strand in his politics. It is necessary to explore Havel‘s thought in 
two parts because Havel could have had a different attitude to the state as dissident 
than as President.  
Aviezer Tucker claims that Patočka, Havel and other Czech dissidents promote a 
perfectionist ethics.469 He argues that the dissidents involved in the creation of Charter 
77 were communitarians arguing for the creation of a community with the aims of 
furthering perfectionist virtue; however this communitarian project required liberal 
politics in recognising universal human rights.470 I don‘t find this to be a convincing way 
of presenting the case. I think the communitarian claim is weak as it is not community 
that gives the sense of the good life, but rather the community that is enriched through 
individuals being authentic. I will return to this point later in this chapter. James 
Pontusso, in his book Václav Havel; Civic Responsibility in the Postmodern Age, argues 
that it is not liberal institutions in society which make a good society, the goodness of a 
society rests ultimately on the moral character of its citizens. Not that the good arises 
directly out of the community; instead, that civic action by individuals makes a good 
community. I will return to this point in more detail in the next section of this chapter. 
Havel the dissident is not a perfectionist. Havel‘s encounter with the Union of 
Czechoslovakian Writers, published as the essay ‗On Evasive Thinking,‘ is clear evidence 
of this. I discussed the concern for using language responsibly in chapter four of this 
thesis, but it is also useful for this section, since the sentiment with which Havel 
lambasts the union is clearly that of a liberal thinker. 
The main issue that Havel takes up with the union is its choice of projects to fund or 
endorse. The Union chooses which genres and styles are worth publishing, and these get 
allocated spots in the various sponsored literary magazines and journals. Also there is 
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clearly help from the government in choosing the official literary style and consequently 
other genres, styles and authors are ignored and not given publishing opportunities. For 
Havel this is outrageous because they are making the assumption that they are in 
possession of knowledge about which literary styles can best encapsulate the human 
condition. Havel is adamant that all styles deserve equal funding as that kind of 
knowledge is humanly impossible. He reminds the union of his involvement with the 
magazine Tvar, which had its funding cut prior to the meeting. Tvar’s aim was to publish 
without ideological prejudice, which meant that articles were published in many styles 
and genres. This brought Tvar into conflict with the government. It was seen as a thorn in 
the government‘s side as many genres are hard to direct towards the party line. In order 
to keep the union functioning comfortably, Havel claims that the union ignored Tvar 
because of political pressure, which he claimed was a rejection of their duty to protect 
the art of writing, rather than to protect and value only one kind of it.471  
Havel writes: 
 
I think the Union of Writers should have the qualities of a good dramaturge. It 
should never hand out directives on how to write, or impose any artistic 
program on literature. Precisely the contrary, it must help literature and 
authors to be true to themselves; help magazines to be what they want to be, 
which is the only way they will be good magazines... helping each writer to be 
himself to a maximum degree – unique, well defined, and clear on how to go 
about fulfilling his own program. The point is that if literature is to be genuine, 
it cannot be anything but concrete, unique, sovereign and consistent.472  
                                                 
471 See John Keane, Vaclav Havel; A Political Tragedy in Six Acts, (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1999), 
170-172. 
472 Havel, Open Letters, 19 
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These are the beliefs of a liberal anti-perfectionist. The perfectionist would be making 
claims about a certain type of writing which contains value and be pushing the union to 
support that. Havel remains neutral on what kind of literature best expresses the human 
condition and asks the institutions which allow publication to exhibit the same neutrality. 
This is an anti-perfectionist position devoid of a public ranking of modes of expression. All 
literary modes of expression are valid to the dissident Havel. 
Havel the dissident also focuses on the individual‘s ability to consider their actions 
and make a community-independent decision about what kind of person they would like 
to be. This is a clear liberal standpoint. Tucker‘s claim that Havel mixes 
communitarianism and liberalism is weakened by this focus in Havel‘s dissent on the 
individual‘s ability to rethink their understanding of what a good life is. This liberal 
position is strengthened when we consider Will Kymlicka‘s contrasting of the 
communitarian view of practical reason as a quest of self-discovery with the liberal view 
of practical reason as judgement. Kymlicka claims that for a prominent kind of 
communitarianism, that of Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Alisdair MacIntyre, 
practical reason leads us to discover who we already are, making us reconcile to our 
position in history or within the community. For liberals, on the other hand, questioning 
our lives using practical reason helps us to discover who we wish to be.473 The 
greengrocer in Havel‘s The Power of the Powerless, discussed in chapter 1, makes a 
judgement about his political views and acts to change the community in which he lives. 
His understanding of the good life, when placing the placard, is one coercively imposed 
upon him by the community. A choice not to place the sign would involve a very definite 
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judgement about what kind of person he needs to be so that his actions can be in line 
with his understanding of what a good life is.  
A liberal would argue that the greengrocer is free to act for a revised view of the good 
life where that revision has taken place in the individual rather than through community 
coercion. A communitarian might argue against the imposition of a communist ideology 
upon the greengrocer and from a communitarian standpoint argue that the problem is 
that the greengrocer is lamenting the loss of a society which has faith in itself. In that 
case the communitarian could accept the greengrocer‘s recognition that something is 
rotten in the state of Czechoslovakia. However this misidentifies Havel‘s concern about 
the greengrocer‘s predicament. To my reading, by refusing to place the sign Havel‘s 
greengrocer makes a decision involving his own sovereignty. His actions aim at the 
establishment of a civil society, but his actions are motivated by a liberal understanding 
of the self. I admit that I am opposing a perfectionist strand of communitarianism against 
liberalism. 
The solidarity of the shaken, which Tucker takes to be the authentic community with a 
shared conception of the good as care for the soul, misses the point that the ―shaken‖474 
are liberal dissidents who use an ahistorical understanding of man to hold justice up as a 
critic of the community.475 They are, ―persecuted‖ and possibly ignored. They are not a 
community creating together a common form of the good life. The solidarity of the 
shaken is an organisation of individuals who have undergone a rational inquiry into their 
actions and their relationship to a good life, and from that analysis have realised that 
another kind of acting is necessary for that. The sheer difference of opinion that 
comprised the Chartists‘ views of what is right, is testament to this. To quote Ronald 
                                                 
474 Patočka‟s notion of the „solidarity of the shaken‟ is discussed earlier in Chapter 6. 
475 When I say ahistorical I do not mean that they are ignorant of history. Patočka is intimately concerned with 
humanity in its historical situation. Instead I am referring to the freedom from history that the shaken are able to 
manifest. An ahistorical condition recognises that transcendence is a part of any present moment hence history is 
only a force which reveals a part of appearance. Transcendence is possible from history. 
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Dworkin ―In the end political theory can make no contribution to how we govern 
ourselves except by struggling against all the impulses that drag us back into our own 
culture, towards generality and some reflective basis for deciding which of our traditional 
distinctions and discriminations are genuine and which are spurious.‖476 For Dworkin, 
there is implicit, in liberalism, this critique of history and culture. The liberal is not 
ignorant of community and values, but is free to assess their worth. 
In the conclusion of Tucker‘s book he argues that the dissidents of Czechoslovakia are 
the reason why there is a Czech culture today that has roots in its past. In other words 
they were a perfectionist kind of communitarian. They preserved Czech culture by 
bringing it ‗underground.‘ They understood that it was worth preserving and had some 
intrinsic worth as a community in which the good life was possible and so, the existence 
of a Czech identity after socialism is due to them.477 I disagree. Within the community of 
dissidents, each made an independent analysis of what was valuable about Czech 
culture and preserved what each thought worth preserving. I have already mentioned the 
extreme difference among Chartists on what the aims of Charter 77 should be.478 The 
Charter‘s document itself is the only shared understanding. The Charter was for 
socialism, Christianity, democracy, and just dissent in general depending on which 
dissident was asked about it, and the same applies to the preservation of Czech culture. 
Tucker writes: 
 
Though many ordinary Czechs still regard the dissidents as eccentric fools 
who ruined for twenty years their chances of small improvements in their 
standard of living and the chances of their children to get an education, and 
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though many others like to believe that the dissident movement was just what 
was left of the losing wing of the Communist Party in 1968… once the younger 
generation attempts to reconstruct their national identity and history, they will 
at least have something to be proud of in their national and cultural 
history.479 
 
On my reading, the community‘s shared version of the good life was to collaborate with 
the regime. The dissidents acted jointly but, on individual understandings that the 
community needed to be challenged. Their judgements were those of liberals, not those 
of communitarians struggling to understand their place in the community. The dissidents, 
not being of the state, are therefore not communitarians promoting a state version of the 
common good. Their dissent is in line with John Rawls‘ claim in A Theory of Justice that: 
 
While justice as fairness allows that in a well-ordered society the values of 
excellence are recognised, the human perfections are to be pursued within 
the limits of the principle of free association. Persons join together to further 
their cultural and artistic interests in the same way that they form religious 
communities. They do not use the coercive apparatus of the state to win for 
themselves a greater liberty or larger distributive shares on the grounds that 
their activities are of more intrinsic value.480 
 
I think Rawls description of free association guiding a valuation of judgements on the 
good life within a community applies to the actions of Czech dissidents, like Havel and 
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Patočka, who kept alive their version of the Czech identity during totalitarian occupation. 
Havel‘s own remarks in ‗On Evasive Thinking‘ support my reading. 
 
How else do Vladimir Holan481 and Bohumil Hrabal482 achieve what they do 
except by how consistently they are themselves, how directly they are 
obsessed by their methods, how indifferent they remain to the world of 
categories, intellectual evasions, the norms and interests of the time by which 
they will be measured?483 
 
 It still remains to ask the question about Havel the President. As President did Havel 
endorse a specific version of the good life? Did the state under Havel have perfectionist 
tendencies? It is my contention that Havel the president was not a perfectionist. A 
reading of his speeches while President supports this. On September the 29th 1994 
Havel delivered a speech at Stanford University.484 It is riddled with a kind of mysticism 
symptomatic of his later writings, however there is still vital information showing his 
political views within.485 Essentially the speech argues for a democracy that respects the 
higher horizon of Being.486 Havel argues that a truly peaceful world order will not arise 
until democracies become a place ―for quest of creation, for creative dialogue, for 
                                                 
481 A Czech poet and contemporary of Havel‟s who was nominated for the Nobel prize in 1960. 
482 A Czech writer and contemporary of Havel‟s. 
483 Havel, Open Letters, 19. 
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claimed that the pre-natal experience contained global archetypes which were not culturally formed (Havel, The 
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realizing the common will, and for exercising responsibility‖.487 This might be construed 
as a perfectionist politics as Havel has a ‗perfect‘ society in mind, or so it seems; but 
Havel goes on to say, ―I do not possess any special formula to awaken the mind of man 
to his responsibility to the world and for the world.‖488  He is not a perfectionist here, as 
he does not say that it is the state‘s responsibility to bring people to the good life. 
One of Havel‘s points in the speech is that a new order will not come through the 
application of a new doctrine or ideology. Havel can be read as distrustful of 
communitarian politics as he claims that using common rituals or dogmas to promote a 
new world order would add to the already existing cultural elements that he distrusts.489 
The important step for Havel is that individuals and communities engage in a critical 
―self-examination‖ that will lead to a life in truth.490 He speaks of the importance of the 
separation of powers, the universal right to vote, the authority of the rule of law, 
―freedom of expression, the inviolability of private ownership,‖ as important aspects of a 
society, but only as mechanisms for enabling dignity freedom and responsibility.491 If a 
peaceful world order is to succeed, then it must be based in an authentic respect of the 
higher horizon of Being, here called the experience of transcendence, or the experience 
of that which unites all humanity. Havel is making a statement, common to many of his 
Presidential speeches, that the world requires multicultural coexistence which respects a 
common universal concept of a beings relationship to Being;492 that the uniqueness and 
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freedom of each human being is best protected by a democratic system;493 that no state 
should coerce this transformation from its citizens.494 Despite being something of a 
utopian dreamer himself, Havel is not committed to a particular project to bring about 
this pluralistic world civilization which respects each individuals way of living in truth. This 
shows him not to be a perfectionist. He argues that we should not allow utopians with a 
clear vision of a utopia to dictate our politics because their ―siren song‖ will lead to 
destruction. Havel the politician is hence more like Mill, arguing for a humble admission 
that the good life is not something we can be cognisant of, yet is best achieved by 
allowing individuals the liberty to find it themselves. If there is a perfectionist strand in 
Havel it can only be in his implication that everyone who has the liberty to examine their 
life-world, should. 
 
Havel’s Brand of Liberalism 
In claiming that Havel is a liberal it is necessary to explore the main currents of liberal 
theory and see where in the field of liberalism Havel fits in. Havel is not an egalitarian 
thinker, or to be precise, Havel is not concerned with distributing social goods in an 
equitable way, as are some liberals, like Rawls. For the sake of clarity, I take John Rawls‘ 
A Theory of Justice to be the central work in the canon of contemporary liberalism. For 
Rawls, liberty is a social good to be distributed.495 Rawls organises his theory of justice 
around two principles. The first is that each person should have an ―equal right to the 
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most extensive set of basic liberties compatible with similar liberties for others.496 The 
second is that ―social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both 
(a) reasonably expected to be to everyone‘s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all.‖497 From this, Rawls develops a theory of justice as fairness. For 
justice to be a part of the state, the two principles of justice must be satisfied. Hence 
there is a fundamental egalitarian basis to Rawls‘ theory. If society is a collective 
producing goods in the forms of social liberties and rights, then their distribution 
becomes a matter of fairness. This is different from Havel‘s position according to which 
politics is a question not of fairly dealing out social goods, but of how individuals are 
responsible to a higher horizon of Being - though there is a concern for social conditions 
in Havel‘s liberalism which I will label 'liberal agonism' in the next chapter. For Havel, as 
evidenced in his essay ―On Evasive Thinking‖ in order for people to be meaningfully 
engaged in the task of discovering an authentic identity, there are basic social conditions 
that must be met. In ―On Evasive Thinking,‖ Havel lambastes the state for allowing 
buildings to fall into such a state of disrepair that fragments fall and kill citizens.498 For 
Havel‘s liberal agonism to succeed in encouraging citizens to be existentially honest with 
themselves, there are social conditions which must be met through economic 
engagement. My point is that for Havel, the point of economic engagement is not the fair 
distribution of social goods, but the distribution of social goods that focuses on the more 
important task of stimulating citizens to authentically engage with themselves. 
In Summer Meditations, Havel‘s first book published while President, Havel clearly 
marks out his task as President as one of creating the conditions for a democracy that is 
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based on a moral foundation.499  The moral foundation is not one of fairness, but of 
authentic living, and enabling individuals to express their freedom publicly. It is my 
contention that Havel is proposing an agonistic liberal democracy. This is more evident in 
his later speeches which concern democracy. In a speech to the national press club in 
Australia, Havel writes that the future of democracy depends on grounding politics in the 
experience of every individual rather than in a system derived from a specific culture 
which excludes others outside it.500 The search for a moral basis on which to secure 
democracy, which involves individual liberty to allow for authentic existence, is clearly the 
position of a liberal politician, even though it does not share Rawls‘ egalitarian 
conception of justice. 
This is the major difference between Havel‘s brand of liberalism and that of Rawls. The 
distribution of social goods is not a topic on which Havel writes very much at all. For 
Havel, society should be structured to allow an existential commitment to authenticity, 
whereas for Rawls, the basic institutions of society should be structured to allow a fair 
distribution of primary social goods as determined through a philosophical methodology. 
Havel‘s liberalism is not presented in this way. What I see as the value in liberal politics, 
in Havel‘s philosophy, is the opening up of lives to a contest of what is of value. This is not 
a contest over the possession of social goods, but a contest of ideas. 
 
Sources of Havel’s Liberalism 
There have been two major themes that this thesis has explored thus far. The first is 
Havel‘s quasi Heideggerian concern for the way in which scientism has changed thinking 
into a techne which has taken humans away from their humanity. The second is Havel‘s 
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concern for the detrimental effects on a political state when ideology manipulates 
language.  I have been claiming that Havel‘s political philosophy is founded on a 
phenomenological investigation of the life world, aimed at pushing back the horizons of 
lived experience so as to direct life towards the highest horizon. Throughout, Havel claims 
that it is folly to assume that a constructed system of living can make otiose the call of a 
higher horizon. He has cautioned dissidents and politicians to respect the immensity of 
the natural world in which we are thrown, and to avoid the hubris of one who claims to 
have utopia within their reach. I have claimed that this position is that of a liberal and the 
political situation which Havel espouses is necessarily anti-perfectionist. It is focussed on 
liberty, so that individuals can examine their own life-world and through that examination 
live a life in truth. This section will explain how the critique of technology and the critique 
of language inform Havel‘s liberalism. 
In ‗Politics and Conscience‘ and The Power of the Powerless, Havel argues that post-
totalitarianism is an expected product of a modernity in which mankind understands 
itself as a techno-scientific entity rather than as a pluralistic and  mysterious moral 
agent. The experience of post-totalitarianism is, for Havel, also a mirror for western 
democracy.501 Havel sees a crisis in modernity as affecting all of modernity, not just a 
part of modernity living under the conditions of late-socialism. As explained above, Havel 
thinks that liberal institutions alone are not enough to bring about a solution to a crisis in 
modernity resulting from a schism with traditional modes of being-in-the-world which 
encouraged political action and civil society. For Havel, action must return to living. In 
Chapter 1, I explained that for Havel, acting politically was an answer to the challenges of 
the crisis in modernity that he identified along with Heidegger. In Chapter 5, I described 
Patočka‘s concept of the ‗solidarity of the shaken‘ as engaged intellectuals risking a 
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comfortable life in order to point out ideological trends in society which are coercing 
inauthentic behaviour. In Chapter 3 I used Arendt‘s understanding of the world and 
action to frame Havel‘s and Patoka‘s thoughts on the same topics. That is, Arendt 
understands the world as the space where in which politics and action are created by 
throwing one‘s life and person into the public realm for critique and possible self-re-
evaluation.502 Tying together some threads of this thesis, a liberal self-critique, employed 
in a public realm, represents Havel‘s solution to the problems of a world which has 
reduced itself to techno-scientific calculations. The Socratic lightness with which one 
must be prepared to sacrifice oneself in public - that one must expose oneself to critique 
in public - requires a liberal society if the sacrifice is to not become, like Patočka‘s, 
physically harmful or fatal one. Only a society which encourages self-examination and 
holds a neutral position on conceptions of the good can fully benefit from the 
engagement of the ‗shaken‘. 
I have also argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that manipulations of language through 
discourse, can have the effect of concealing the true nature of phenomena. A liberal faith 
in state neutrality that allows citizens to form their own conception of the good life 
through self-examination is a strong element in Havel‘s thought and supports his views 
on discourse. Havel believes that the state should not force citizens to behave in certain 
ways. From his observations of post-totalitarian manipulations of discourse, he has 
developed a belief in state neutrality and a belief in rights that allow a self-examination. 
This self-examination is essential if one is to determine how to commit to a project of 
authenticity. And there are other connected rights to consider - the right to participate in 
public life through good television, newspaper, internet and other media, and a right to a 
good education so that a life in truth can be better explored. 
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The commitment to authenticity – to a life in truth as the best kind of life – is an 
important aspect of Havel‘s liberalism and the stumbling block which my claim of Havel 
as a liberal must overcome. There is an implicit emphasis in Havel‘s thought that 
engagement in the political is where the good life is. This is not, in my opinion to make 
Havel a perfectionist as the state is to remain neutral. Havel does, however,  seem to put 
forward ideas which go against the liberal notion of having liberty not to engage in politics 
if one so feels. It is my contention that in a neutral liberal state, ideological coercions are 
less attractive than in non-liberal states as there is a greater degree of education to 
challenge one‘s version of the good. In a liberal society, we are less free to put on the 
ideological cardigan. There is less state-apparatus that employ fear that would place one 
in a position to make a choice  between a comfortable bad faith and an uncomfortable 
authenticity. With the agonism of Havel‘s liberalism, that I will explain in the next chapter, 
corporate or cultural institutions which can also promote fear and coercion are better 
able to be rejected. Citizens are encouraged, in a neutral state, to deliberate on the 
conception of the right. 
Pontusso explains that an error of communism, for Havel, was that it undermined 
people‘s moral sense by making ethics a communal rather than individual exercise.503 
The consequence of this was to destroy the institutions and practices of a civil society 
which had held people together voluntarily for generations.504 In other words the 
resulting society was symptomatic of the anthropocentric techno-scientific ideology of 
modernity which destroyed the space of politics. A society which recovers the space of 
politics is therefore the solution to the crisis modernity finds itself in. 
Pontusso also claims that the reason why, for Havel, ideology can be attractive to 
individuals is existential in nature. Pontusso writes that the political problem of ideology 
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―arises because human beings are prompted by their apprehension of death to join 
social groups that give a sense of solidarity and completion.‖505 The ‗shaken‘, in 
Patočka‘s thought, live in persecution precisely because their actions challenge the 
sense of existential security that people find in their groups. The state, in Havel‘s view, 
has a responsibility to be pluralistic and neutral. I think that this concern of Havel‘s lies 
with protecting difference promoting toleration at the same time, rather than fostering 
the conditions which make people feel that a particular ideology feel that it has exclusive 
knowledge of the good life. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how Havel‘s political philosophy can be understood as a 
liberal political philosophy. Essentially, I have offered a way to understand liberalism by 
building on the classical liberalism of Mill that emphasised liberty as the fundamental 
principle of a good society. I have explained how for Havel, a commitment to authenticity 
is what characterizes the good life, despite the inability of a person to answer once and 
for all the question of what authenticity would actually demand of us. I claimed that 
Havel‘s liberalism is a political philosophy which encourages self-examination through the 
phenomenological method that Havel favours. 
I outlined Havel‘s liberalism using his involvement in Charter 77 and the trial of the 
PPU, and his speech at the Union of Czechoslovakian Writers, as evidence of a liberal 
standpoint in his dissident activities; I have also argued that his activities as President 
demonstrate him to be a liberal. A key aim of this chapter was to criticise Tucker‘s claim 
that Havel is a perfectionist, and I did this by arguing that Havel‘s call for state neutrality 
makes him an anti-perfectionist. I also showed how Tucker‘s position on Havel‘s 
combination of communitarian and liberal strands of political philosophy is untenable, 
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and that liberalism is the political philosophy with the strongest affinities to Havel‘s 
thought. In comparing Havel‘s liberalism to the equality liberalism of Rawls, I showed that 
although exhibiting a strong liberal position, Havel is not contributing arguments for an 
equitable distribution of social goods. This leads me to think that Havel is not an equality 
liberal like Rawls. Certainly Havel is not concerned with social goods, but the more 
important task of politics is to stimulate citizens to have an authentic engagement with 
themselves, and that does require a host of social conditions to be met. 
Finally this chapter explored how the two common threads of this thesis -Havel‘s 
critique of technology and Havel‘s concern with language - inform his liberal position. The 
next chapter will be explicit about what exactly defines a liberal agonism, the particular 
version of liberalism I am claiming as Havel‘s.  Also I will examine criticisms of liberalism 
made by the agonist Chantal Mouffe in the light of Havel‘s liberal position. I claim that a 
liberal agonism is immune to the criticisms made by Mouffe. 
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Chapter 8: Havel‘s Liberal Agonism 
 
 Introduction: 
Václav Havel never formally set out a cohesive political philosophy; however, my thesis 
is presenting Havel‘s thought as constituting a peculiar kind of liberalism, which builds on 
the philosophy of Jan Patočka‘ and the critique of technology by Martin Heidegger – a 
liberalism that I have termed liberal agonism. In this chapter I want to spell out liberal 
agonism as a political philosophy and test it against what I see as the main strand of 
agonism, that put forward by Chantal Mouffe. Mouffe is a good counterpoint to this 
discussion because she is highly critical of liberalism, and the discourse ethics of Jurgen 
Habermas. I mention Habermas because my reading of Havel has him advocating a 
politics created through discourse, hence Habermas implicitly looms large over the 
discussion. I agree with many of the criticisms of Habermas made by Mouffe, and think 
that Havel would as well. However I see Havel as remaining faithful to the principles of 
individual liberty. Hence the kind of liberalism espoused by Havel is interesting; it focuses 
specifically on a critical re-evaluation of one‘s positions. Therefore the agonistic element 
is a self agonism, which makes a very different political agonism then that of Mouffe, 
which revels in an agonistic display of hegemonic ideological creations of identity. Making 
this distinction between Havel and Mouffe will be a key business of this chapter. 
In my reading, Havel‘s position is something more than a standard liberal view on re-
evaluation and deliberative process because at no point does he contend that a 
consensus can actually be reached. With attention directed to evaluation, rather than the 
results of evaluation and without abandoning a liberal position, I see Havel‘s liberalism 
as fundamentally agonistic. Living in truth is therefore a self agonism which requires a 
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liberal state with certain flourishing social institutions. Liberal agonism does  not share 
the drive for consensus which is key to the deliberative democracy of Habermas, nor 
does it share Mouffe‘s concern with revealing the hegemonic struggles that create 
identity. 
 
 What is Liberal Agonism? 
I am well aware that I am using Havel‘s thoughts here rather than simply relaying 
them. I do find a cohesive liberal argument throughout Havel‘s work that shows that I am 
using Havel‘s thoughts in a way that is true to his writing. Were Havel to have sat down 
and worked out a systematic expression of his political philosophy, I believe it would have 
looked like the liberal agonism I am going to spell out. 
A key insight of Havel‘s political philosophy implicit in his writings is that agonism 
without self-interrogation is problematic. Hence the central locus of any agonism is the 
self. For Havel, the best kind of state for allowing and encouraging individual‘s to self-
interrogate is a liberal state. Therefore liberal agonism is a state that allows, celebrates 
and encourages individual liberty to investigate what existential identities should be 
expressed and acted upon by individuals through a process of self-interrogation. 
Havel has an interesting understanding of the self which I have pointed out in previous 
chapters. Building on Patočka‘ asubjective phenomenology, Havel‘s self is revealed in the 
search for it. The self is not the transcendental subject of phenomenology, the self is the 
asubjective self which exists as an always historical being, but also as a part of Being. 
Agonism is the process that reveals the self to the self, even if only partly or temporarily. 
In other words, the subject is known in the search for it - not as the result of a 
transcendental deduction, but in revealing it in its interactions in the world, through its 
actions in the public sphere. In other words, the self is process based. I want to consider 
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a passage from To the Castle and Back as a primer to a discussion of liberal agonism. It 
sets the tone of self-critique and existential honesty as necessary conditions for progress. 
 
The beauty of language is that it can never capture precisely what it wants. 
Language is disconnected, hard, digital as it were, and for that reason, but 
not only for that reason, it can never completely capture something as 
connected as reality, experience or our souls. This opens the door to the 
magnificent battle for expression and self-expression that has accompanied 
man down through history. It is a battle without end, and thanks to it, 
everything that is human is continually being elucidated, each time somewhat 
differently. Moreover, it is in this battle that man in fact becomes himself. As 
an individual and as a species. He simply tries to capture the world and 
himself more and more exactly through words, images, or actions, and the 
more he succeeds, the more aware he is that he can never completely 
capture either the world or himself, nor any part of the world. But that drives 
him to keep trying, again and again and thus he continues to define himself 
more and more exactly. It‘s a Sisyphean fate.506 
 
Havel‘s wariness of political manipulations of discourse can be contrasted to the hope in 
the above passage that through agonism, language can come closer to saying something 
true about the self and life. History, and the movement of history, is described here by 
Havel as being constituted by the individual‘s search for self-expression. It is the 
individual, searching for a voice to existential identity which gives the species its 
meaning. 
                                                 
506 Václav Havel, To the Castle and Back, trans. Paul Wilson, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2007), 347. 
251 | P a g e  
 
Likening history to a Sisyphean fate, Havel‘s liberalism is clearly focused on 
encouraging a rich political discourse. However this is not a discourse aimed at 
consensus, such as thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas promote; it is a discourse aimed 
at giving existential meaning to a particular moment. Hence in Havel‘s liberalism, state 
neutrality and the promotion of a civil society are not mechanisms of promoting a 
specific, well defined liberal individual. Liberty is valued not as a way of being free to act 
away from the state‘s coercions, but as an opportunity to give authentic expression to the 
species. To put this differently, a politics of liberty allows individuals to make a better 
state through their own battle for self-expression. In Havel‘s agonism the battle is with 
oneself, not the battle of vested positions.  For Havel, agonism without self-interrogation 
is highly problematic. Individuals must justify their positions honestly to themselves if 
they are to express themselves authentically. 
The non-ideological basis of Charter77, and the many varied positions of the members 
of the Civic Forum, are evidence of the kind of politics that Havel endorses. Havel‘s 
liberal agonism would be a democratic state. Democracy, having political parties that 
citizens can choose between allows those parties to push for meaningful ideas and 
thereby allow the public to identify with certain political goals, such as human rights.507 It 
is in giving a voice to views outside the norm that political discourse is enriched.
508
 
Individuals who publically give expression to their existential identities create the impetus 
for opposition voices to form, which either hold the dominant political ideas to account or 
usurp them. This agonism is not like Jurgen Habermas‘ idea of rationally building a 
consensus through communicative action.509 Habermas argues for a model of 
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1996). 
252 | P a g e  
 
deliberative democracy based on this consensus building. In a deliberative democracy, 
an action or choice is legitimate only if all parties that could be affected by the ruling 
accept it or would accept it in an engagement in rational discourse. Instead, Havel‘s 
agonism does not have the rational goal of Habermas‘ critical theory. That is, Havel is not 
proposing a theory of communicative action where participants in a discourse persuade 
each other rationally of the best political decisions. This is an interesting comparison 
because where Habermas focuses on shared and transparent meaning, Havel is dubious 
about such discourse. Havel instead proposes an alternative political philosophy where 
individuals, in working out their existential projects, create a responsible authentic 
community; they are engaged together in the Sisyphean task of making life incrementally 
better without falling for the illusion that a utopia can be achieved. Hence Havel‘s liberal 
agonism should not be considered as analogous to a deliberative democracy. 
Responsibility is what allows the voice of the other to be heard in politics, and it is in 
being responsible for the other that the individual works out their own existential project. 
What I mean is that in Havel‘s liberal agonism, the individual, in encountering another 
individual, impacts on that other and is therefore responsible in the memory of Being for 
that other.510 That is through self-interrogation, individuals justify to themselves their 
actions towards others. Hence an existentially authentic expression of the self takes 
account of how one behaves towards, or is responsible for, the other. 
Havel‘s liberal agonism would rely on a few social institutions to promote and allow for 
self-interrogation. A healthy and diverse arts culture and a healthy and diverse press 
would be of paramount importance; as would be a focus on education.511 I argue that 
these institutions would need to be strong in a liberal agonism, because the main aim of 
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the state is to create the freedom for its citizens from ideological coercion. Free press 
inform citizens of the actual happenings in their place, and encourage critique of 
practices which engenders a spirit of problematizing the world. Art, as explained in 
Chapter 1, creates the space in which citizens encounter transcendence. That is, art can 
be either a space for personal reflection on one‘s actions, or art can be a vision of an 
idea for transcendence. Art, in a liberal agonist state, is not promoted on ideological 
grounds. That is, all art is equitably promoted, funded, and written about. The ability of 
the art to show something of the human condition, rather than the popularity of the ideal 
which it embodies is what should be considered as the art‘s strength. I have listed 
education as a key focus of liberal agonism because the point of liberal agonism is to 
encourage self-interrogation in order to hold social institutions to account. Self-
interrogation is best served through education. I am not going to spell out a curriculum, 
but it is important to say that the state has a duty to supply a good education to all 
citizens. Havel does not write explicitly on education however I find a useful idea of 
education that fits the model of liberal agonism which I am explaining in the work of the 
Seventeenth Century Czech mystic and thinker on pedagogy J A Comenius. 
Comenius‘ idea of pansophia, or pan-education is that education should be ―for all‖ 
and ―of all in all matters.‖512 Banjamin Kuras describes three elements to pan-education 
in his book Restoring Comenius. These elements fit well, I contend, with the liberal 
agonism of Havel. The first is ―educating fully and to full humanity all people jointly and 
separately.‖513 The second is Educating sensitively and training correctly all men in all 
matters. The third and final element, I take to be the most important. ―In all ways, and 
not in order to show off and deceive but to seek the truth, so that no one can avoid 
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discovering the purpose of their mission in the world.‖514 If we tweak the idea of a 
mission in the world, the third element to pan-education could be rephrased as that all 
education should aim at making people aware of their authentic identities. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to trace the influence of Comenius on Havel‘s thought, such a 
project would be interesting but at least I have already demonstrated that Comenius' 
ideas may be justly used alongside, and to illuminate Havel's. 
Citizens who act as authentic agents, who acknowledge their responsibility to each 
other, are in a better position in this liberal agonistic state to hold social institutions to 
account - to promote change and progress, even though the task might be Sisyphean. 
This state is less likely to exhibit ideological manipulations which would cause citizens to 
self-deceive, or live a lie, and hence this state is a better manifestation of responsibility. 
The next section will further explore the comparison of Havel‘s agonism to Habermas‘ 
discourse ethics which aims at a rational consensus, and to Chantal Mouffe‘s agonism. 
 
 
Liberal Agonism Further Explored 
I want to continue with the brief comparison of Havel‘s liberal agonism to Jurgen 
Habermas critical theory in order to further reveal the uniqueness of Havel‘s position. 
Havel‘s position is spelled out very well by Martin Matuštík in his work Postnational 
Identity; Critical Theory and Existential Philosophy in Habermas, Kierkegaard and Havel. 
I find it interesting that in nearly all scholarship on Havel‘s political thought, there is 
hardly a mention of Matuštík‘s work. It stands as one of the first books on Havel‘s 
political writings and is the most rigorous philosophically; so it is strangely absent in the 
world of scholarship when one considers its success in situating Havel amongst such 
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philosophical heavyweights as Habermas and Kierkegaard. I disagree with Matuštík‘s 
emphasis on deliberative democracy. I remain an advocate of liberalism being the 
position which Havel propounds consistently. However Havel and Habermas both share 
the view that responsible discourse can enrich civic virtues in a time when ideology is 
encouraging a life in lie, (or as Habermas would say, a colonised life-world). As Matuštík 
notes, Havel‘s perspective is existential, whereas Habermas defines communicative 
action in the terms of critical theory. Havel saw his task as politician and intellectual to 
―subject the West, and in fact modern civilization in general, to critical reflections in order 
to cancel out the decadent effects of modernity. 515 This is not deliberative democracy, 
but something different, what I am calling liberal agonism – charging the individual with 
becoming a moral and authentic agent in the political. 
Matuštík argues that Havel‘s philosophy is useful in reconciling the existentially empty 
discourse ethics of Jurgen Habermas and the politically empty existential honesty 
championed by Soren Kierkegaard. Matuštík uses Kierkegaard to explain that there are 
two parts to the creation of a good society: existentially aware citizens and citizens who 
have an idea of exactly what social conditions should constitute a good society. Matuštík 
writes ―What good is storming the bourgeois ―castle in Paris‖ if one does not have a clue 
as to how one is and wants to be?‖516  In order for a good society to exist, both a vision of 
the kind of processes necessary to facilitate the running of society and the allowance of 
existential inquiry are both necessary conditions. Matuštík finds in Havel‘s responsibly 
endowed life-world both conditions for making the good society. I have been arguing that 
Havel‘s responsibility does not entail a shared vision of exactly how institutions should 
behave. Instead, responsibility is a means of judging the behaviour of institutions and 
people‘s actions within them. In other words, Havel argues for a problematizing of the 
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present, rather than subjecting the present to a comparison with an ideal. However, that 
Matuštík finds a union with the non-political politics of Havel and the critical theory of 
Habermas, and the existentialism of Soren Kierkegaard is an interesting point worthy of 
consideration. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to say much about critical theory and 
consequently I don‘t seek to further discuss the claims that Matuštík makes about 
Habermas. Havel does not engage with critical theory himself, and liberal agonism is not 
deliberative democracy, as I have claimed above. The value, for this thesis, in Matuštík‘s 
work is that it helps me further clarify why 'liberal agonism' is the best label to attach to 
Havel‘s work. 
Matuštík shares with Havel the view that the primary role of language is to express 
existential identity, rather than, as Habermas would have it, performing a function of 
carrying meaning to another through discourse in an ideal speech situation where other 
factors that limit the transferring of meaning are avoided.517 The aim of Matuštík‘s work 
is to show how a model of deliberative democracy can be drawn. I have already 
disagreed with this supposition as an interpretation of Havel, but I do want to spell out 
the points of convergence that Matuštík and I share in our analysis of him. Matuštík uses 
Havel to analyse the negative elements of nationalism.518 Matuštík  analyses nationalism 
in Yugoslavia in the early nineteen-nineties, and finds there a process of identity 
formation based on hatred and intense nationalism. This is ideological and dangerous, 
hence the tragedy of the acts that were committed there during the writing of his book 
(1993), and then again in 1998-2001. By invoking Havel‘s critique of identity based on 
hatred (from his paper, ‗Anatomy of a Reticence‘,) Matuštík finds an analogous 
sentiment to Kierkegaard‘s theory of ruling without authority – whether this is done by 
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employing resistance to racial or gender apartheid or in resisting totalitarian regimes.519  
For Matuštík, this is theory to apply to Yugoslavia‘s problems. That a rigorous existential 
inquiry of identity is required of an individual to be moral, is common to both Havel and 
Kierkegaard, and Matuštík, theorising from a late lecture of Habermas and a 
conversation with Habermas about his reading of Kierkegaard, contends that the 
existential critique of the individual and the call for an existential revolution to realise an 
honest identity, combined with the post-national politics of Habermas‘ deliberative 
democracy, is the best way to instil post-national identity and improve deliberative 
democracy.  
 
[Havel] argues for a necessary complement to the procedures of deliberative 
democracy: to resist either a nationalistic or political lie, participants in 
discourse need a high degree of self-critical distance.520  
 
I agree that Havel‘s project requires individuals to achieve a self-critical distance from all 
actions; this is what a responsible action is - one that is self-critical so that its impact on 
others can be evaluated. Also, it is only through this self-critical distance that the evils 
that can come through group identity can be avoided. Havel later supported the 1999 
NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, (something he was much criticised for). I will discuss 
Havel‘s support for the bombings later in the chapter. 
Matuštík points out that a common theme of Havel‘s speeches is self-criticism.521 He 
writes that Havel ―argues that unless one stands guard against insincerity in one‘s own 
house – within individual and group formation – it is naïve to expect checks and 
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balances from democratic procedures alone.‖522 This is a point that fits in with my 
explanation of liberal agonism. For Havel, as Matuštík notes, when one is self-deceived 
into living a lie, one loses sight of one‘s real responsibility to the other. One loses a life in 
truth, which Matuštík calls a ―sincere openness‖,523 as one loses sight of history and 
one‘s place in the flow of history. The fixing of identity that comes with a group identity 
such as nationalism makes one unaware of the shifting nature of identity as Being 
unfolds, as Havel would say, or as history flows, as Matuštík would say. A final point 
about Matuštík‘s work in helping me explain Havel‘s liberal agonism is Matuštík‘s work 
emphasises seeing the world as a problem, or as shaken, and that only through the self-
critique that such a realisation encourages is there hope for a moral politics. Havel‘s 
Liberal Agonism and Chantal Mouffe‘s Agonism 
Seeing the world as a problem (or as shaken, as Patočka, and Havel do), promotes a 
kind of agonistic politics where the political is determined through a clash of wills in a 
public space.524 Hence, in further exploring Václav Havel‘s liberalism it would be 
worthwhile to consider the agonistic political philosophy contained in Chantal Mouffe‘s 
radical democracy. It is my contention that whereas Mouffe sees the individualism of 
liberalism as problematic due her post-structuralist understanding of the constitutive and 
contingent nature of identity, Havel has a different perspective. Havel keeps the liberal 
focus on the individual, whilst promoting the agonism that Mouffe sees as fundamental 
to a healthy democracy.  
Chantal Mouffe describes the importance of a politics that celebrates antagonistic 
struggle. This is because she is an anti-essentialist. She argues that all social norms are 
constructed through power relations. Hence an agonistic politics facilitates the process 
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of norm creation and allows norms to be unfixed and fluid.525 She bases her political 
philosophy on an understanding that identity is composed of what Derrida called its 
‗constitutive outside‘; this means that in every identity the acts of exclusion which govern 
the constitution of that identity are present as a possibility. Because all social norms 
contain their constitutive outside, all identities, for Mouffe, are constructed as 
difference.526 Hence the idea that any individual within a democracy or any type of social 
organisation can claim to constitute the totality of identity (for example claiming that my 
identity is a typically Australian identity), misses the fluid nature of identity as difference. 
For Mouffe, this means that a good political situation is one which, recognising the limits 
of each individual‘s claims to the solidity of their views, focuses instead on the 
possibilities of a vibrant politics through agonism. Hence for Mouffe, what she terms a 
radical democracy is the best kind of society.527 A radical democracy is a democracy 
which focuses on recognising difference rather than aiming at consensus. I have serious 
reservations about the effectiveness of Mouffe‘s agonism, and radical democracy. I 
would like to claim that Havel offers a more responsible version of agonistic politics in his 
liberal agonism. My key question about Mouffe‘s agonism is, where is the normative 
drive of agonism? Identity, in Havel, is what is brought out through agonism; for Mouffe, 
the value   is on the agonism itself. 
In her book, The Return of the Political, Mouffe defends a feminist philosophy that is 
non-essentialist.528 Arguing against feminists who claim that an essential female identity 
is a necessary condition of a feminist politics, Mouffe argues that essentialism is unable 
to articulate a politics which would give voice to oppressed social groups.529 For Mouffe, 
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it is when the view of a human subject as a rational agent with coherent views and 
positions is rejected, and when the view that the human subject can appear to itself and 
hence know itself is also rejected, and only when these ideas are discarded, that it is 
possible to ―theorize the multiplicity of the relations of subordination.‖530 Mouffe is 
building on many of the currents in psychoanalysis, post-structuralism and 
deconstruction and she uses examples from each of these areas to demonstrate how her 
non-essentialist reading of identity is the right one.531 Her project is of a radical 
democracy, where equality and liberty for all ―identities‖ creates a condition of agonism. 
In this condition the hegemonic struggles that create those identities (and multiple 
identities that exist simultaneously), are exhibited and then overcome. For Mouffe this is 
the only politics which escapes the dangers of group identity formation which always is 
based on an act of exclusion. Hence, looking for the essential ‗woman‘ sets up the 
conditions for ‗woman‘ to be fundamentally opposed to man. This politics becomes a 
gendered issue. Mouffe sees identity in a very different way from Havel. According to 
Havel, fixing identity with some large ‗meta‘ group such as ‗man‘ or ‗Czech‘ is 
problematic, as it is for Mouffe. For Havel, however, the search for identity is to reveal 
individual identity, rather than social identity. Havel‘s existential and phenomenological 
background informs a view of identity which is very different from Mouffe‘s. What they 
share is the view that agonism reveals the extent to which hegemonic forces have 
constructed the view of one‘s identity. However, in Havel, this recognition is followed by a 
move towards the individual‘s existentially authentic identity; this is an identity that 
Mouffe would reject. Equality and liberty, in liberal agonism, allow individuals to give 
expression to their own identity, so that they don‘t get caught up in the detrimental and 
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261 | P a g e  
 
sometimes violent identity politics of group identity. This is the lesson of Havel‘s views on 
discourse outlined in Chapter 6, and it is these views which inform his liberal agonism. 
Mouffe is highly critical of liberalism, wheras Havel, as I claim is a liberal; therefore it is 
necessary to explore Mouffe‘s criticism of liberalism in her agonism if one is to defend 
Havel from her criticisms. The argument that I want to develop, is that whereas Mouffe 
sees the shortcomings of liberal democracy as stemming from its failure to deal with the 
criticisms of democracy made by Carl Schmitt. Schmitt argues that that democracy is 
founded on an act of constituting the demos as an us and excluding those who are not in 
the demos. Havel‘s politics is concerned with a broadening of political horizons to make 
less clear the distinction between them and us. 532 Hence Havel, I contend, is able to hold 
on to his liberal position and promote a politics of agonism. 
As Mouffe puts it, liberalism‘s faith in state neutrality is misplaced because by nature, 
identity is inessential and not neutral. She agrees with Schmitt that democracy is 
founded on a substantive conception of equality; that is, there is some more tangible 
concept of what it is that unites citizens and that citizens share in. This is opposed to 
liberalism‘s individualist promotion of a concept of general humanity which is applied to 
all people. Hence there is a paradox inherent in liberal democracy. On the one hand 
democracy works as a homogenizing force that unites citizens through a shared and 
substantive conception of identity. Then there is the individualism of liberalism, which is 
essentially incompatible with democracy because liberalism fails to distinguish just who 
exactly is ‗in‘ the demos and who is ‗outside‘ of the demos. The idea of basing democracy 
on a general notion of ‗mankind‘ is doomed to instability and failure. Alternatively Schmitt 
predicted, it is doomed to shift inequalities and acts of exclusion to other spheres of 
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human life such as economics.533 In other words, liberalism destroys the political if it 
tries to illuminate the constitutive acts of exclusion which go into identity formation. 
Mouffe does not follow Schmitt through to his rejection of democracy. Rather she sees 
the antagonistic process of exclusion as the possibility of a kind of renewal. A political 
process which encourages these acts of exclusion and does not fix them as a set of 
norms, encourages a continual agonism which adds a political richness to social identity.  
I have deliberately used the word 'renewal' to describe the result of Mouffe‘s agonism, 
(although it is not a word that Mouffe herself uses,) in order to demonstrate the different 
view that Havel maintains. It fits into the Husserlian, Patočkean and Havelean schema as 
a part of living in truth and care for the soul –  that the project of caring for one‘s soul or 
living in truth is a process of constant renewal. It is within this schema of living in truth 
that constitutes a key difference from Mouffe‘s position. Essentially for Havel identity is 
not thought of as difference. For Havel, agonism reveals the extent to which one‘s identity 
is formed by struggles with hegemony. That does not mean, however, that one‘s identity 
is totally formed by hegemonic relations, as it is in Mouffe. Havel remains a philosopher 
of authenticity; he believes whole heartedly in an authentic character which can be 
revealed through a life of resistance and self-critique. Abstract and general notions of 
human rights and individual sovereignty are extremely important to Havel and the risks of 
instability which Mouffe points out are not, to Havel, the obstacles which Mouffe finds 
them to be. 
My argument is that the existential nature of a life in truth is an essentialist 
understanding of identity, and that consequently Havel‘s liberal agonism is a radical 
individualism, where the political is the place in which individuals discover their authentic 
natures. To phrase Havel Socratically, the continual questioning of the given does not 
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reveal that the thing in itself does not exist, or that is only a contingency formed from 
hegemony. Rather, the continual questioning of the given reveals the responsibility that 
the individual had for pointing out the extent to which the perception of the given is 
formed by hegemony. Consider the following from Letters to Olga: 
 
Evidently there exists an experience in which the longing of separated Being 
for remerging with the integrity of Being is satisfied, as it were, in the most 
mature and complete manner. That experience is typically and most 
profoundly human: it is the experience of meaning, and of meaningfulness. 
The need for meaning and the search for it... accompany the human ―I‖ from 
its beginning right through to its end.534 
 
For Havel, meaningfulness is an experience particular to the self. Meaning is essential in 
the self. This does not necessarily mean that meaning, once grasped becomes fixed and 
static in a person, remaining through all of a person‘s actions; rather, as explained in 
Chapter 4, there are moments in life of real meaning, of authentic good faith, which give 
the self an elated feeling of wonder, or, simply of being satisfied in a particular situation. 
Phenomenological investigations into one‘s actions in the life-world can bring that 
meaning to an I, and in fact Havel, in a very phenomenological move claims that these 
searches for meaning might constitute the I.535 In describing the I, or as Mouffe might 
say, identity, Havel writes that the I is  
 
... something more than the vigorous effort of the mind to grasp Being by 
perceiving and throwing light on it; these intentions are, of course, present in 
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the ―I,‖ but they do not explain it entirely: it transcends them – by virtue, for 
example, of how it contains them within itself, mutually increases their 
strength and consummates them: paradoxically, the ―I‖ seeks fullness of 
participation, but an alert participation, one that already knows of itself; it 
seeks a totality of merging, but a totality – so to speak – that is fully aware of 
its own unrealizability.536 
 
The questioning is not all of the I, the questioning that the I engages in as a part of an 
agonistic act is to reveal what the self apparently already knows - its participation in 
Being. What the I seeks is responsibility, or an awareness of its participation in the world. 
Again, Havel points out that the totality that the I is looking for might perhaps be 
unattainable. 
In liberal agonism there is emphasis on individual responsibility which is not to be 
found in Mouffe‘s political philosophy. It seems to me that Mouffe‘s central concern is 
that minorities have a voice in the antagonisms of politics. I agree with her that this is 
important, but having a voice does not necessarily translate to having a responsible 
voice. For Havel, being responsible for the world involves a self‘s understanding of their 
role and complicity in making the world situation.537 So in the next section we must 
analyse Havel‘s concept of responsibility. It will emerge that a liberal conception of the 
self is required in order to understand Havel‘s sense of responsibility.  
Havel’s Responsibility and the Liberal Conception of the Self 
An interesting theoretical perspective on Havel‘s idea of responsibility can be found by 
using Patočka‘s project of asubjective phenomenology. This has left some traces in 
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Havel‘s thought which I want to explore. The argument that I will spell out in this section 
is that a close reading of Jan Patočka‘s asubjective phenomenology, can help explain why 
Havel‘s political philosophy of living responsibly in truth is necessarily liberal.   
Ivan Chvatik argued that Patočka‘s phenomenological project is, against Husserl‘s, an 
asubjective phenomenology.538 It is my contention that the understanding of 
consciousness in Patočka‘s phenomenology can shed light on Havel‘s own conception of 
identity and consciousness. This further supports a critique of Chantal Mouffe‘s position 
of anti-essential identity elaborated in the above section. Patočka‘s position, as 
explained by Chvatik, is similar to Plato‘s thought in the Theaetetus. Chvatik writes, 
 
So we can say that Protagoras‘ thesis is valid in its original form. By his soul, 
man is indeed the measure of all things; he ―decides‖ by an act of his soul 
whether things exist or not. His decisions are, of course, not arbitrary. This is 
where dialectic – the Socratic art of discussion – comes into play. In this 
discussion, we reflect upon the past and present in relation to the future 
(186A), distinguishing cause and effect, etc.; we examine ―in the process of 
reasoning‖ (186D) what comes to mind by itself along with other bodily 
sensations, and only ―with difficulty and slowly, through many troubles, if at 
all‖ (186 C) do we succeed in eliminating contradiction (186 B) and acquiring 
the insight that all parts of our discourse are truly in agreement, fit and match 
one another. Only then can we call our discourse a definition and rightly 
believe that we possess knowledge. 
I would say that Plato thematizes here, in his own way, the problem of 
appearance as such, and that the solution he proposes is similar to 
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Patočka‘s: the accomplishments of the soul are invisible, since, when all is 
said and done, they take place in the very object they identify; despite this, 
their existence cannot be denied, just as Patočka grants the empty ego cogito 
an indubitable existence and joins in Heidegger‘s quest of what this existence 
amounts to.539  
 
The soul remains invisible to experience in its search for the meaning of appearances. 
The soul is no contingent lived experience.540 The soul is caught in a double world: ―the 
naturally given environment and in a world created for [us] by modern natural 
science‖.541 As Havel claims in the section quoted above, the positioning between these 
two worlds is what gives the ―I‖ its unique identity. Its ability to problematize the world 
reveals the extent to which contingency and hegemony contribute to appearance; but for 
Patočka and Havel, the I is still separate to this contingency and hegemony. There is still 
an I for the world to appear to and for whom a formalism can shape appearance. The I is 
something more than its reflections of lived experiences. It is historical, which Mouffe 
would grant, but it is also more than that. It is also free to ―eliminate contradiction‖ 
through seeking a ―merging‖ with the natural world which is the apriori ―horizon of all 
horizons.‖542  The I is that which problematizes appearance and aims at meaning, aware 
that meaning might not be realizable. But this does not mean that meaning is relative or 
does not exist.543 Also, as previously claimed, the I is revealed in the search for it. 544 In 
other words we could say that the I is revealed in the movement towards itself.  
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From a Havelian perspective, a conception of the I as anti-essentialist, (such as that 
propounded by Mouffe,) is lacking in responsibility. It is alienated from the ―I‖ in that 
Mouffe argues that the I is only an amalgam of lived experiences. Havel, in Letters to 
Olga, writes about a time when he was first imprisoned and had written a letter which 
was ―very close‖ to what the authorities interrogating him wanted to hear. He feels 
somewhat guilty at having given in to the regime so he embarks on a search within his 
self to explain why he acted that way. For Havel it is a mistake to blame outside forces 
for the action. There is some internal, a priori I which is separate to the outside world and 
which uses the outside world of appearance as a means of forgetting guilt. In other 
words it uses the outside world of appearances as a means of living a lie. The real 
responsibility lies within Havel; he writes: 
 
Today, the hidden motives behind this attempt are clear to me: accepting full 
responsibility for one‘s own failure is extraordinarily difficult, from the point of 
view of the ―interests of our existence-in-the-world,‖ and frequently it is 
virtually unbearable and impossible, and if one wants to live even slightly 
―normally‖ – i.e., exist in the world (guided by the so-called instinct for self 
preservation) – one is irresistibly driven to ease the situation by dividing the 
self, turning the matter into an unfortunate ―misunderstanding‖: those 
entirely warranted approaches cannot possibly be addressed to me, but to 
the other, who has been mistakenly identified with me. Obviously if one stuck 
complacently to this approach, it would lead to the disintegration of one‘s own 
identity. For it is only by assuming full responsibility here for one‘s own 
elsewhere, only by assuming full responsibility today for one‘ own yesterday, 
                                                                                                                                                        
544 See Chapter  4. Previsouly I explained asubjective phenomenology to promote a view of human rights that 
establishes a right as the property of the subject whose existence is a questioning movement. Movement in the 
sense of continually reinterpreting the world and realizing the possibilities inherent in the world. 
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only by this unqualified assumption of responsibility by the ―I‖ for itself and for 
everything it ever was and did, does the ―I‖ achieve continuity and thus 
identity with the self.545 
 
I think that Havel would argue that Mouffe‘s agonism gives in to the irresistible drive to 
divide the self and identify the I with the outside forces that the I engages with. That is, I 
am not the person who makes a decision, but the sum total of the coercions which make 
the decision for me. The historical contingency of the self is not denied by Havel; he 
Havel is celebrating the I‘s ability to take ownership for its actions. For this kind of 
responsibility an essential I is required. To identify with hegemony is to identify with a lie. 
The I is able to transcend power struggles, and through an agonistic engagement with 
itself, authentically to identify with its actions. Havel goes on to claim that to deny this 
ability of the I to be responsible for its actions is to ―narrow and weaken the control of 
one‘s ―I‖ over one‘s actions.‖546 This can only be understood as a turning away from 
Being in which one would ―disintegrate into fragmentary, isolated, self-enclosed events, 
interests and aims that lack any transcendence beyond one‘s ―existence-in-the-
world‖‖.547 
Implicit in this recognition of, (and transcendence of,) contingency is an understanding 
of a general and universal human condition that requires liberty and state-neutrality to 
better enable a search for authenticity. Only living in truth renews a sense ―of sovereignty 
over [one‘s] own affairs, to a radically new insight into the mysterious gravity of my 
existence as an uncertain enterprise and to its transcendental meaning.‖548 The free 
individual, situated in the world, is the normative basis for responsibility. Mouffe‘s and 
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Schmitt‘s criticism of liberalism, that the general conception of mankind is no basis for a 
solid unified state, still needs to be addressed. The free individual who, through 
existential inquiry aims at authenticity, is still, Havel recognises, situated in a political 
reality and through their actions form that political reality. Hence, it is necessary for me to 
defend this Havelian liberal conception of self from Mouffe‘s and Schmitt‘s criticism. 
In the perspective of liberal agonism there are necessary social conditions which must 
be met to promote self-agonism. Both Havel‘s understanding of the self and his politics 
of self agonism, require liberal institutions. As Seyla Benhabib notes, ―Agonistic visions of 
the political are often inattentive to the institutional preconditions which must be fulfilled 
for such politics to unfold.‖549 I agree with Benhabib. Mouffe has a tendency to argue for 
a complete transformation of politics to allow non-essentialist identity to be discovered 
through agonism. Havel‘s politics on the other hand, which aims to allow the conditions 
for self agonism. This necessitates a liberal political situation, and as citizens note their 
complicity in the institutions they engage with on a daily basis, they can realise their 
responsibility through a concrete understanding of their relation to (and their impact on) 
the other and the world. 
Havel’s Post-nationalism 
The argument that I draw out in this section is that Schmitt is incorrect in his criticism 
of liberalism and democracy‘s failure to properly constitute a state, and that Mouffe is 
equally mistaken in her insistence that a state based on an abstract notion of a universal 
humanity suffers from an improper understanding of the contingent nature of identity. I 
want to agree with part of Matuštík‘s analysis of Havel as a post-national thinker. 
Matuštík makes an excellent point in his analysis of Havel when he writes that in 
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analysing some of the problems in politics today, ―we need to invite the movements of 
resistance into our daily affairs.‖550 Matuštík also writes that only in acknowledging the 
groundlessness of all identity formation is there hope for politics.551 I think this is too 
extreme. As already claimed in this thesis, Havel effectively defends a self that has an 
identity. Instead I think it would be better to say that only by incorporating into political 
discourse the voice of individuals who have achieved a self-critical distance, is the 
chance of a moral political state possible. 
In the final section of Disturbing the Peace, Havel is asked about hope in the eighties. 
His response is a defence of actions of sacrifice, and a promotion of the value of 
individuality. Havel seems to be saying something similar, as a point made by Mill, that 
society is better when there are more eccentrics.552 Havel‘s point is that society is richer 
when individuals pursue their own worked out versions of the good life and find authentic 
expression through them. He is asked by the interviewer about problems of Czech 
identity and an antagonism between Czech and worldly ideals. Havel rejects outright that 
a unified Czech identity is a problem for him. He takes his Czechness for granted - almost 
as a given and not necessarily a political concern. Instead, he argues that politicals 
involves larger matters such as how to deal with one‘s life and sort out ―human, 
existential, moral and civic‖ concerns.553  Summing up his position he claims, ―I‘m not 
saying [the Czech question] doesn‘t exist. I would only recommend that we not treat it 
like a universal coatrack on which to hang all of life‘s unpleasantness.‖554 
This is not a point that Schmitt would agree with. For Schmitt, and for Mouffe, a 
society based on abstract political equality shifts the inequalities to other spheres of life 
                                                 
550 Matuštík Postnationalism, 258 
551 Ibid. 
552 Mill, “On Liberty,” 73.  
553 Havel, Disturbing the Peace, 178-179. 
554 Ibid 180. 
271 | P a g e  
 
such as economics. The current ideological dominance of neoliberalism, Mouffe argues, 
might be due to the factors Schmitt‘s identifies. Mouffe argues that Schmitt needs to be 
taken seriously; she is concerned that without grounding the subject in a pluralistic and 
decentred, or deconstructed demos, individuals,  
 
would be left, at best, with their liberal rights of appealing to defend their 
individual rights when these have been violated. In all probability, such a 
cosmopolitan democracy, if it were ever to be realised, would be no more 
than an empty name disguising the actual disappearance of democratic 
forms of government and indicating the triumph of the liberal form of 
governmental rationality.555  
 
Using Havel‘s perspective to respond to this, we might say that as long as that liberal 
form of governmental rationality was aware of avoiding Schmitt‘s predictions of economic 
(or some other kind of reductionism,)  there is actually nothing wrong with this. Take 
Havel‘s response to the war in Yugoslavia as an example - something he was heavily 
criticised for. Havel urged NATO to bomb Serbia, and Serbian positions in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina.556 His decision was based more on a liberal cosmopolitan vision of politics 
than on any democratic conception. For Havel, that individuals were being massacred 
was independent of any Schmittian explanation of identity. There is only one way to 
understand that judgement. Havel proposed a transnational solution. He felt that every 
nation was bound by duty - was responsible for protecting the lives of those being 
massacred. Hence he proposed a military intervention that did not respect a Serbian 
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position. For Havel it was irrational to defend the massacre of Croatians. In his 1985 
paper ‗Anatomy of a Reticence‘, Havel writes, ―the fundamental lesson of experience, 
that one must not tolerate violence in silence in the hope that it will simply run its course, 
retains its validity.‖557 National sovereignty comes second to a liberal conception of the 
self, and Havel argues that when liberal values are being oppressed or violently dealt 
with, there is a responsibility for other nations to get involved.558 He said of the bombing, 
―I believe that during the intervention of NATO in Kosovo there is an element nobody can 
question: the air attacks, the bombs, are not caused by a material interest. Their 
character is exclusively humanitarian: What is at stake here are the principles, human 
rights which have priority above state sovereignty. This makes it legitimate to attack the 
Yugoslav Federation, although without the United Nations mandate.‖559 Havel‘s 
understanding of identity is therefore a post-national understanding of identity. 
Havel‘s thoughts on hope help shed light on his post nationalism. 
 
The kind of hope I often think about… I understand above all as a state of 
mind, not a state of the world… Hope is not a prognostication. It is an 
orientation of the spirit, an orientation of the heart; it transcends the world 
that is immediately experienced, and is anchored somewhere beyond its 
horizons.560 
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I think it would be safe to say that hope, for Havel, is the awareness of the possibility of 
renewal or transcendence. Havel goes on to say that it is hope that gives the inspiration 
to continually try new things. I am again reminded of Mill‘s sentiment that no human 
knowledge can ever grasp completely the good life; hence it is important for individuals 
to be encouraged to look for the good life themselves, because each individual knows 
their own good better than anyone else.561 Havel consistently argues that ideologies are 
driven by what in Disturbing the Peace is called ―self-momentum‖. No individuals are 
driving ideology. Instead, the sum total of people‘s actions supporting or complying with 
the ideology are what create the momentum of the ideology.562 The momentum of 
ideology is only halted through individuals living in truth. Havel writes that in the eighties, 
he sees hope in action with many individuals acting out their own version of authentic 
expression, whether it be literary, musical, religious or through some other medium. For 
Havel, each of these expressions, although not always overtly dissident, has an effect of 
changing the world in which they live.563 Even if that change is not immediate, nor 
obviously effective, it is still perceptible. For Havel, this is because social norms are 
made from the bottom up rather than from high power structures issuing edicts. The 
actions of ordinary citizens, the non-political actions, make the political situation. Hence 
the position I read Havel as maintaining is that politics is a place for individuals to 
practice authenticity and realise hope. It ought not create a structure which coerces a 
certain kind of identification and a formalistic identity.  
This is necessarily a post-national position because the kind of identifications which 
are made by the demos as collective, and which are not based on general conceptions 
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on the liberty and equality of individuals, are as problematic as they are exclusive. 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (in The War has Taken Place,) writes that freedom is not 
practiced alone, that freedom necessarily entails the freedom of others.564 In this essay 
he is making a point about Marxism as a solution to the post-war situation in Europe, but 
there are insights which are helpful for understanding Havel‘s position as I am 
elaborating it. There is a tendency in consciousness, for Merleau-Ponty, to alienate other 
consciousnesses. Creeds like anti-Semitism when promoted in a demos, become a 
means of transforming other consciousnesses into less than human types. This can be 
used as a criticism of Schmitt‘s position. The demos, if given a nation to identify with, can 
view other nations as less than themselves, which is a harmful position.  We have seen 
that although Havel does not want to do away with national borders and national 
identities, he still wants to see a great power shifted to trans-national institutions like 
NATO, the EU, and the UN, who have a military power to protect a liberal conception of 
the individual. Havel addresses Merleau-Ponty‘s concerns, and insists that the practice 
of one‘s freedom entails a responsibility for the freedom of others. A liberal agonistic 
state is a state which avoids the problems of poisonous group identities through the 
promotion of individual responsibility. 
 Conclusion 
I have claimed that although never explicit about a systematic political philosophy, 
Havel still promotes certain ideas and values throughout his career and that through an 
examination of the continuous threads a political philosophy does reveal itself - what I 
have called a philosophy of liberal agonism. Hence, this chapter has attempted to sketch 
out an argument for liberal agonism. Havel‘s focus on the importance of individual 
responsibility that is entailed in his notion of non-political politics, I have argued, requires 
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a liberal state that respects and promotes the individual‘s self-expression of an 
existential identity and that encourages a self-critique of that identity. When expression 
and critique are combined, the conditions for responsible living are met. The good society 
is one which manifests responsibility. In order to make the position of liberal agonism 
clearer, I have compared my sketch of liberal agonism to Habermas‘ deliberative 
democracy, arguing that Havel‘s mistrust of discourse that is not expressed from an 
existentially authentic position, (spelled out in Chapter 6,) means that Havel does not 
share Habermas‘ concern with the communicative act and consensus building. The idea 
of a rational consensus that Habermas promotes might be an unrealistic goal. Havel‘s 
emphasis on existential honesty, in liberal agonism, is a different way to think about 
political discourse. I have also explored the agonism of Chantal Mouffe, arguing that 
Havel‘s conception of identity allows a vastly different politics than Mouffe‘s who argues 
the self is always constituted by hegemonic struggles.  Finally, in this chapter I claimed 
that Havel‘s politics is best conceived as a post-national politics because, for him, 
responsibility to the other is not limited by one‘s national identity. 
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Conclusion 
What I Have Argued 
This thesis has rested on a denial of Havel‘s own claim that there is no coherence to 
his thought and that he offers no philosophical position. Indeed, I have denied Havel‘s 
own denial that he is even a philosopher. I find Havel to be an exponent of a remarkably 
responsible and moral political philosophy and so I have traced out just what that 
political philosophy is and what influences on Havel have helped shape that philosophy. 
The first chapter of the thesis explored the influence of Heidegger on Havel. This is 
because a large body of scholarship treating Havel‘s thought lists him as the most 
important influence. The two book length studies by James Pontusso and James Sire 
both cite Havel as a Heideggerian thinker and a book length study and article by Aviezer 
Tucker looks at Heideggerian elements as well. I argued that Havel‘s philosophy can be 
considered as a meaningful move beyond Heidegger in addressing the problems of 
modernity that both Heidegger and Havel identify. Both thinkers are concerned with the 
technologisation of thought and the resulting loss of authenticity; however, I have argued 
that it is Havel who has formulated the more meaningful address to this predicament. In 
comparing Havel‘s and Heidegger‘s thoughts on the political significance of art I 
elaborated a philosophy of transcendence in Havel which is absent in Heidegger. 
Heidegger‘s thought aims at Being, and for Heidegger art aims at Being as well. For 
Havel, art has a political significance which opens the political up to transcendence. 
Hence art that highlights the detrimental nature of thinking as techne opens a space up 
in the thought of the consumer of art for a meaningful self-critique which creates the 
impetus for a shift from a life in a lie to a life in truth. 
Another repeated accusation levelled at Havel is that he is a religious thinker and so 
my second chapter explored the presence of religion in Havel‘s work. Ultimately, I 
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rejected the claim that Havel can be called a religious thinker. He is close, on a number 
of occasions, to professing a belief in a deity; however it is equally plausible that Havel is 
using religion as a symbol, and this is the better interpretation. This is the interpretation I 
adopt as I think that a life in truth is not informed by religious conviction and is instead 
an existential idea. Havel uses religious phrases to talk about responsibility. He is trying 
to describe the responsibility that each person has to the other and to the world in that 
all actions that influence phenomena within the horizon of being. In that sense a life in 
truth is an existential concept rather than a religious one. The chapter concluded with an 
exploration of how Havel‘s political thought can be applied without the metaphysical 
ground that a religious interpretation of Havel would necessitate. 
The third and fourth chapters built on the analysis of Havel‘s thought made by Edward 
Findlay in his paper ‗Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique; Political philosophy in 
Václav Havel and Jan Patočka‘. I have disagreed in the main with Findlay‘s thoughts on 
Havel. For Findlay, Havel‘s writings reflect the philosophy of Patočka and Czech 
dissidence in general without offering a cohesive line of argumentation.565 Findlay is right 
in that Havel does reflect a lot of the themes of Patočka‘s work and so my second and 
third chapter explored that influence.566 Unlike Findlay, however, my aim was to spell out 
how Havel appropriates the themes of Patočka‘s work while offering his own unique 
ideas at the same time. That is, I demonstrated how there is a unique Havel and not just 
a Patočkean Havel. The focus on concrete political matters in Havel‘s writings is a move 
past Patočka, whose rigorous adherence to considering problems in phenomenology is 
only brought into politics in the last essay of his Heretical Essays and in his involvement 
in Charter 77. Havel, on the other hand, uses the phenomenology of Patočka as a launch 
pad into the concrete world of the political, aiming at real change. With that in mind I 
                                                 
565 Findlay  “classical Ethics,” 404. 
566 Ibid. 
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explored similarities in Havel‘s writings to those of Hannah Arendt, whose concern with 
concrete political events is matched by Havel. Another important theme of my discussion 
of Havel appropriation of Patočka was the echoing of Patočka‘s engagement with the 
philosophy of Plato.  I explored Patočka‘s interpretation of Plato‘s cave allegory to show 
how, for Havel, seeing the world as problematicity is an activity that is performed inside 
the cave, or in the world we are thrown into. This is a key idea for Havel as it shows how 
his politics works without having to supply a utopia. That is, the world can be revealed as 
a problem, and one can create transcendence without having a clear understanding 
about the goal of that transcendence. A key feature of Chapter 4 was an exploration and 
comparison of Patočka‘s idea of the community of the shaken and Havel‘s power of the 
powerless. Both Patočka and Havel celebrate the importance of the sacrifice made by 
dissidents. Patočka‘s shaken choose not to live rather than live without the good and 
Havel‘s powerless risk their comfort for the sake of the good.  The concept has different 
names and in Havel it is more focused within a philosophy of dissidence; however, the 
influence is obvious. 
The fifth chapter of this thesis explored in greater detail Havel‘s idea of living in truth. 
The essential point of the chapter was that this is a concept best conceived as an 
existential idea (building on the claims of Chapter 2). I entered Havel into a meaningful 
discourse with Sartre by comparing living a lie to Sartre‘s concept of Bad faith. The 
ultimate aim was to show the depth to Havel‘s analysis of self-deception in an ideology 
driven political situation. The Sartre of Being and Nothingness writes that bad faith is a 
way of dealing with anguish. I argued that Havel‘s analysis of self-deception is not 
grounded in an existential anguish at the ultimate meaninglessness of existence, but is 
instead grounded in real concrete political situations. Havel never loses sight of morality, 
and hence living a lie and living in truth are always moral attitudes of the self. I argued 
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that this is a meaningful address to Sartre‘s anguish as, for Havel, the experience of 
being is really one of elation. 
I continued the theme of presenting Havel as an existential thinker by exploring a 
concern for meaningful discourse in his writing. For Havel, discourse expresses an 
existential identity and he is concerned about the way that identity is lost in a 
technologized world and in an ideological world that reduces utterances to clichés. In his 
plays, essays, speeches  and letters throughout his career, Havel argues for  a restoration 
of meaningful discourse.The loss of identity by the character Hugo Pludek, as he enters 
the world of work and adopts it language in The Garden Party, the loss of the moral 
dimension of the word ‗peace‘ in ‗A Word About Words‘, the description of the 
greengrocer‘s loss of integrity by placing the unwanted placard: all of these examples 
show a deep concern with ensuring that our actions and discourse match up with 
existentially authentic identities that we have worked out through rigorous self-
interrogation. 
The focus on the self as the locus of a moral state led me to explore a liberal inflection 
in Havel‘s works. In turn, that led me to the conclusion that Havel does in fact espouse a 
liberal political philosophy. Throughout his involvement in Charter 77, the Civic Forum, his 
presidency and his career in drama, Havel holds the view that the individual should be 
free from state or ideological coercion. For Havel, politics is not a question of fairly 
dealing out social goods, but of how individuals are responsible to a higher horizon of 
Being. Havel does echo many of the sentiments of classical liberals and my chapter 
explored them through in the work of John Stuart Mill. Ultimately, Havel‘s difference from 
Mill is to be found in Mill‘s idea of the harm principle. Havel thinks that an individual 
should be free from the state only in so far as the state would encroach upon the 
individual‘s expression of their existential projects. 
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I argued that Havel‘s liberalism is a political philosophy aimed at rescuing modernity 
from the pitfalls of scientism and ideology. The aim of his political philosophy is the 
liberation of the self to perform a self-interrogation to more authentically manifest 
responsibility; hence I called Havel‘s liberalism, ‗liberal agonism‘. 
Chapter 8 explored further the notion of a liberal agonism, claiming that its essential 
feature  is an agonism with the self. I situated this as having a loose relationship to 
Patočka‘s project of asubjective phenomenology as, for Patočka, the self is not the 
subject of a transcendental reduction but rather, is revealed in the polemical search for 
the self. Similarly for Havel, self-interrogation reveals one‘s responsibility to the world and 
to the other. Hence, a politics which encourages self-agonism is the most preferable kind 
of politics. A liberal state which encourages and creates the conditions for a self-
interrogation, can create citizens who would hold institutions to account because they 
are aware of their complicity in the actions of those institutions. A key feature of liberal 
agonism is that agonism within the state does not aim at rational consensus as it does in 
the model of deliberative democracy put forward by Jurgen Habermas. Instead, Havel 
likens the task of politics to Sisyphus, forever critiquing, never settling. This is in line with 
the Platonic element of Havel‘s thought outlined in Chapter 3. Finally the chapter outlined 
how Havel‘s liberal agonism is best understood as a contribution to post-national politics. 
For Havel the moral outweighs the national and existential identities are not tied to a 
specific national identity. A real understanding of history and a responsibility for history 
recognises the fluidity of nations and hence any attempt to fix national identity is creating 
an ideological shelter which forces a life in a lie. 
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The Significance of Liberal Agonism 
I think that the outline for a liberal agonism that I spelled out in the last chapter of this 
thesis is a meaningful answer to some of the problems confronting the present moment 
politically. The entire aim of this thesis is to derive a coherent political philosophy out of 
Havel‘s many writings and apparent contradictions, and I did this by describing a liberal 
agonism. To conclude the thesis I want to suggest in what areas a philosophy of liberal 
agonism might be appropriate for further study in the contemporary political climate. 
Politics today is in a deeply troubled state, and it was my original reading of Havel that 
opened up to me the possibility of a theoretical rescue without having to argue for a 
complete transformation of the human subject. The ideology of neo-liberalism, which 
arguably is responsible for many of the economic predicaments that the world finds itself 
in, is also a world phenomenon that is undermining the political sphere. I think we would 
benefit from having Havel‘s thought included in the debate over the neoliberal ideology's 
role in politics. One of the main problems of the neoliberal ideology infecting politics is 
the increase in authoritarian legislation aimed at protecting liberties. The breakdown in 
meaningful communication especially surrounding the words ‗freedom‘ and ‗security‘ is 
ripe for Havel‘s contribution.567  I also think that current discussions about what the 
Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls the state of exception, and the rising loss of 
liberties in the western world in the name of protecting liberties, is of special cause for 
concern. Havel‘s liberal agonism could contribute something useful to the debate around 
this phenomenon. I will briefly elaborate on these two main areas in which Havel‘s liberal 
agonism would be well placed as a voice of dissent. 
                                                 
567 Mary Zournazi has written an illuminating little book Keywords to War in which she demonstrates her 
concern for the abuse on meaningful discourse perpetrated by politicians and the media in the war on terror. I 
mention this book because I think it is quite Havelian in scope. Zournazi‟s method is to point out how a 
particular word, such as freedom, is being abused and then to give an etymology of the word demonstrating its 
use in political and philosophical discourse over the course of western history. 
See Mary Zournazi, Keywords to War; Reviving Language in an Age of Terror, (Melbourne: Scribe, 2007). 
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Schmitt argued that a society based on an abstract non-substantive type of equality 
would relegate inequalities to other spheres of human activity and hence relegate politics 
to those spheres. For the last few decades, up until the recent collapse of world markets 
in 2008, Schmitt‘s argument seems prophetic. Neo-liberalism - or the view that free 
economic markets are the best institutions for regulating free behaviour – is a deeply 
problematic political ideology, and Havel‘s liberal agonism is a great perspective from 
which to critique this view. Havel‘s liberal agonism criticises the reduction of human 
behaviour to economic analysis, and avoids the pitfalls of Schmitt‘s criticism of general 
concepts such as ‗the good of man.‘ As Kymlicka points out, there are some thinkers who 
argue that the market can be a school in civic virtue.568 Lawrence Mead, for example, 
claims that the political ideal is a society in which everyone contributes; hence, 
unemployed individuals who chose not to work should have no entitlements to 
encourage participation and contribution.569 There is a clear reduction of politics to 
economics in Mead‘s analysis. The only social contribution an individual can make, in 
Mead‘s outlook, is an economic one. 
Hence, it is my view that neoliberalism is an ideology rather than a philosophy. It does 
not describe truthfully the human condition, and prescribes a society which needs to be 
buttressed by sometimes oppressive social institutions. In his 1963 essay The Great 
Ascent, Robert Heilbroner talks about the necessity of economic development and the 
subsequent struggle that will ensue with the denationalising of developed nations. 
Heilbroner writes that ―the price of development is apt to be political and economic 
authoritarianism.‖570 For Heilbroner, state intervention is not required to maintain levels 
                                                 
568 Kymlicka Contemporary Political Philosophy, 304 
569 Lawrence Mead, Beyond Entitlements; The Social Obligations of Citizenship (New York: Free Press, 1986), 
219-220. 
570 Robert Heilbroner, The Great Ascent; The Struggle for Economic Development in Our Time, (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1963), 20. 
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of social morality; instead it is required to force economic progress on citizens who might 
be frustrated by a lack of progress and hence might require military intervention to keep 
them under control .571 One of the hallmarks of neo-liberalism is its faith in the 
impropriety of governments to intervene in social affairs because their intervention in a 
market is a hindrance to productivity. This is a key argument of Hayek‘s The Road to 
Serfdom, which argues that Government intervention in an economy puts society on the 
path to becoming socialist and totalitarian; this is also a key argument in Milton 
Friedman‘s Capitalism and Freedom, which argues that a free market economy is 
necessarily politically free and democratic.572 I think that Heilbroner‘s prediction that 
infact (contra Friedman) the business of deregulating economies is likely to go hand in 
hand with increasing political authoritarianism and the development of regimes of social 
control is well worth considering.  The ideology of neo-liberalism uses the rhetoric of 
freedom and the reduction of state intervention in economic matters to pave the way for 
a new form of political authoritarianism. 
In describing the neo-liberal agenda, Henry Giroux writes:  
 
neo-liberalism obviates issues of contingency, struggle and social agency 
by celebrating the inevitability of economic laws in which the ethical idea 
of intervening in the world gives way to the idea that we have no choice 
but to adapt both our hopes and our abilities to the new global 
market.573 
 
                                                 
571 ibid 21. 
572 See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962). & 
Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1980) 
573 Henry Giroux, “Neoliberalism and the Demise of Democracy: Resurecting Hope in Dark Times” Dissident 
Voice, August 7, 2004. http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Aug04/Giroux0807.htm (Accessed 10 Mar 2008). 
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Wendy Brown, in her essay ‗Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy‘, describes 
the interest that neo-liberalism has in exerting power through a social system.574 Neo-
liberals view neither the market nor rational economic behaviour by individuals as a 
natural phenomenon; instead the markets require moulding and directing to achieve a 
society that behaves in a neo-liberal way. Education-systems, political-party policies and 
legal-interpretations are all strategically manipulating social-behaviour to reinforce a neo-
liberal ideology. In education, for example, the teaching of multiculturalism is being 
transformed into the teaching of trans-nationalism with the aim of easing the transition 
to a perception of the state as a disempowered structure.575 Political-party policy is 
aimed at focusing public policy on the market.  
The state is now the manager of the market and not the facilitator of the public sphere 
where individuals give expression to their agency. In evidence of this trend, in the 
Australian Senate, foreign countries are referred to as our competitors rather than as 
other nations.576 In a recent Senate committee report regarding the introduction of an 
emissions trading scheme, the argument was put forward that Australia should only act 
after it has been determined whether or not an economic advantage would ensue from 
the introduction of the scheme.577  
The result of the neo-liberal ideological structuring of society is that the public sphere 
has been branded as an economic marketplace. 
 
                                                 
574 Wendy Brown, “Neoliberalism and the End if Liberal Democracy,” Theory and Event, Vol 7, iss 1, (2003). 
575 Katharyne Mitchell “Educating the National Citizen in Neoliberal Times: From the Multicultural Self to the 
Strategic Cosmopolitan” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 28, No. 4 (Dec., 2003): 392 
576 Select Committee on the Scrutiny of New Taxes., Interim report - the Carbon Tax : economic pain for no 
environmental gain, (Canberra, October 2011) 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/scrutinynewtaxes_ctte/carbontax/interim_report/c04.htm (accessed 
November 1, 2011). 
577 Ibid. 
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Far from flourishing when left alone, the economy must be directed, 
buttressed, and protected by law and policy as well as by the 
dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate competition, free 
trade, and rational economic action on the part of every member and 
institution of society.578 
 
On Brown‘s view, neo-liberalism represents an invasion of the public sphere. In the same 
way that post-totalitarian ideology required a transformation of human action in order to 
sustain its existence, neo-liberalism requires a transformation of action in order to 
sustain its existence. The importance of the public sphere, as the arena of a life in truth, 
is paramount for Havel; hence, the ―buttressing‖ and ―protections‖ required by 
neoliberalism are a threat to meaningful public action by diluting it. 
Havel‘s concern with the political manipulation of language to coerce behaviour from 
citizens, which I outlined in (Chapter 6,) is a very fitting counterpoint to neoliberal 
manipulations of the law and the economy to promote the market as the creator of social 
norms. For example, the lack of freedom in the market, instituted under the banner of 
freedom for the market, is something to be concerned about. The misuse of the word 
‗freedom‘ to describe an increase in authoritarian-like governmental policy, also under 
the banner of neoliberalism, is a phenomenon for concern - and Havel‘s liberalism, with 
its emphasis on state neutrality is a fitting treatment. The life in truth, which avoids the 
pitfalls of ideological coersion, is an authentic counterpoint to the neoliberal citizen who 
views their own life as an apolitical project to be maximised. In this connection we should 
recall Patočka‘s shaken, who in solidarity are ready to change society. We should also 
recall Havel‘s power of the powerless. Real political response can be found in these 
                                                 
578 Brown “Neolioberalism and the End of Democracy,” 4. 
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perspectives. Havel‘s liberal agonism can be used as an escape from being fed as fodder 
for a neoliberal ideological structure, which sells the image of the market as the seedbed 
of civic virtue to promote its own ideological ends. 
In his book Summer Meditations, written during Havel‘s second year as President and 
published just months before the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, Havel writes about the 
economic task of the Government. Havel wishes to introduce free market practices into 
the Czech economy; however he is being cautious about implementing a fullly neo-liberal 
system. His main concern is an overwhelming tidal wave of consumerism might 
ultimately alter the Czech identity irreparably. He concludes that allowing a massive 
construction boom to destroy the feel of Czech cities would be dangerous; so too would 
creating legislation to gradually remove the role of the state so that eventually the state 
would become little more than a collector of taxes to support infrastructure that cannot 
be supported privately. 579  Havel‘s liberal agonism is a moral counterpoint to the 
diminished role of the state in a neoliberal ideology. Havel writes, ―systems are there to 
serve people, not the other way around. This is what ideologies always forget. It is a fatal 
error. Communism has shown us, most graphically, where such forgetting leads.‖580 
Hence, for Havel, the market is to be viewed as an enabler of economic growth. 
Economic growth is not to come at the expense of a morally responsible direction for the 
nation. In his article ‗A Call for Sacrifice: The Co-responsibility of the West‘ Havel writes; 
The economic advances of Euro-American civilization, based as they are on 
advances in scientific and technical knowledge, have gradually altered man‘s 
very value systems. Respect for the metaphysical horizons of his being is, to 
                                                 
579 Havel, Summer Meditations,  65-79. 
580 Ibid 71 
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an increasing extent, pushed aside to make room for a new deity: the ideal of 
perpetual growth of production and consumption.581 
 
For Havel, to avoid this disaster, a global market should not be expected to assume 
the role of the nation state, and ideology should not inform political decisions. The state, 
according to Havel, is there to facilitate a responsible direction for the nation. That is, as 
well as overseeing the market, the state has a responsibility to ensure the existence of 
civil society – a public space in which citizens engage in authentic political discourse and 
initiate authentic political action. A liberal agonism is hence pragmatic, since the 
institutions that are set up by the state and are held accountable by the citizenry are non-
ideological in their foundation. Ideals such as perpetual growth should not be a 
consideration of political decision makers.  
Havel‘s problems with neoliberalism formed the basis of his long running dispute with 
his Prime Minister Václav Klaus, who was a committed neo-liberal. Havel, as I have 
mentioned, was not anti-market. Instead, he was anti-market-as-ideology. Pontusso 
claims that Havel saw the market as a possible seed of a morality in which ―everything 
belongs to someone – which means that someone is responsible for everything.‖582 
However, for Havel, the market only works if other social institutions are in a healthy 
state as well. Hence, for Havel, good government is not about creating the perfect 
conditions for the market to flourish, and (as a neoliberal would put it), allowing the rest 
to follow. Instead, for Havel, a market can only flourish when a healthy civil society 
exists.583 A further utilisation of Havel‘s writing, in the debate around the politics of 
                                                 
581 Havel “A Call for Sacrifice,” 2. 
582 Havel Summer Meditations ,62. 
583 Ibid. 
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neoliberalism, would be a breath of fresh air against a stale ideology which in the 
process of destroying civil society. 
One of the most dangerous side-effects of the neoliberal state is the increasing 
emphasis on security to protect our ability to freely exchange our goods.584 Many 
thinkers have written about the increase in authoritarian-like measures that states have 
adopted in the name of protecting our security and our freedom. Havel‘s liberal agonism 
has much to add to the discussion. Damian Cox, Michael Levine and Saul Newman 
suggest that a term to use when considering some of the decreases in liberty in the 
name of liberty might be ‗extra judicial,‘ in that the sovereign state acts outside the law 
to enforce ‗protection‘.585 James Bovard, in his book Attention Deficit Democracy, argues 
that the US government has used the war on terror as a means of increasing its control 
over citizens. He argues that the state exploits citizen‘s desire for security and through a 
politics of fear mongering has reduced civil liberties.586 Such a claim is also contained in 
the analysis of contemporary politics made by Giorgio Agamben who, argued against 
Schmitt‘s claim that a weakness of liberal democracy was its inability to provide a 
sovereign who could act outside the law.587 For Agamben, the existence of phenomena 
such as Guantanamo Bay, the Patriot Act, detention without trial, torture and extra 
judicial killing with drones, are evidence that the state today has created a permanent 
state of exception.588 For Agamben, modern liberal democracies have engaged in a 
                                                 
584 I agree with the argument put forward by Cox, Levine and Newman that the current political climate can be 
regarded as a politics attempting to immunize itself against the threat of terror (or another „outside‟ threat), and 
in so doing undermining its democrtacic foundation (p.15).  
585 Damian Cox, Michael Levine, & Saul Newman, Politics Most Unusual; Violence, Soceignty and 
Democracy in the ‘War on Terror,‟ (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmila, 2009), 68-70. 
586 James Bovard, Attention Deficit Democracy, (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 ). 
587 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
1988), 34. 
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 13-
15. 
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biopolitics of increasing their control over all of the features of citizens lives. Biopolitics is 
a concept Agamben has borrowed from Michel Foucault. Biopolitics is the exertion of 
power over all aspects of an individual‘s life in all of their spheres of interaction.  
Agamben also builds on Hannah Arendt‘s analysis of the status of refugees, arguing 
that there is a strong link between human rights and the nation state.589 For Agamben, 
and Arendt, endowing the refugee with rights represents a challenge to the sovereignty of 
the state. Agamben describes a photograph of a starving child in Rwanda that represents 
a clear split between ―natality and nationality‖590. Hence the experience of the refugee is 
an escape from the biopower the state exerts over citizens through its promise to endow 
the citizens with rights. 591 I think that it is precisely in such a situation that Havel‘s 
thought shows its contemporary utility. Against the backdrop of the state of exception, 
the liberal agonist political philosophy which rests on the power of the powerless, is a 
meaningful response. Havel‘s political philosophy, showing how an individual in a polis 
deceives themselves, is not only pertinent, but a unique contribution to the critique of the 
current political situation for those who are worried by the trend towards more 
authoritarian politics. Agamben, and others, are right to point out the disastrous politics 
of extra-legal law makers; however, I think that Havel needs to be considered in more 
detail as someone who can shed light on our own problems. His ideas emphasise dealing 
with the world as it appears to us, and as we live in it. This is in contrast with Agamben 
                                                                                                                                                        
588 In the The State of Exception, Agamben writes that the Patriot Act, in allowing the attorney general to place 
into custody “any alien suspected of activities that endangered the “national security if the United States”” has 
created a new political reality which “radically erases any legal status of the individual” (3) This has lead, in 
Agamben‟s eyes to the non-legal status of individuals held prisoner in Guantanamo Bay who are denied the 
basic rights set out in the Geneva Convention on the rights of prisoners of war (3-4). 
See Georgio Agamben, The State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005). 
589 Georgio Agamben, Homer Sacer, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 
131. 
590 Ibid 131-132. 
591 Ibid. 
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who  argues that the world should be radically transformed through the experience of the 
refugee or some other individual abandoned by the state, because essentially, all states 
are nihilistic in their juridical appropriation of ethics.592 
 I am not convinced by Agamben‘s conclusions. There is something deeply problematic 
about valorising the plight of a refugee in Rwanda, and this is precisely Havel‘s liberal 
agonism is pertinent. Havel‘s liberal agonist state encourages the use of art and 
aesthetics to create the impetus to challenge the immoral use of ‗biopower‘ or some 
other authoritarian wielding of power. Whereas Agamben believes that the space of 
politics has been lost forever through a contamination of the law, Havel‘s liberal agonism 
is less pessimistic, arguing that politics can not only be recovered, but reinvigorated. 
The world today is far from perfect. I am concerned about the loss of political action 
and the attack on liberal values that is common in media discourse. Now, as it was in late 
socialist Czechoslovakia, it is timely and appropriate to hear the voice of a thinker who 
argues clearly for an authentic approach to action. Who argues for a recognition of the 
linked-ness of our actions and hence our mutual responsibility for ourselves, towards 
each other and towards the world. To hear the voice of a thinker who argues that all is not 
lost and that we do not find ourselves on a downwards spiral to nihilism. 
Havel‘s legacy, I have contended throughout this thesis, is not limited to his role as 
dissident in the cold war. Havel offers a political philosophy which is a unique brand of 
liberalism that is philosophically rich and worthy of future study. 
  
                                                 
592 The meaning of „Homer Sacer‟ comes from Roman law and designates a person who can be killed but not 
sacrificed. Someone who is outside of the law‟s domain. For Agamben, there is the possibility of a radical 
transformation of the world through the idea of Homer Sacer, hence his analysis of the experience of the refugee 
and the concentration camp. 
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